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ABSTRACT 
Th~ thesis is ~n attempt to offer a reconsideration of Lenin°s 
book The State and Revolutiono The. argument h that commentators 
m&tMre ~heory of politicsg and to the body of ideas that s~bsequently 
becam2 Leninis~ Xt further argues that an understanding of the 
present Soviet ~egime0 and others of a similar naturep is aided by a 
realisation that the themes of The State and Revolution are present 
in the institutional arrangements of those societieso 
The Introduction takes as a starting point recent events in 
Poland0 and suggests that an understanding of those events may be 
gained by an investigation of the discourse on political forms that 
Marxism offerso 
Chapter One presents the origins of the textv its·theses in 
summary fo~ and the reception given to the text by subsequent 
commentatorso These are divided into those taking a 0 historical 0 
and those takbng a 0-·poU.tica.l 0 approacho Suggestions are made of 
the inadequacy of both approachesg reasons for such inadequacies 
are proposed0 and an attempt is made to offer an alternative approach 
based upon hermene~U.cs 0 in particular Gadamer0 s concept of 0effec Uve~ 
history0 o 
Chapter ~ examines the way Lenin conceptualised the problems 
of state and politics in post~revolutionary societyp and the measures 
he proposed for the soluti~n of these problemso It is argued that 
the libertarian arrang~nts suggested in the text in fact provide a 
cultural and institutional foundation for an authoritarian stateo 
Ch~pter Three ~ttempts to inyestigate fu&ther the assumptions on 
the phenomena of bureaucracy and democracy that underlie the texto 
lts debilitating effect on SMbsequent theorists of the contemporary 
state is suggest~d 0 ~nd an interpretation of Weber0 s thoughts on the 
iss~es is provided as a means of discovering the weakness of such 
theories a 
Chapter Four &ttempts to examine more closely the elements of 
Lenin°s thought and culture that made the concepts of The State and 
Revolution both possible and necessaryo This leads to an attempt 
to elaborate the theory of political motivation that is ~n unspoken 
assumption in Lenin°s writingsp and criticises that theory as 
reducing politics to an ontological impossibilityo It is suggested 
that this is a necessary assumption for Lenin°s commune~state to 
famctiono 
Chapter Five offers an interpretation of Sartre0 s °Critique of 
Dialectical Reason° in order to establish the parado~ical absurdity 
and:inevitability of Lenin°s thesiso Sartre0 s sociology of 
,·· 
revolut_ion is emphasised for its understanding of the relationship 
be~een politics and time 0 and Lenin°s text is then finally assessed 
as an attempt to provide the constitutional arrangements for a society 
outside of timeo 
~ 1= 
INTRODUCTION 
The process that began in Poland in August 1980 and was brought 
to a halt by th~ military takeove~ of Decembe~ 1981 contained many 
~emarkable f~atu~eso One of thes~ ~as th~ strategy adopted by the 
leadership of the Solidarity movementD ~hich displayed a ~emarkable 
confidence and agYessiveness in the pursuance of its d~mands 0 while 
r~fusing to translate this into a 0 political0 programme o~ movemento 
Quite the ~eve~se in fact 0 with Solidarity seeming d~termined to 
resist any definition by th~ state of its activities that woMld 
~ende~ them 0 political0 o 
Such a stance might be open to at least two types of criticism0 
both suggesting a p~oblem of 0 immaturity0 or 0 irresponsibility0 o 
from one standpoint it may be argued that Solidarity0 s ~osition 
exacerbat~d the social and economic crisis at a time when the 
~nion°s right to exist had already been ~stablished0 and a policy of 
militant activity was uo longer relevant or usefulo This stance 
can be seen as a causal factor in-the military initiativep and 
indeed 0 might give some degree of legiU.macy to. \that .mctiono . __ . "-·-
Once the basic right to exist had beel!l won0 it woull.d--seem that 
historical experience and practical·l~gic should have dictated_a new 
attitudeo That is 0 having established an organisation that could. 
clafm de facto loyalty and support among a huge sector of the 
population» it was time to move from being an organisation of dissent 
and protest advancing the interests of a specific social groupo It 
~as necessary for Solidarity to see itself as a partner i~ the power 
structure and make its own contribution to solving the social crisis 
that gripped the countryo At very leastp some kind of 0 social 
con~ract0 was implied whereby .mn equill.ibriMm could be established 
between the union and the Partyo 
be provided ~ith the necessary assurances that would all~ the 
process of reform to continue and consolidateo Thus the quality of 
magnanimity was unfortunately missing from So!id~~ity 0 s st~~tegyo 
Thusv despite ~alesa 0 s assertions to the effee~ thetg 
01
o o o Solidarity has declared its readi'd'iless to co=operate 
in implementing any rational programme aimed et overcoming 
the crisis and reforming the existing st~ctyr~s of the 
social and economic life of our counttyooo 00 Ill!.) 
it was clear that the history of the absorption of worker0 s 
representativesby the apparatus after previous crisQs showed the 
danger of a whole=hearted adoption of such a courseo 
But if magnanimity was lacking to effect the ~ecessary com? 
promise» so also was its oppositeo For the second criticism that 
is possible is that Solidarity failed to translate its awesome 
social power into a coherent and determined struggle for political 
powero They had deprived the Party of the power to make decisions 
over vast areas of social and economic life,_ but they naively refMsed 
to openly challenge the power structure0 and ~us complete their-victoryo 
From the standpoint of both criticisms0 what is deemed to be 
lacking is politicso In the first -case, politics sophisticated 
enough to establish a compromise; in the second case~> politics ~-~-
tough enough to make a bid for the control of the Stateo As sucb0 
whatever the risks involved in either option (absorption in the 
first casep defeat in the second)v the risk involved in opting for 
neither loomed even largero Some force would have to step in and 
fulfil the responsibilities that Solidarrity so studiously refused 0 
and thus arrived the rule of the Armyo 
It is possiblep therefore0 to see the career of Solidarity in 







itself being attributable to the lack of mati!JzHy fx-om which Sllllch a 
~ew movement ~ill suffero But Bauman h~s SMggested that such ~ 
v!e't! would quite fail to grasp the originalU:.y !!;)f So:Udarity0's 
He points out that the refMsal to become ~~~g~cl 1~ poli~ics ~as 
deliberatep (l) and involved vezy careful and conscious definition 
of aims on the part of the leadersbipo To the claims of both 
defenders and opponents of the regime that the union°s activities 
were by their very nature politicalv the union offered a ~ifferent 
definition of politicso ·They were advancing a concept of politics 
that was not about power0 but about representationo :U: rejected 
the assumptio~ that the articulation of specif1c interests by a 
. . 
particular social group eutomatic.mlly implied a cl£~ for control 
of the Stateo This of course is distinctly different to the . 
official culture of politics within the !astern party reg~es0 
which are built upon the assumption that there is no distinction 
beteeen State and societyo Such a distinction is the salient 
I 
feature of liberal democzacies 0 ~erei~-politics is_s~en.as the 
discourse of the necess~ry i~terplay be~ee~ the i~terests and 
ideologies articulated !~ civil society ~nd their representation 
in the administrative processes th2t are al!ocat~d to ~he Stateo · 
The concept of politics as identical ~ith the issue of the 
possessio~ of State powex- must of course abolish ~clitics as 
activity and rephlce it wU:ln politics as appax-atuso 
A culture of politics as apparatus might seem to dictate an 
inevitable stra~egy for any who criticiSe the existing reg~eg a 
direct challenge to the totality of ~isting powero But 
Solidarity rejected this imperat!veo ~at apparently they instead 
di~ was to attempt to ~ncouple certain areas of civil society from 
th~ machi~ery of State powero 
negotiation that did not necessarily ~pimge upon0 ~r eon~radict0 the 
the withdra~al from politics was in another se~e a ~ec1~tion of 
politicso Xt was a reclamation of aooncept of po1i~!cs ~~dolent o~ 
the mainstr~am of European political theory0 that based Mpon the 
separation be~een State and civil soc!etyo 
in fact argued that the Government and Party shoul~ ~itbdra~ from 
certain areas of social life0 while retaining control ov®r the A~0 
policep and central administrationo 
necessarily and automatically be filled by Solidarity members 0 but by 
the members of the particMlar social group involved o the professio~ 0 
the media0 the arts a and in the case of the trade u~ions 0 by ~he 
members of the working classo Similarly0 the uithdr&ual was 
reinforced from SoUdarity0-s side by the ruling uhiclb. forbade union 
officials to hold office in the State or municipal ~ebtmeryo(J) 
distinction between State and civil societyg 
00The campaigu of depoliticizat!on waged by the Pol!sh 
workers can be interpreted as an ~ttempt to regain the lost 
autonomy for civil soeietyo aa(4) 
This is the meaning of the emphasis upon autonomy for union 
activitieso The unionists were not by this implying an 
alterative form of State pawero Their 0 autonomy0 did not 
necessarily possess implications of the Councilotype State fo~ 
the reconstruction of the State along lines more in keeping with 
radical and putatively 0Socialist0 formso Whet was involved 
instead was the rejection of a singleQcelled political stTUctur~ 
and the evol~tion of a fsx more highly diversifie~ oYganis~ ln 
other ~ords 0 an organism that ~ould be abl~ to co~~ ~ith the 
complex socisl problems and the multiform human aspiratio~s that 
~re ~he co~comitant of a modernised Soc!~tyo 
prophetically made this crucial ~~stinctio~ be~een possible paths 
to reform: 
0~ile the goal of traditional Ma~ist~ ooo remains 
the negative Utopia of the politicizati.on of 'the wholle 
of society~ the immense bMlk of Easte~ ~uropean dissidents 
seeks the creation or recK'eatiori of civil societyo 00 
The nature of what needs to be created in such societies is 
summed up in their indictment ofg 
00 ooo the traditional indifferll!nce or »nostHity of 
classical Marxist theory (based on the identification of 
capitalism and civil society) to the institutions that civil 
society in its capitalist form already possessesg market0 
parli~entarism0 negative rights attached to possession and 
privaeyP general and formal law-0 ftreedom Qf speech and press 0 
political pluralis~ and~ above all 0 those institutions of 
smaU.,seale public participation which are to mediate between 
the individual- -and the representatives of !Political power., aa (6) _ 
fxom politics 0 but perhaps only from politics as it is officially 
defined by the State cultu~eo 
withdrawal was bound to have political .effects0 of major di~ensionso 
The greatest effect would be the overthrow of the discourse that 
legittmated the party regime., Conversely0 had Solidarity itself 
adopted a strategy of power~ it would itself have not been immune 
to problems of legitimacyo The competing c~atms that both the 
Party and the union might advance to such legitimate possession of 
power might ~ell both lack convincing ~uthorityo 
But the existence of groups within society that manage to 
fxom the state appat"atus must xesunltt in the gen<ex-.aU(l)llll of IHl fbld of 
politics ~herein such gxoups and interests cp~~a~eo This is why 
be x-eformed or xeconstruct~~ = bwt also ~ d!sco~rseo 
defines Solidarity0 s xefusal to engage in politics ~s a r~fMsal ~o 
0
\ o o the rules of the political gmne0 the gramme.~ of 
political language 0 are so constructe~ tha~ they auntomatic&lly(J) 
reproduce and perpetrate the party0 s dominationo o o 00 
legitimates only one conce~t of politicso 1~ is a concept of 
politics that must embax-x-ass and confuse the mew paxticipantsp 
because ~ithin it their ~ very existence is illegittmateo 
But to establish domains outside the reign of the paTty is to 
subvext the official dliscouxseby rendering its ~ssumptio!lS v~cuollls 
and redundan to The creation of the ~lements of civil society im 
its o~ ~ay redefines the proper role an~ powers.~f the state0 in 
,_ 
the sense of reducing these to the representative and administrati~® 
functions that it possesses in democratic theory and pr~~ticeo 
The argument that X will seek to develop conce~ the origins 
and nature of the discour$s of politics that obtains in countries 
like Polando This discourse originates in Marxismp but in some 
ways politics is an unfortu~ate domain to inves~igate from the 
A study of his WYitings ~ill find much 
analytical discussion of the natuxe of politics ~t specific moments 
of modern historyo But when Althusser points @utg 
=7= 
00The readex 1:;;7HlL knoB' lhOB' Voll.t!.!me 'il'hx-~~ <emYso 
Utll~8 Classes a forty lines 0 ~hen sill.~em.ce 0 °0 
~xposi~ie~ of a theory of this doma!np andp most notably ~f &11 0 B'~ 
a'K'® left B:H.ho'lllt tB substantive discussion of Man:0 s conc<aptuaHsatioM 
cf th~ institutions of a~ emancipated societyo 
which ~.ms perhaps necessarily construed as tlne exclusive focus of the 
struggle for emanc!~ationo 
inevitable that this should be a neglect~d area of discussion0 that 
questions of 0 state and gove~nt0 should be overwhelmed by this 
prior 0obses$ion°( 9)o The one state institution to which M.mrx d!d 
declare allegiance ~as the Paris Commune of 1871 and it is the image 
and the imagination of the Marxist trad!tiono ·-Even here0 Arendt snd 
~eiler have entered a reservation regarding Marx0 s commitment to this-
......_ 
fo~D argu~ng that Marx envisaged for the Commune a role only as: 
00 temporary org2m in tile po!iU.cal 
struggle to cllldvance the revolna tion0 °0 ( ll.O) 
that is0 ~ as the permanent organisational form for the ~olitics 
of the future societyo 
Neverthelessp Engels o reporting to ~ebel the conclusions to 
which h~ end Marx had come in the light of the Commun@ seems 
cmtegod.cal: 
QoThe whole talk about the sta\i:~ should lt>~e droppe~v 
especi~lly since the commune 0 ~h!ch ~as ~o longer 0 
stat~ in the proper sense of the Bord ooo the stat~ is 
o~ly a transitional institution Bhich is ~s~d !~ the 
struggle~ in the revolution0 to hold doBn one 0 s 
adversaries by force ooo as soon as it becomes possible 
~o speak of fTeedom the stat~ as such c~ases t@ existo 
~~ ~owld therefor~ propos~ to replac@ stat~ ~ve~hez® 
by Gemeinwesen0 a good o!d GeTm&n word Nh!ch can ve~ (ll) 
~ell convey the meaning cl the French 'i:Yord communeo 00 
These comments on the Gotha Programme ol the Ge~n Soeialo 
Democratic ~arty are significant not only for their insistence on 
the idea of the communeo 
established between freedom and the statev and here the importance 
of the Commune to· concepts of the socialist order is clearly more 
central than Arendt has allowedo What is involved 0 of course; is 
This refusal to all~ the state ~ny more 
complex artic~lation and any broader ~ole is clearly a restrictive 
theoretical step0 particularly in the light of the rich tradition of 
R>Olitical phU.osophy0 at very least :Silllce Hobbes 9 that has invi!j;lUgated 
the more realistic problem of the ambig~ity_and ~elicacy of the 
relationship between ~he st~te and freedo~ 
For in the fol_l0'!;1ing chapters I .s!laU seek to define the lOAture 
of the contemporary political formS and discourses of the 0Marxist0 
states through an imrestigatio!!ll of that concept of ~e comnnn~e that -
evoked Marx0 s approvalo Xn an echo of Engels 0 argument0 the us~al 
definition of the r~lation between these two entities a the 0 reallya 
existing socialism0 and the 0 communeastate0 o is one of contradictiono 
The two appear to represent the antipodean forms that state 
institutions might takeo Xn contrast to this argument0 however0 X 
shall be trying to suggest an inescapablev and prob~bly causalv link 
between the twoo 
But the subject of my ~rgument w!ll be 'Lenin0 ~ot Ma~o Such 
~ substituion might ordinarily evoke ~ protest fxom those who consider 
that Leninism is but one of many possible versions of Marxismp and in 
itself not the most legit~teo 
rliscussing such &n argumeot is perhaps we&ker than it might otheTWise 
beo Wo~ Marx ~ndowed posterity with no other theory of the ~olitics 
and government of socialist society than the commune~state~ and 
Leni~ incorporated into his politics the theory of the common~state 
as elaborated by Marx0 without add!t!o~ and ~ithout omissionso 
Here0 at least0 there seems to be a proces$ 0 not of revision or 
development0 but of straightforward inheritaneeo 
References to Introduction 
(1) Speech at loLoOo Conference in Geneva0 5th June 19810 printed 
in Do MacShane Solidarityg Poland 0 s Independent Trade Unionn 
198la p-9161- (Nottingham)o 
(2) Zo Bauman On the Maturation of Socblism :bt-Telos 47 Spring 198ll.0 
po5lo 
(4) Bauman opoeito Po52o 
(5) Ao Arato & Mo Vajda The Limits o'f- the l!.eninist- Opposition in 
New German Critique 190 Winter !9800 pol67o 
(7) Bau\1'18n OPo eito Po 5lo 
(8) Lo Althusser Reading Capital London 19700 pol93o 
(9) Ho Arendt On Revolution London 19630 Po258o 
(10) Ibido po257o Anweiler concurs with Arendt i~ OoAmweiler 
The Sowietso New York0 19740 Pol5o 
(11) fo Engels Letter to Ao Bebel March 1875 in M2rx & Eng~!s 
Selected blorks Mosccre l968p Po 339o 
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CHAJPTER l1.. 
LENIN°S STATE AND REVOLUTIONg ~ROBLEMS 
OF A TEXT AND ITS DISCOURSE 
Th~ collected works of Lenin fill some forty~five volumeso(l) 
Yet0 for the ~~rpose of understanding Le~!n and his impact ~pon 
the world we inhabit9 the bulk of it is redundanto It ~as relevane~ 
only for specialist academics 0 traditionalist revolutionaries 9 and 
fastidious ideologueso For the rest of mankind 0 the importance of 
Lenin is contained in a handful of tractso 
that have functioned as definitive elements of contemporary political 
culture0 the active elements that have shaped institutions 9 parties 9 
states 9 and peopleso 00Bhat Is To Be Done00 (ll.9o·:n a'iCgl\Jied \the need 
for a revolutionary pa~ty to combat the consciousness of the peopl® 
and supply them with scientific and revoltlltionary i>oliticso 000sle 
Step Fo-nrard 9 Two Steps Back01 {1903) propotn:Ad~d0 if only by example0 
the necessary form of this party ~ tight0 professi@nal0 disciplined0 
structured by democratic centralismo 
a specific characteristion and perspective on contemporary world 
socie_ty and eco_nomy 9 and m:-ote a the..oretical conclusion to-the 
capitalist epocho 00State and Revolution°0 (1917) gav~ a prescription 
of what a real socialist revolution woull.d have to achieve0 and a 
model of the institutions it would construc~o Finally11 °0LeftoY:1ing 
Communism00 ( 1920) articulated the approach necessary for the capture 
of power through the rest of the capitalist world 11 in a ~olitical 
handbook that established revolution as the highest ~rinciple 9 and 
flexibility as the only strategyo 
But within this group of textsp The State and !~volution stands 
aparto The unity of the other texts lies in that ther &~~ practical 
poli~ic&l proble~ 
In 1903~> the proposals of 
the need to provide a ch&racterisation of the Wirst Worl~ Uar tha~ 
~ould co~demn the pro~~ar positions of the European Soc!~l Democratic 
Xn l920v it ~as the immaturity·. andcnaivety of the new 
Europea1m Communist Parties that dictated \the lih«m h~ncfbook of 
revol~tionary tacticso All the texts are res@lutely practicaRo 
They display an overriding concern for the mechanics of powerv of 
an instinctive realis~ They assault &ny thou,ht that hagbo\!lrs a 
whiff of liberalism0 utopianis~ impractic~litYv abstract morality~> 
or ethical motivationso 
Thex-e is no difficulty in placing \the origin ox- import of 
t.heste texts o Nc so with The State and Revolutio~ 
seev it has proven di_fficullt to explain-pK"ecisely 'Why Leniil chose 
the moment of temporary luU in the storms -of 1917 to write the 
~· .... 
book in his enforced Finland exileo And it i3 even more difficult 
to discover why he chose to ~ropound the argument it containedo 
~hat possible connection these thoughts bore ~ith what subsequently 
occurred under his leadership is the most obscure question of allo 
But these problems do not confer upon the text the status of 
an aberration0 standing at odds with the rest of the opuso In 
fact the effect of the text is the re~erseo The State and Revolution 
provides Lenin°s legacy with a dimension that would othe~ise be 
missing0 and it is arguable that such an absence eoul~ ~ebilitate the 
effect!weness of the artefact that is Lenin and Leni~is~ tiithout 
!fc0 the whole canon. of lhis m:iHngs would t!:Bikce O&l &1!1 e!i!.Urely 
different aspecto The existce~ce of The State and Revol~~ion 
suggesiSS that the rest of the corpus 0 on the faere of U. pr.mctical 
WTitings with an instrumental i~tent0 axe b~il~ ~p@n ~ fMndament~lly 
emanc!patory intentv and that the subseque~t lhi3to~ of thee RMss!~n 
state ~ncler Stalin and his heirs can reasonably be imterpxetce~ as ~ 
violatiQlll of both the letter and spirit of tenin°s politiC$ 0 
Openly Qr implicitlyD State and Revolution has lha~ & long ~~reex 
as X.enin.0 s credentials as a revolutionary humanist0 aUy!ng lll!m ~ith 
those who reject the pragmatism and brutality of subsceq~ent Soviet 
historyo 
authoritarianismp proletarian creativity0 self~emancipation0 all 
resound through the writingo So at very lea$t The State and 
~vclution may be a baitp which can. lead to a consequent acceptance 
of all the less attractive elements of practic&l Len.in!s~P and a 
hook0 preventing cr delaying the rejectiol!ll of the ~bol(g Leninist 
ideology by those repelled _by the ideology !n aeticno At most0 it 
lies at the very core of -the effectiveness of K.eriinism as & mobilisixng _ 
ideology of political_movementso A political ideology based only ~pon­
a ~h~cxy of vulgar r~alpoUtik (t!le~.!e_s~ of X._enin° s 'f:n'~ti_n&s)-~~nd ~ 
reality of disappoi~ted hopes ~nd bloody conf~sions (the histo~ of 
the Soviet Stste) would be a ~e~k one indeedo The State and Revolution 
inserts into this unconvincing ensemble B~ll the humanist elements 
that ar(l!) m :issingg the deep aspirations for a truly free lilociety 
based upon tolerancep equalityp and fraternityo An effective .and 
practical politics which can guarantee the birth of Utopia is 
difficult to resisto 
At the time he ~ndertook his first researches on the theoretical 
probl~ of the State0 Lenin ~as liwing in ~ile in Zuricho These 
J9X"epax-ations 'WeJCe modest 0 and . amounted tov ·in their !Published form0 
about one hundred pages of extracts from Ma~ and Engels accompanied 
by Lenin°s marginal noteso( 2) The material was written in January 
and February of 1917 and was left foz safekeeping in Stockholm when 
he returned to Russia in Aprilo 
instructed Kamenev to arrange thei1r publication if he did not survive 
the eontemporary eventso After the 0July ~ys 0 D Lenin went into 
hiding and asked fov: the notebook to be brought to himv where he 
used parts 11 but not all~ of it in the writing of The State and 
Revolutiono 
The opportunity to complete the work on the State arose in the 
wake of the 0Ju1y Days 0 0 What amounted to a popular v:ising began 
on Jrd July 19171) at the moment when the Government bad ordeJCed-a 
large military offensiveo The demonstrations lasted four days and 
developed into a serious threat to the Governmento Although the 
Bolsheviks considered that the moment was far too premature to 
attempt to supplant the Provisional Government11 the Government coull.d · 
not but'~see it as am attempt on their-part to f11.n:ther destabiU.si!!_the 
situationo Loyal tr~ops ~ere drafted into the capital11 Pravda w&s 
~uppressed 11 and orders were issued ~!>r the arrest of-the three ehi!af-
Bolshevik !eaderso Kamenev was taken and Lenin and Zinoviev went 
into hiding and escaped to Finlando 
Although he maintained int~te contact with developments in 
Petrogradp Lenin°s return to the city was delayed until the 9th 
Octobero It was on the following day that the Bolshevik Central 
Committee was persuaded by Lenin°s urgent insistence to dec!de to 
prepare for armed insurrectiono A political burl!!au was appointed 
to carry out this decision11 although the actual task of organising 
the action fell to the Military=Revolutionary Committee of the 
Petrograu Sovieto This body predated the decision of lOth October0 
beifig ~ Menshevik initiative ~!th so!ely defensive responsibilitteso 
After the lOth October decision~ the Bolsheviks converted it to their 
own purposesp composed as it was exclusively of Bolsheviks with one 
Left SRo This was the instrument that organised ~e seizure of 
power later in the montho 
tb.;At the completion of the work by the addition of a seventh chapter 
on °The Experience of the Russian Revolutions 1905 and !917°· was 
interrupted by these events and commented thatg 
09 it is more pleasant alllld useful to go through th~ « J) 
experience of revolution than to write about ito 00 
In the Collected ~orksp the text is noted ~s being wr!t~en in 
Augus toSeptember 1917 P although not published .. 1\lntil 19180 This 
I 
does not signify that the ideas contained in it were not made public 
until after the October Revolutiono It appears that the actM~l 
writing of The State and Revol111tion was in itself little more than Sl 
formalityp the central themes had already been articulated in various 
public writings throughout the yearo In the interval between the 
February revolution and his return to Russis Lenin WYote his -oLe~ters 
from Afar0 0 one of ~hich contained the central idea of the need foT a 
postorevolutionary state11 but 2 °0State of a different type00 o The 
Commune is advanced as exemplaro He returned to the theme in-his 
article on °The Dual Power0 published in Pravda on 9th Aprilp six 
days after his return from exile9 and the Commune is further referred 
to in the 0 Letters on Ta~tics 0 11 written between 8th and 13th April9 
and discussed in some detail in the pamphle~ 0 Tbe Tasks of· the 
Proletariat in Our Revolution° 0 completed on lOth April 11 although 
not published until Septembero Lenin°s Report to the Petrograd 
City Conference of the RSDLP(B) on 14th April presented the concept 
~n some clarity to his comradeso 
not~ ili'l his public arnd p~ivatce -c-nd.UXllgS arnel his proposretrll 0 lRevision 
of th~ farty Programme0 which was ~ublish~d in JuXlle 19170 makces the 
innovations officialo (-4) 
00 ooo RSDL~ make its primary and immediat~ t~sk to overthrow 
the Tsarist autocracy and set up in its place .a deuwcx-~Uc 
bl . 01 repu :lCo o o 
!n favour of one that statedg 
01The pax-t.y of the proletariat camnot "K"em.ain content ~ith 
~ bourgeois parliamentary democratic X"epublie ooo Th~ 
paTty H.g'hU for a mox-e democratic wcrkex-s and ~easants '&'~J?Il.l'blieo 00 
Th~ proposals then proceed to introduce the concepts oi 
recallable delegates and el®etive officials9 and envisages the 
emergence of the Soviet form as the structure of the SU.ttceg 
00 aoo parliamentary 'K'epresentaUve iusti!.ie11lltions ~ill.ll. 
be gradually Teplaced by Soviets of pecp1e0 s 'K'epresent~tMn!!!l 
(from various classes and professions 9 ©'&' f'K'om va~x.-!ous (S) 
localities) faanetioning as both legislative Sind ·exeet!!U:vl2 bodi~s0 °0 
lt is clear0 therefore0 that the ideas in The State and Revolution 
have already been propounded by Len~n some time before be had the 
""~ - -· - --·-
opportunity to codify them in a 0 theoretical 0 ~orko l t shoulcll also 
not be forgotten that to attribute to him sole authorship @f the 
ideas would be mistakeno lt seems to have been Bukha~in°s ~®rlier 
work that first brought the classical Marxian concept of the State 
to Lenin°s attentionp although he had until F12bruary !~17 displayed 
a sharp hostility towards the 0 semioanarchism0 of Bukharin°s call 
for the 0 revolutionary destruction° of the bo'lllrgeob stateo(~) 
At a diff12rent lev12l 0 it is likely that sw~~ libertarian ideas had 
already been given currency by the political activity of anarchist 
~16= 
and popu1!$~ tr~nds ~ithin the r~volutiona~ry movement0 and it ~s 
quite probable that experiences sine~ Februa~ had given ~!se ~o 
id~asp albeit imprecisev with simUat' H'be1rtarian and utopian 
yearnings amongst pa.rts of Une ~op!:.llh.'d.on itstelfa Bh&t L!enll.¥!! d!a 
~as to take the ideas ou& of the realm of rom&nt!c ~@l!~ies ~nd 
emoUve speculation and fuse them ~ith a p!rS~ctieal and s<eembngly 
successful politicsa They were transformedv as a x-esu1~0 from 
being the ephemera of social dislocation into the line@g~s of the 
state that ~as born later in the yearo 
The Argument and its Significance 
The theses of the text can9 ~ithout doing violence to the 
argument0 be stated in summary forma 
(a) all states are an instrument for the oppr~ssion of one 
class~> or set of classes 0 by anotheio TIIbey are0 in the last 
reso~t11 and in their most fund.a~ ental aspectv bodies of armed mena 
(b) the state form constructed under the capitalist mode of 
producUon is appropriate for only that social systemo -!FoE" 
a new class pow~r0 it is ~herefore Decessary that the old 
state machine be aestroyed and a new one construct~~o 
(c) This new state regime is temed the 0Dict-atorship of-:tlle 
Proletad.at0 o 
(d) The dictatorship of the proletariat wiU11 howeverp involve 
less need for a state machine than any previous regimeo This 
is because (i) the ruling class will for ~he first time be the 
majority class in the population0 and (ii) the administrative 
tasks of the state have been innnensely simplified by the 
development of the forms ~nd forces of production unde~ cap!talismo 
(~) Nevertheless 0 a state of some form ~ill be needed to 
(i) suppress ~he remnants of the old ruling classesp and 
(ii) regulate the distribution of ~conomic resources and 
Tewards during the transitional period leading to a socialist 
economyo 
(f) This ne~ state will not Tecognise· the ~ivision of tasks 
established by capitalist regimeso 
judicial functions will be removedo 
(g) The state will therefore not be of a parliamentary type 11 
but of a soviet or council typeo The stTMcture of parliaments 
establishes false barriers betwee~ the rulers and the ~ledg 
the political system must become delegatory rather than 
representativeo Parliaments also elevate the principle of 
separation of powers 0 thereby reducing or eliminating the 
possibility of democratic control over the functions of the 
stateo All such functions will be conferred on a single 
institut!ono 
(h) The tasks of: ~running the state can be fulfilled by all and 
any member of societyo To ensure-maximum participation in 
these tasksp and remove the possibility of the development··of 
a bureaucratic elite11 the holding of office ~ill be governed 
by the principles of rotation of office~ instant recall for . 
Violation Of mandateD and payment Of average SalarieSo 
(i) This state willp from its very inception9 be set on a 
course of withering awayp as the conflicts it exists to 
resolve are eliminated in the course of development of the 
socialist economyo 
On initial considerationp it is difficult to claim much 
significance for the worko Historians of Lenin°s l\.ifa9 and 
thought 0 of the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik regime0 
of political philosophies and practices 0 tend to ~evote Aittle 
space to The State and Revolutiono The piece appears to offe~ 
little opportunity for comment or discussiono !t is usually 
merely necessary to summa~ise it0 and the val~e of any f~~the~ 
examinatio~ is not easy to establisho 
~nd confessedly derivative argumento !t p~esen~ rno' problems of 
interpretation: the~e cmre no ambiguities in the text0 no 
opportunities for conflicting readingso ln that sense0 it is not 
And0 in contrast to 
those ~o examples 0 it does not require 0 translation° for a modern 
audienceg despite the frequent polemical references to unfamiliar 
contemporary figures 9 its concepts are not strange to a modern 
readership~ its arguments are anything but subtle0 and its message 
is transparento As political philosophy9 it.does no more than 
retail the themes of a much older and richer political traditiono 
EoHo Carr has pointed out its roots in Moor~0 Rousseaup Godwin0 
the early socialists 9 as well as Marx and Engelso( 7) 
I 
But if a discussion of the work as political philosophy 
Seems unrewa.rdingp there is eerhaps --~Ven less satisfaction to be 
derived from studying it as a historical objecto Its status .in 
tbe history of the time is-unambiguous; it is marginalo lt is 
not an official document0 a government decreep a manifesto or a 
party programmeo It was a subterraneanp not a public documento 
By the time it was published real events in the life of the n~ 
regime had rendered it little more than a historical curiosityo 
Such is the discrepancy between the argument of the text and the 
manner in which the Bolshevik regime actually developed that it 
appears to offer no access to understanding what happenedo Here 
CaliK' articulates the most popull.ar srgumentg he details the 
of the EuTopean ~orki~ class to make theili ~evo!Mtio~s ~h!ch ~ould 
yesetne the ne~ stateD the siege laid by a 00capitaHs&: wodd Mnit~QJ 
And sog 
00 Lenin never openly ondmitted these disapJ?ointmentsD OX' 
perhaps even admitted them to himselfo But they ~e~~ 
res~onsible for the onpparent contradictions be~een the 
theory of The State and Revolution oand the pr.act!ce of the 
first year Of theo regimeo DU on 
Despite the central role ~hich the ability to quote appropK'iate 
texts from Lenin· played iK! the imM!1r~pa1rty disputes of the wenties0 
even here !he State and Revolution appears to be absente None of 
the major oppositions seem to honve deemed the work signiH.cant 
enough = ~r perhaps acceptable enough = to include it in theiT verbal 
armoury 'for combat·. ing Stalin° s appromeho ( 9) _, ~As hist«llgy0 ~en0 the. 
work seems to be of p~rely archeological interesto 
Yet these considerations perhaps mistake ·the nat~re of the 
o'bjecto The fact is that the significanc~ of-the-text b deriv~d 
from i~s contemporary politic~l an~ soci®! role0 not from historical 
or philophical considerationso The significance of Marxis~ 
Leninism is as one of the most effective mo'biU.sing ideologies and 
legitimating belief~systems in the history of part!es 0 states 0 and 
societieso 
Xt is an ideology widely subscribed to som~ sixty ye.ars after 
the death of its junior author0 in strikingly diwers~ locales and 
sit~ations around the globe0 albeit oft~n to SUJ?port ide~$ &~d aetions 
---~-.-------_,...._..___:..._ _____________ '-"o- ~-- .; • 
huge distance between the original i<lle.ms .!llncll their coxiltemporBlry 
versions does not undermine the relevance of discussion of ~hose 
Such a connection would on~y be illegitimate if ~e 
presumecll a rationality of discourse in histor!c2l action ~hat 
cannot seriously be postulated this late in the ~entieth centu~o 
by the lights of the progenitors they nevertheless testify ~c ~hat 
elements @f the initial problematic have been ° foun.d relevant0 by 
Andv of coursep the particular ideas under discl!lssion 
lay more claim than most to the appeal to the judgement of the court 
of history .. 
Even if it is difficult to establish a precise connection via 
the geneaology of discourses between 
Marx and Engels 9 and the political p1ract1!.c·es and institutes th2t 
characterise contemporary party r<egimesp it is possible to suggest 
tlhat more profound p1rocesses are .mt ~ode that establish a linko 
Historic41ll evetits can easily be exphdned by 1r<eference to-tllne @lOSt· 
obvious influencesg the consequences Qf .m plra!d.sely articulated 
and 0material0 conditionso But they may not necessarily be most 
adequately e%plained by such m~anso Hist@~ica! events have elusive 
causes or history would be far easier to dix-ect than bas proven to 
be the case a and historical explanations must often proceed by 
intuition rather than documentationo The u st elusive of historical 
causations is 0 culture 0 p becauseculture is both the contex~ and the 
co~consp!rator of all human action9 and the problematic thing about 
it is that the most important ~lements of it are by definition ann~ 
spoken and inexplicito The 0 ideas0 that constitute it are obviously 
the most.successful o because most inUt!lenUal ~of all ideas 9 because 
2lo . 
they have become 'second nature' to the members of a particular 
society. But becDuse they are 'natural', they do not pose 
themselves obvious1y for interrogntion. 
This argument will therefore seek to suggest that the 
significance of the text is not historicalu philosophicalu or 
political as much as cultural. Its problems are cultural~ and 
its consequences are cultural. Historical accounts have failed 
to find much to say about the text because they have treated it as 
innocent of cultural determinations. Accounts of it within the 
'politica~mode have succumbed to the 'enchantment' of the ·text 0 
and have been incapable of subjecting it to interrogation because 
they have tnken as a context-free truth what is essentially a 
culture-bound ;trtifact, as culture bound as any of the other 
political philosophies which that trctdition prop~ses to critique., 
I shall suggest that it is not possible to provide an historical 
explanation of the origins and consequences of the text without an 
articulation of the culture in which it arose ~ and that culture 
will be defined by its absences as much as by what is present. 
And I shall suGgest that it is not possible for the radical 2olitical 
tradition to constitute the text as an object 9 and by implication to 
constitute Leninism as an object, unless its cultural specificity is L 
understood, and unless the nature of its cultural hegemony over 
subsequent radical culture is defined. 
Cultural critique is problematic: culture is not only ebject, 
it is also subject. Culture cannot be thought of except through 
culture, throueh internalized norms, attitudes 9 and values. How is it 
possible thenu to attempt a valid criticism of cultural objects? How is 
one to avoid the situation scathingly described by Adorno: 
"The cultural critic is not happy with .civilization~ to 
\~hich alone he owes his discontanto He speaks as if he 
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represerted either unadulterated nature or a higher 
historical sta8e• Yet he is necessarily of the same 
essence as that to which he fancies himself superior. 
The insufficiency of the subject •••• becomes intolerable 
\vhen the subject itself is mediated down to its innermost 
make-up by the notion to which it opposes itself as 
independent anc sovereien". (11) 
Adorno offers a categorisation of possible modes of critique 9 and analyses 
the danc;ers associated vii th each of them. An 'immanent critique 0 0 he i:c'J: 
explain· 5g is achieved by 
•• ••• confronting (the culture) with the norms which it itself 
has crystallized". ( 12) 
and revealing·.the discrepancy between the object and the claims of the 
object, and those claims and the soci~l reality they criticise. Wh~t 
is involved is a minute and detailed investigation and dissection of 
every aspect of a particular cultural object; and criticism can claim 
such a dispassionate relationship to its object o:f study :because the subject 0 
the critic, claims an autonomy from the world of facticity that surrounds 
him; he claims to be more than a mere product of economic 0 social 0 and 
cultural determinations. But there is no euarantee that such immanent 
criticism will not suffer from, at least, what may be called an unconscious 
failure of nerve. For, 
"the spontaneous movement of the object can be followed 
only by someone vJho is not entirely engulfed by it". ( 13) 
This surely was the trap that awaited a conventional 9 form of cultural 
criticism. It concealed the assumptions of the object of criticism 
and thus rendered itself complicit in 6~s claims. 
Marxism, had offerred an example of an alternative node of critique. 
This transcendent critique was able to insulate itself from the unwanted 
dictates of the indige~ous culture. 
"The transcendent critic assumes an as it Here 
Archimde an position above culture •••• " (1L~) 
This was the basis of effective ideology critique, as it had been 
used to confront the social ideologies of the nineteenth century 
bourgeois reality. And ~dorno was aware of the achievements of such 
critiques. Indeed 9 it was an essential part of his initial formation 
as a Marxist. Classical liberalism,and its pretensions to effective 
social integration, had been confronted by the ability of Marxism to 
reveal the stricture of power and partial social interests that expounded 
But, Adorno· realised 9 this approach faced the unco~fortable question, 
from what standpoint does this critique take place? Even Archimedes 
needed a fulcrum. All transcendent critiques were therefore based on 
teleolgies which assumed a certain end to the process of history, and 
of cultural change. Adorno, throughout his career, was profoundly suspicous 
of such systems of thought, which assumed an ontology and some form of 
identity between subject and pbject. Such approaches functioned Ot~ by 
reducing complex realities to a single organising principle. 
Marxism had demonstrated an 'affinity with barbarism', that is a willingness 
to confidently sv1eep away the claims of all and any cultural phenomena· to 
some degree of independence 9 to have some-legitimate statement to make 
that was not simply a pnoduct and reflection of existing power structures. 
The Marxist definition of culture as superstructural reflection of the 
'real' economic base compounded the cultural destruction inherent in·any 
systemic thought. It resulted in a vulgar reductionism which denied culture 
any possibility of distance from the power of a ruling class and tended to 
"wipe away the whole as with a sponge"o (15) 
Adorno pointed to the paradox that it was precisely the project of contempo.r&~-~"'j 
social development to turn that philosophical assumption into a growing 
reality. It was the urgent desire of present and future administrationr, to 
achieve th~ integration)(.\£ culture became an industry, and pm-1er became 
administration. And further, if 
''•a• the choice of a standpoint•9utside the swHy of existing 
society is as fictitious as only the construction of abstract 
utopias can be". (16) 
the existence of a realll-existin& society outside bourgeois society 
offerred the practitioners of transc~ndent critique the irresistllble 
temptation to ground it~,! fin the only concrete alternative available: 
that of the 'socialist' regimes. And, paradoxically, it was precisely 
in the USSR that culture had become, emphatically, administration. 
In sumpnot only were the components of this alternatiVe culture so ethically 
suspect as to problematise it as a basis for the critique of anything, 
the critique made such an immoderate and sweeping and immediate 'totaliz-
ation of its object that no insights into its nature and complexities could 
be forthcoming. 
Hegel, whose system provided the· model for this approach, had suffered 
the exposure of his pretensions at the hands of subsequent history. His 
sophisticated system proved less than adequate to its claim of revealing 
the true past, present, and, above all, future , of human reasun. Adorno 
insisted that in fact 
" The matters of true philosophical interest at this point 
in history are those in which Hegel, agfeeing with tradition, 
expressed his disinterest. These are non-conceptuality, in-
dividually, and particularity - things which ever since Plato 
used to be dismissed as transitory and insignificant •••••• ". (17) 
The solution to thi~ problem is unclear. It has been suggested that 
Adorno established a satisfactory path between the Scylla of immanental 
submerg~nce and the Gharybdis of trancendental barbarism in, at least, 
his sociology of music. Jameson explains that 
" ...... for Adorno the work of Beethoven stands as a kind of fixed 
point against which earlier or later moments of musical history 
will be judged"., (18) 
This was not, it should be understood, because Beethoven's v10rk represented 
some abstract ideal of form or beauty,which other composers failed to attain 
due to an inadequate aesthetic talento The uniqueness of Beethoven 
was his ahility to express the antinomies and tensions of a point in 
history when the future \-Jas profoundly ruptured from the past o It fully 
explored the 
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o o o o r·eculiar freedom in the social structure of his time 00 o ( 18) 
It is thus an expresGion of human freedom 9 but one which derives the 
expressiveness of its freedom from its intimate involvement with its 
situation an historical time. This freedom expresses Beethoven~s 
emancipation from immanence; but its connection to lived history of the 
moment gun:rcmtees it frnm d'&ssolution into the meaningless 
"extreme autonomy and overripeness (of) the hypersubjective 
composers of the later 19th centu~ = let Tchaikovsky .stand 
as their archetypeoo•oo 11 (19) 
Thus Beethoven is not conceived as some 'still point in a turning world 0 , 
to whose formal qualities all other attempts at musical composition 
must aspire. It is rather this complex and ephemeral relationship 
between conciousness of, and independence from 0 the c~©cia~ reality 
in which the work is created, that gives it the character~ itself 0 of 
the supreme corpus of critical cultureo 
0 
But does this offer a solution to the problem under discussion 0 that is 9 
how to open a meaningful discussion of a document of political argument? 
Adorno's concept of Beethoven is certainly a striking and thought~ 
provokinG imc<e;e, and it would be advantageous to the argument that follows 
were the reader to bear that image in mindo But inasmuch as we have no 
such artefact in the field of political discourse which will authoritativel 
inform and illumine the concerns of our present historical age, we are 
still left bereft of a clear path to followo At this stage 0 there~ore 9 
all that I vii ll bke from Adorno's typology is an analdgical classi fie= 
ation of the treatments that have been given to Lenin°s texto 
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Analogically it can be sugcested that the historical school of 
writing - l'Y the vet·y nature of their discourse~ and not due to any 
other motives - have iJr~di]ced trm1ce:1de!ilt critiques that have failed 
to plumb the complexity of their obJecto While for the political 
traditiong the ideology of The State and Revolution is the very warp 
and weft of their own culture, for the historical analysts the dis-
crepancy betHeen author, text, and history is so obvious as to deprive 
the text of meaning, rather than grant them a true appropriation of 
the objecto It should be said that this is not because of any affinity 
to a 1 ba.rbaris! . .'1 1 in their values; but their very distance from being 
enrn(.shed in the idEOlogy of Leninism makes it impossible for them to 
feel its pulse in the lifeless text they are examiningo This has no 
immediate relationship to an author's ideological positions; but it 
is interesting that the more ideoloGically distant from Leninism that 
an author is, the more generous his comments on the text tend to beo 
It will he seen thBtit is the marxists Carr 9 Hill, and Bahro who see 
motivations and interests 11here the non - o:p anti-marxists like Ulam and 
Conquest see innocent emot.&@nso 
This would suggest an insoluble problem: a cultural object can 
. only be grn.sped as !!!l object from outside, but the object can only 
be gr;isped from inside, that culture. But perhaps an awareness of the 
existence of the dichotomy will make available insights that might 
otherwise eRcape. 
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The Historians 0 Assessment 
I ahall first consider estimations of the text made by 
historians : that is, by those seeking to account for causes and 
explanations of the Russian Revolution and its subsequent development~ 
and the relation of Lenin and his ideas to that processo The authors 
are both marxist and non-marxist, but what they have in common is 
that they partRke of a discourse on what happened, and why, and are 
thus distineuished from thane we shall consider later as contributors 
to the 'political' discourse. They will be identified by an approach 
that 9 in contrast, takes the events the historians discuss as a 0 given~, 
and seek to determine the relevance of that complex hist .orical 'given ° 
to a contemporary political problemso 
A recent work on Lenin's political thought criticises what it 
calls the "conven{i11al wisdom" that characterises Western discussions 
of Lenino ·i'!,is is the idea that Lenin was an '0instinctitfe politician" 
whose ability and willineness to grasp opportunities and manipulate 
situations meant that as a theorist he vias '~inconsistent, unorthodox, 
and vacillatinr;, and by these tokens comparatively unimportant19 o (.2.1 ) 
Hardine;'s description is not inaccurate, although his contention 
that "Lenin's economic and social analyses provide the clue to 
coherence and consistency in his more expressly political strategies" 
is not sucessfully demonstrated. As vie shall later se.e 9 perhaps it 
could not be. 
C~nceptions of this text among the authors criticised by Harding 
varyg they ~ange from suggestions that it is since~e but unconnected 
to anything that later transpired 0 to those that discover in it 
rather less sincere motives 9 and find that the democratic instincts 
it espouses were a mask for something less attractiv~a Conquest 
finds bo~h the con~ and the intention of the ta~t hard tg faultg 
"The thesis presented in The State and Revolution ia 
far from an ignoble one ooo the booklet was not publishsd 
before the R~volution 9 so there can be no question of it 
being a piece of intellectual demagoguery ooo It is not 
ths product of anything so crude as hypocrisy ooo but rathe~ 
of the paradoxes 9 the ambivalence of LeninUs whole political 
natureo" (~) 
This 9 despite the fact that Conquest may be considered one of the 
commentators most out of sympathy with Lenin°s thought and achievements" 
Wilsonvs classic work on the origins and development of 
Bolshevism dismisses the piece with rather less sympathyg 
11 He had given so little thought to the ultimate goals 
or socialism ooo that when ooo he tries to formulate some 
notions of the subject 9 he can only look it up in Marx and 
Engels and repeat the meagre indications ~r~the ocrltique 
of the Gotha Programm~ in respect to inequality of wages -
and the ~ithering away of the stateo There is nothing in 
The State and Revolution except the qualified utopianism of _ 
his mastersa 11 {~2) 
Ulam construes the work as more ,_serious in its selection of 
texts and ideas than Wilson has alloweda He stresses the fact 
that this was not something carelessly 8 thrown off~ in the heat 
of the moment 9 under the pressure of eventsg 
"·oo the length of its preparation and Lenin°s extrema 
solicitude that th~ work be completed even if he were to be 
Obumped off' indicates that this is not a mere propaganda 
pamphlet addressed to the needs of the houro 81 (;c,~) 
Vet he clearly cannot locate the work comfortably in the Lenin 
he knows: 
0
ooo no ~ork could be mora unreprssentativs of ths 
authot$ political philosophy and his genaral frame of 
mind than this one ooo The unfortunate pamphlet is almost 
a straightfor~ard profession of anarchisrnon {~~) 
Ulam does not suggest that tha work is 0 insincere 0 o 
contrast to Hardingus approaeh 0 he f!~ds that the conditions of a 
particular political moment can dietats the content of Lenin°s 
Rather than his politics flowing from a consistent and 
coherent social and economic analysis 0 the demands of politics 9 of 
the imminent revolution 9 impose upon Lenin the need for a particular 
mode of theorisingg 
~ •• o in the revolutlon 9 in the struggle for power 0 
mar~ism subsists and conquers by an appeal to the 
anarchistic instincts oao Such was Lenin°s e~sorption in 
the doctrine and its psychology that upon coming to power 
he could pass 9 as if unconsciously 0 from a denigration of 
the state to its staunch defence.~ (~b) 
Liebman seems to disagree with Ulam 0 s estimate of the importance 
Leni~ attached ~o the work 9 a necessary move :p~rhaps in a book 
which attempts a sustained defence of Lenin°s-politicsg 
~xi must be ~mphasised that The State and Revolution is 
an unfinished ~ork 9 the ~riting of which.was inte~r~ted -at 
the end of the summer of 1917 so~that the author might engage 
in less theoretical work and prepare for the imminent coming .( 2 /) 
of the state that would be born from the revolutiono" · · 
On the doctrine of the 9 smashing of the state 0 Lenin advances 0 
according to Liebman 0 "nothing that was not in conformity with Mar~ist 
doctrine." Liebman does, however 0 conside~ that on other issues 
Lenin makes an original contributiono On the building of socialist 
aociety 0 Lenin "advancing beyond the realm of classical mar~lem 
ventured 000 into the unknown and dangerous territ~ry in ~hich 
criticism of society gives way to constructive ~orko 00 (~g) 
~nd 9 on this count 9 Liebman judges the ~ork a failure 0 and a dangerous 
one at thato He is a remarkably sympatheticCommentator 0 but faele 
compelled to underline the consequences of the 0unfinished 0 nature 
of the work g it sllro.ds g 
00
ooo glaring weakn~ssas whare one of the most important 
and difficult problems is concerned 0 namely that of th® 
dictatorship of the proletariat ooo it is surprising to see 
how lightly Lenin dealt with it ooo here was a book that 
needed to be completed and developed 0 since 9 as it stood 0 it 
was silent about 9 or else overlooked 0 or even dodged 9 th6 
gigantic problems that the building of socialist society must 
necessarily encountero 00 (2~) 
Liebman then briefly indicates ~hat appear to him as problems 
in the application of such ideas to ~ complex societyo But he comes 
to concur with Ulam 0 s emphasis on the effect of the political momentg 
"lr democratic inspiration lies at the heart of leninoa 
vision at the time 9 and gives it its 0 immoderateo ~haractero 
This is fGhe mark of the periodo o o 01 ( 3G 
The critics so far discussed have maintained an essentially 
generous interpretation of the worko The practical implications 
for a mass democracy 9 for real power to the soviets = were genuinely 
conceived by Lenin as the aim of the revolutionary processo 
the work was inconsiste~t wit~ all of lenin°s thought so far 0 and was 
to be effectively negated by his suos~quent actions 9 it was a simple 
response to the spirit of the times 9 an infatuation with the vibrant 
creativity displayed by the Russian peopleo 
Others have suggested more considered and less ingenuous motives 
behind the worko Schapiro baldly asserts thats 
"It is unlikely that the more utopian parts of this 
represented Lenin 9 s conviotionso" (31) 
He does not attempt to define mora specific mot!va~ionso 
Daniels is similarly dismissive in his concurrenceg 
"The book reads like a manifesto of !eft-wing Bo!shevism 0 
and indeed 0 that is its real significancao To consider The 
State and Revolution as the basic statement of Lmnin°s 
political philosophy =which non=communists as well as 
communists usually do = is a serious erroro Its. argument 
for utopian anarchism never actually bscame official policy 
after the revolution 9 as the Soviet leadership has always pratendedooo~ (3~) 
It can 0 ho~ever 0 be suggested that the 0 over=emphasis 0 on the 
libertarian mode in the te~t was deliberateo firstly 0 it can be 
considersd as pa~t of a longstanding 9debateng the debat~ within 
the international socialist movement initiated by the 0 bstraya1° of 
the social=democratic parties of Europe in August 1914 0 Thus 
EoHo Carr also appreciates the significance of the 0 momento8 but 
for him the moment is defined not only by the i~minence of revolution 11 
but also by the need to settle the issues raised by ths split in the 
int~rnational movemento For Lenin 0 these issues boTe directly on the 
likely outcome of the 1917 eventsp and lack of clarity on them could 
constitute a danger to the success of the revolutiono The classical 
flar){ian concept of the shte had contended with two deviations sines 
being propounded by Mar~ anc'l Engels g ths. o_~raf-Drmis t 0 l!lhich _did not- -
consider that the class natu&"ra of ths sta{te {.rosed a problai'il under -_ -
bourgeois democracyv and the ana~ch~st 0 which denied any role for a . 
"" 
state in the revolutionary transformation of societyo.-The latter had 
been a minor trendp the for~er !!las a dominant tendency 0 responsible 
for the volte=face of 1914 9 whose dangerous nature must have been 
multiplied in Lenin°s eyes by the conciliatory attitude of the 
Bolshevik Party to the provisional ~overnment before his return in 
Aprilo Thus earr suggests that~ 
aa ••• it was the loyalty of the so=called social democrats 
to the national stata 0 their abandonment of the fundamental 
soci~list tenet of hostility to the state 0 which had bro~en the 
international solidarity of the Markers of Europe and driven 
-sJ.= 
them to engage in fratricidal strife at' the behest of the ruling 
classes of their respective nationso .Hence the emphasis in (s~) 
The State and Revolution ooo was somewhat one=sided 000 °0 
This in itself does not undermine the moral or theoretical 
integrity of the texto It does not put in question 0 rather !t 
confirms 0 lenin°s adherence to the soviet formo Others 0 however 0 
suggest that certain absences in the text 9 and the incongruity of the 
te~t itself 9 express a degr@e of 0dishonesty 0 0 and perhaps reproduce 
the consistently manipulative and opportunist character of Leninos 
poli ticso The soviets are a means 0 and a transitory one 0 not an endo 
Hill places the emphasis on Lenin°s clear perception of the political 
and social barriers that could obstruct the transformation of Russia 
under a Bolshevik leadershipg 
"Lenin wished above all to ensure that no respect for 
formal legality 0 or even for a constitutionally expressed 
majority 9 should prevent the Bolshevik Party from seizing 
a favourable opportunity for carrying out changes which he 
regarded as essentialo He was convinced (rightly 0 as was 
made clear in October and November) that the policy of his 
party represented the will of the majority of the population: 
and even if this had not been so he would have argued that the 
pressure of existing institutions, the_ ruling class __ monopolyc---
of education and propaganda before 1917 9 the age;..long -habits-: --
of submission and obedience 0 weighted-the scales unduly-in 
illiterate Russiao- The dictatorship was -needed as a weapon 
against inertia 0 force of habito~~ (3t;.) 
The authoritative historian of the Russian soviets 0 Anweiler 0 -
echoes the suggestion that Lenin's infatuation with the soviets 
was a short-term, tactical position derived from the necessity to 
gain state power. Previously 9 he had been hostile to the soviets 
in 1905: 
"Lenin was suspicious of all spontaneous - and to him 
formless = attempts at organisation by the proletariat 0 (~<) 
since they would threaten his party's laadershiPooo" 
The change of attitude in 1917 was of a specific natureg 
"As Martin Suber aptly B){p:;:essed .it 0 Lenin assimilated 
0 the soviets into an action programme 0 not into a 
structural idea 0 0 With all the idealized glorification of 
the soviets as a ne~ higher and more democratic type or 
stateD Lenin°s principal aim was revolutionary=strategic 0 
rather than social=structuralo 
That the soviets might not only e~ist for the sake of 
the revolution 0 but that 0 in a deeper 0 more elementary sense 0 
the revolution might also e~ist for the sake of the soviets 
did not cross his mindo 
Lenin°s attitude to the sovietsD like Mar~ 0 s approach 
to the Paris CommuneD was dominated by the politics of 
revolution; his blueprint of the socialist soviet state in 
The State and Revolution was the theoretic justification or 
the imminent seixure of power ooo the slo9an of the so~ts 
was primarily tactical in nature ooo 11 ( Sb) 
Keep 9 who has retrived and translated the available records 
of the proceedings of the CEC of the Soviet in the first months 
of Bolshevik power 9 points to what he considers to be a lack of 
seriousness in lenin°s writing 9 and again attributes this largely 
to the demands of a strategy for powerg 
"The theory ooo left many questions obscureo lenin 
paid remarkably little attention to the operative practices 
of the soviets ooo he showed uirtually no interest in th~ 
actual workings of the-institutions upon which the socialist 
order was supposedly going to rest: how decisions~were taken--
or how the various Soviet organs interacted at different' 
levelso Nor was he disposed to forecast the attitude of~the 
Bolshevik government to the Sov~~t movement 0 s anarc~istic 
features which so crassly contradicted the centralist 
principles to which his own party was committedo The 
silence was in large part tactical: lenin realised that·by 
entering into too much detail he would spoil the bright image 
of the future that he was delineating ooo this appealing 
doctrine ooo enabled the Bolsheviks to seize the initiative in 
the Soviet movement." (37) 
BahroD the East German dissident, carries the argument one step 
furthero For him, the actual totalitarian development of the future 
Soviet state was contained in the texto The 0 democratic 0 arguments 
lack significance, and convince only the naiveo 
~Lenin 9 s The Stat~ and Revolution~ rsprssenting hia 
immediate preparation for the captu~e or powerv ~as fondly 
quoted against later developments by those illusionists who 
held in their polemic to the troditional elements of the 
position it developedo But on the decisive question it : ( .3\l) 
conceives Soviet power in just the way it was then being createdo 00 
for Sah~o this decisive question is Lenin°s emphasis on the 
need to replace the smashed state machine with a new one 0 which will 
inherit the role of 0 commanding 9 and 0governing 0 o Xn the final pages 
of the text 0 Lenin is enthusiastically concerned to stre~s that what 
will follow the revolution is the period of 0 transition°p andg 
"Until the 0 higher 0 phase of communism arriues 0 the 
socialists demand the strictest control by society and by 
the state over the measure of labour and the measure gf 
consumption ooo It follows that under communism the~~ 
remains for a time not only bourgeois right 0 but even (~9) the bourgeois state 9 without the bourgeoisis 0 ... 
Bahro commentsg 
"Here is the unmistaksable voice of compuls1on 0 ~ 
compulsion directed not against the former ruling classesp 
but one that can only be addressed to the 0 backward 
elementsQ of the working class and the people itaelVo" (q~) 
It may be objected that Bahro can hardly--be-classHia~ s~Hong -
He-is a political writerp a dbsident111arxist 
~riting in a Osocialist 0 society 0 whose .imposing book is concerned 
to approach the pressing political problems of that societyo 
Nevertheless, I include him in this survey because he similarly is 
concerned to view the object = the experience of Lenin and the 
revolution = from outside 0 by means of an academic and highly 
theoretical mode of writingo In a •ense he is transitional bet~een 
the historical and the political mode of interrogating Lenin'• ta~to 
This perhaps demonstrates the way in which the two modes are forced 
to meet to give life to an appreciation of the textp and 0 also 0 how 
rare are the attempts to combinep reconcile 0 or transcend the two modeso 
The enthusiastic reception given to Bahro 0s wo~k tsstiries to thiso 
Perhaps the write~ best qualified to span the space between the 
historical and political was Trotskyo lndeedp he seems uniquely 
qu~lified for this tasko His mammoth 0 Mistory of the Russ!e~ 
Revolution° represents an attempt by a central political ector ~a 
a~plain the experience in which he participatedo But it is ror our 
purposes a disappointmantoYo Lanin°s major theoretical work of the 
period 9 to the work that waa later to gain wider credence than 
perhaps any other 0 Trotsky devotes hardly one page out of a thousando 
He will see nothing original in the work 0 nothing problematical in 
its origins and intentions 9 nob' in its consequenceso Xts production 
was a rational act 9 and the war~ is a rational contribut!@n to ~ 
rational processs 
"With the same painstaking care 111hich he dedicated to 
thinking about practical problems of the dayv he hera e~amines 
the theoretic prriblems of the ststeo He cannot do otherwise& 
for him theory is in actual fact Ill guide to actiono In this 
work Lenin h~s not for a ~inute proposed to introduce any new 
word inta political theoryo On the contrary 0 he g~ves the 
war~ an e~traordinarily modest aspeet 0 ~mphasising his 
positirin as a discipleo~ (~ ) 
From Trotskyp the most ardent of Leninists 9 ~he most passionate 
propagator of the centrality of Lenin 11 s theories to the task of. -
revolution to which he 9 Trotsky 9 devoted his life 0 biB havg what 
amounts to silence: a silence 111hich becomes all.the more strznga 
when it is remembered that one of Trotsky 0 s central planks against 
the Stalin tendency was thg, struggle for democracyo 
Trotsky 0 s silence bespeaks an embarrassmento What strange 
emotions must he have had if forced to contemplate this text from 
the historical shallows of 1932? His rigorous discourse 0 a discourse 
founded agonisingly upon the need to ansurs ~he survival of the 
Soviet Union 0 will not allow such feelings to surfacao 
The Political Assessment 
. lhere is no evidence that those who came to rule the Soviet 
Union in the decades after 1917 felt any different than Trotsky 
about the te)(to But 9 of course 9 by then the society had atrophied 
into the most hermetic of authority systems 0 The public writings 
and statements of the ruling group during this period have commanded 
little attention from political analystso In a peculiar irony on 
(ngels 0 dictum the 0government of people 0 had truly become the 
0 administration of things 0 o The absolute erasure of any public 
sphere consigned all ideology to redundancy or vacuityo The public 
discourse of the ruling group no longer had a function~ in any 
society but one reduced to a hermetic administrative structurs? such 
public discourse is essentially· a mode of negotiationg of negotiating 
and rearranging the relations between elites 9 interests 9 groupsv 
classes 9 fractions and parties. Where no such plurality of groups 
exists 9 public discoursa is an absurd non=sense 0 a ghost without 
substance 9 mithout connection or role within the world of material-
corporeality a 
Nevertheless the public discourse of Leninismv overflowed into 
tile IIIDrld of Europe and Asia 0 and ha_d its own effects on political 
cultureo And thus the text under discussion became publicp claimed 
a much higher profile and a more elevated statureo It affected the 
destinies of nations, manipulating and restructuring political cultures 
both sympathetic and hostileo 
Colletti, in his 1967 defence of the text, testified to the public 
career of The State and Ravolutiono He refers to: 
"··· the success of The State and Revolution throughout 
the Stalin era 0 for more than a quarter of a century from 
1928 to l953D not only in AtJssia but in all the Communist 
Parties of the worldoo•'9 (lfcl.) 
This success 9 was in his opinion 0 based upon a misreading of the 
te~tv a reading which suggested only that »Jhe Revolution is violenc~~o 
and it~ sssential act is the smashing or the ~xisting state machinso 
He implies that this ~eadlng was delibe~ately encouraged so as to 
produce a social amnesia ~bou~ the radical=dsmocr~tic implications 
or the Soviet fo~mo It can also be argu~d that the !ncul~ation of such 
an attitude toward their nat!vs state machines among Party membe~a in 
the Wsst was us~ful to th® Russian governmento Practi~ally exclud~d 
as they were throughout the period from negotiating their role and 
defending their interests through the channels of diplomacy 0 ths 
~xistence of a proletarian UTrojan Horse 0 to press the interaste or 
the Soviet Union within these countries was invaluableo 
The most resonant element of the argument throughout tl"lis period 
was therefore probably the term 0 the dictatorship ~r the pr~letariatug 
es a 'slogan it matched the temper of the times 0 when thinking people 
could easily and reasonably be convinced of the need for 0 tough 0 
solutions to tha acute problems of struggle and survival which ~ere 
posed throughout Europeo 
The tradition which consistantly-stressed the 0democratic 0 .as 
opposed to the 0 violent u interpretation of _the -taxt-WIBIS-\Iery--mu~h ~ ~ 
dissident oneo Within the Bolshevik Party 0 Bukharin continued --to 
........... 
express a respect for the ideas. Cohen reports his opposition to . · 
Len!nos attempts to curtail factory committees and eetabli~h 
hierarchical authority in the very language of Lenin°s textg 
"It is good that the cook will be taught to govern the 
state9 but what will there be if a commissar is placed over (43) the cook? Then he will never le~rn to govern the state 0 " 
and Bukharin may be found advocating steps towards the commune=state 
as late as 192Bo 
I 
Lukacs 0 the self'=appointed~ if officially disparaged 11 philosopher of 
the revolution 9 found the Soviet system an spt vehicle for the 
political project of the 0subject=object identical 0 0 
11 The Soviet systemv for example 11 always establish®$ the 
indivisible ounity of economics and politics by ~®lating ~h~ 
concrete e~istence of men = their immediate daily int~rests 11 
atco = to the essential questions of society as a wholeo It 
also sstablishes unity in objective reality where bourgeois 
class interests created the 0division of labour 0 0 above all 
the unity of the 0 power apparatus 0 ooo and the 0 peoplao ooo 
Everywhere the Soviet system does its utmost to relata human 
activity to general questions concerning the state 0 the aconomy 0 
culture 0 etco 0 while fighting to ensure that the regulation of 
all such questions does not become the privilege of an exclusive 
bureaucratic groupo o o vo (.¥-t) 
In contrast to the problems that writers have experienced in 
relating the concepts of direct democracy in ths Soviet form to 
other of Le~in°s ~ritings 9 they fit convincingly into Lukaca 0 highlf 
developed philosophical frameworko Indeed it was perhaps this con= 
sistency of Lukacs at the level of philosophical logic that led·Lenin 
to castigate his writings as ~very left wing and very pooro" 
to the 
Rosmer19 a Fr~nch syndicalist I!Jho was. convax-ted/)Aolshavik :poslfi:on~· · 
and later too opposed the Stalin regime 0 has .testified. to the··· 
influence of the text in reconciling libertarian tendenciesto 
~,~ 
Bolshevism and the 0dictatorship of the proletariatoo(4$Y 
Subsequently The State and Revoluti~n found ·for itself a· place in the 
radical tradition that has been sustainedo Max Schachtman 0 in 1950 
quite distanced from the Russian experience 0 argued thatg 
"The principles of Soviet democracy 0 which were set forth. 
by Lenin in 1917 and 1918 0 especially in wht will remain the 
classic work on the subject The State and Revolution remain an ( b) 
unassailable contribution to the socialist struggle for fx-eedomo" ~ 
T~o decades later 9 Colletti expresses the same sentimentsg 
~Marxist literature since Marx knows nothing that could 
evan remotely compete with the seriou~ness of the critique 
of parliament contained in The State and Revolutiont nor 0 at 
the same timeg anything pervaded with such a profound democrstic 
inspiration as that which animates Lenin°s text from beginning 
to endo 01 (lt-7) 
Not long after Colletti wrote hia assassmentg the~s ®ccu~red 
developments which at once revived and problematiaed the arguments 
of The State and Revolutiono As Colletti has indicatedg the text 
set the culture of the radical camp for several decades through to 
the fiftieso But by that time a process of evolution had occurred 
which had shifted the official communist movement toward a mMCh less 
negative estimation of the institutions of the bourgeois politya 
Var~ous 0 roads to socialismv had been legitimised which aought to 
t~ke account of 0national characteristics 0 a Posed in this wayi the 
change was aubtle 9 and perhaps not totalg the reassessment of 
democracy was a product of tactical nec~ssities 0 and tied very much 
to the historical specificities of particular cultureso Howeverg in 
-
the mid~l970°s 0 in the light of the constant~nability of Communist 
Parties to attain power in the ~est 0 and the constant inability of 
state regimes in the East to reform thegselves in a democratic 
direction 9 a debate broke out which perforce involved an assessment_ 
'~ 
of Lenin and Lenin°s textso This was the 9 EurocommunismLdebate 0 
and the argument for a time centred on-whether to abandon the slogan 
and concept of vthe dictatorship of the proletariat 0 o 
In such a climateg it isg paradoxicallyg not easy to escape the 
sway of Leninvs ideaso _When his co~cept of 0dictatorship 0 is 
abandoned 0 his concepts of 9 democracy 0 can gain in influencea 
Colletti has provided the interpretation which can justify thieo 
ror Collettig little time need be spent on the most primitive 
level of analysis and criticism in Lenino The insistence ~hat the 
and its prasc~iption to Qsmash the old stata machin~o as ~ha ~ub of 
tha argument is to miss the pointo 
image conjur~d up by Lsnin°s mode and ~mphasi~ ln M~itl~gB nooo 
x-evolution 000 in its most elementary and s~te~nal fsatu~esg 
~aptu~@ or ths Winte~ Palaceg the Ministry of Xnte~ior in flames 0 
t~® a~~ast and ®~ecution of ~he political personnel of the old 
governmento~(~R) He goes on to suggest "all this may taka place 0 
but it is not the essential point"o 
What is the essent~al point? 
And it cent~es on the problem of ~ontrol ~r g~ve~nment~l 
inBtitutiona not simply as an ethical choice 0 but·as an ~ss~ntlml 
alement that makes possible the conceptions or a socialist socian 
organisationo for a political or technical elite to s~ercise control 
of the 0 bocU.GJs or a~riiieol men ° would fu:u'il the requirements for the 
te~mination of the old, class-ruleg but ~ould answer no questiona 
about ~hat ~as to repla~~ ito - - Colletti advanc®s e cohsrsnt-and 
' - --logically satisfying argument which bases itself on lil distinc~...:couplet'~'~.=.-
of problems concerning the relationship between par.U.amant ancl -rll~he&-= _ . 
......._ . 
.. 
anti tie so The firet r~lationsh!p is between parJ!iament an~ the- social _. _ 
x-elatione of productic;m' that constitute a capitalist ·aoc!atyo The 
second relationship is that between parliament and the subaltern 
classeso The most obvious 9 yet most superficialg critique of 
parliament 0 argues Collet~i 0 is that which concentrates on the 
relationship between parliament and electorateo This is a simple 
problem of structureg one vote every five or so years 0 lack of 
accountability of representatives and so ona and 0 by the same 
token 0 a problem of the corruptability of parliament ~ t1hat Co.UatU 
describes asg 
. 
"electoral rraudso trasfomismo (absorption or radicals by 
the establishment) 0 °po©k=barrelling 0 0 °sottogoverno 0 (form of party control over the administrative process that 
escape fx-om legislative and parliamentary control) ll ®teo ~o (trelj) 
polnto For it ~ould 0 for Collatti 0 be theoretically possibls r~r 
a parliamentary government to e~ist which had recal1ab1® AoPc 0 th® 
most representative of electoral systems 0 a complete absence of 
frauds 0 cheating 0 bribing and propaganda 0 and for this not to be 
genuine democracy but th• most perfect e~pression or the dictatorship 
of the bourgeoisieo 
For Colletti the relationship between the working class and 
parliament is subordinats to the problem of the. relationship of 
parliament to the social relations of product!ona· 1he heart of the 
matter is not the independence of the state apparatus = ~hether in 
its repressive 11 ideological 0 or purely adminis~tiva forms = from 
parliament9 but the independence of capital from parliarnento 
he would suggest 0 is not a purely contingent independenca 0 resulting 
from the .• manner in which the institutions may.:lnsve historically_ 
developed a It is much rather an imw)nent indapendencso If !t~~ere 
purely contingent 11 parliament .could by the passing of. -laws B)ttenol its 
'-
domain to include capital~ -as-it·is an imm.ment indapendence 11 ioiBo 
as the inability of bourgeois democracy. to dominate- cspi tal ifi --
inherent in the nature of the two enUties 9 bourgeois democracy does 
not contain the possibility of subordinating and disciplining capital 0 
and thus of running it i~ the interests of the subaltern classeso Xt 
could not do so even if it wanted to 0 ioeo even ~ere there the 
equivalent of a Bolshevik government ~ith a parliamentary majorityo 
For it is in the process of production that the key to capitalist 
soeia.ty 0 the production of surplus value 0 lieso Yet it is precisely 
~i thin the production process 0 by the very n·ature of that process 
!tselr 0 that the existence of exploitation is obscu~edo 
words 9 the relationship between exploiter and exploited becomes a 
0myster!ous thing 0 o Bourgeois democracy can only exist because 
capita~ rules social life unperceived and uncontrollsdo Because 
of the fetishized nature of the production process 9 a society whose 
central dynamic is exploitation can convince itself that it proceeds 
by the rule of reason 0 of freedom 0 and of equalityo In CollatU 0 s 
language 0 the essence of the 01 re\l'is.ionist and K"eformistn prostx-ation 
before bourgeois democracy is thatg 
01 For Marxp modern social inequality or capitalist ex= 
ploitation occurs simultaneously ~ith ~he fullest develop= 
ment of juridical .=political equality9 he~e 0 on the contrary 0 juridical=political equqlity ~and ~ence the modern representative 
state = becomes the instrument for the progreasive elimination 
and dissolution of real inequalities 0 which seem arbi~rarily (o 
produced rather than an organic consequence of the system as sucho"( ) 
Because of the peculiar? uniquap and critical nature of the dis= 
juncture between capital and democracyp the relationship between 
deomocracv and the. proletariat can! for capita! be quite fle:dbleo· 
Thus the parliamentary form can only reinforce capitali~t powero 
That is not to deny the possibility and necessity of struggle in the ,_ 
parliamentary arena to reveal the contradictions that exist within it 0 
and between it and the task· of socialist transformation~ But so·long 
as a working class formulated its polibcal perspective in terms of a 
parliamentary project 9 so long would that working class beequally 
still distant from the appreciation of its fundamental social slavery 
and impotence. The project of confronting and overcoming the 
relationship of exploitation had to 9 at one and the same time 0 be 
the project for the rejection of parliament as an ~dequate 0 or even 
usefu1 0 vehicle for this project. 
Colletti insists that The State and Revolution is essentially 
directed to a recognition of the substantial nature of this problemo 
The 0 technical 0 problem of structure referred to above is subordinate 0 
even though the answer to the problem will be round in what appear as 
technical measuresg 
"What is essential to the revolution is the destruction of 
the diaphragm that separates the working classes from power~ 
the emancipation and self=determination of the former 9 the 
transmission of power directly into the hands of the peopleooo 
for lenin 0 the revolution is not only the transfer of power from 
one class to another 0 it is also the passage from one type of 
power to anotherg for him the two things 90 together because 
the working class ~hat seizes power is the working class that 
governs itself 0 °' (S'"I) 
And the corollary: the working class that cannot govern itself 
is a working class that is not capable of s~ing powero 
Parliament 0 because its basic constituent element is the 0individualo 
~itizen 0 divorced from his or her position in the process of 
production 0 is the succinct expression of the subordination to 0 and 
ignorance of 0 the rule of capitalo The Soviet form 0 becaus~ it re= 
constitutes the atomised individual as-a member=e~ a class-standing in 
a specific relation to the process of production 0 and in so Doing 
implicitly and limpidly states the exploitation relationship 0 i~ 
the only form that can express the political struggle that will over= 
throw capitalo A socialist government whose lineaments are those of a 
struggle directed essentially toward and within a parliamentary 
institution will be the product of a struggle that has been deformed 9 
directed into the parliamentary mentalityo Thus will the old circle 
of exploitation and dependence reassert itselfo 
It is unlikely that an assessment could be penned today that 
found the implications of lenin's argument so unambiguouso But many 
of the contributions to the 'Eurocommunism 0 debate taka the argument 
little further than that in which lenin was engaged sixty years agoo 
Three t~S~ts wi!l illustx-ate th~s we!lo Th• difficulty in esca~i~g 
the hegemony of Leni~ is e~pressed in the caution with which criticism 
is often addressedo To begin with an advocat® of the Eurocommunist 
position~ t~e General Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party 0 Santiago 
Ca:rilloo Xn U[urocommunism and the State 0 he is delicatag 
01 The tendency to emphasise what is of paramount importance 
at the given moment 0 even with the danger of e~aggerating it 0 
to the e~tent of making ona=sided and e~cessive generalisations 9 
is 0 I believe 0 apparent in some of LaninOs writings 9 on the eve(~tl) 
of the October Revolution and in the midst of the ReVolutionooo 
Ca~rillo 0 s ergument on the substance of the issue is obscure and 
somewhat tendentiouso He chooses to take issu!Sl with a minor snd sub= 
sidiary argument in LeninUs te~t 0 and not to conh·ont the actual critiqus 
of bourgsois institutions 9 the purposes of thirs critiquEJ 0 and the 
alternative which is suggest~do Consequent!y0 despite his ~~lua~le 
defence of specific institutions (eogo universe! suffrage pp 0 9l=95) 
in the light of the t~sgic e~perience mf Eur9pe in the twentieth 
century 0 his argument fails to take the measure of the real power of 
th$ textg. the way it ariiculates a critique of the limitat.ions-~n---- ---
human freedom and fulfilment which can 0 arguably 0 be attributed to 
the rest~icted nature of bourgeois democracyo 
'--
The response to the Eurocommunist argument can not 0 however 9 be 
said to e~press appreciably more creativity and ssnsit!vityo Probably 
the most authoritative defence of a traditional position ~as devsloped 
by Balibar in a book published in l976o This was intended as e con= 
tribution to the debate in the french Communist Party which led to the 
dropping of the term 0dictatorship of the proletariat 0 o 0Ths 
Dict~rship of the Proletariat 0 is a disappointing piece of intellectual 
work (appearing to do little more for Lenin than lenin did for Marx and 
Engsls 9 ioeo a rathe~ lengthy exegesis and restatement of the original 
text in uncomp~omising terms)a It is concerned to atr~ss the continuing 
relevance of the concept of 0dictatorsh!p 0 :!:"a~htar than any inherently 
democratic themeso 
8alibar 0s book is unlikely to have gained much cr~dibil!ty were it 
not implicitly based upon the work of Althusssr that preceded ita 
Althusser had already constructed an alle~edly much mor® sophisticated 
analysis of the dontemporary capitalist state than had been available 
to Mar~ists hitherto 9 and this analysis provided the intellectual 
juatification for restoring the threatened concept of 0dictatorship 
of the proletariat 0 to its former author~tya In the assay oxd~ology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses 0 (~) Althusser noted that the 
classical Mar~ian characterisation of the state as an in5ttument of 
class repressionp although eorreet 9 needed supplementingo The· 
necessary supplement was the concept of 0 X~s~logical State Apparatusesoa 
That is 9 if the function of the state was the reproduction or the 
conditions of production 0 it achieved its aims by ideological means 
as well as by coerciono 
Alongside the repressive arms stands a pano~y of ideological 
institutionso This in itself ~hardly represents ~an 1lrigina1~eon=~~-
tribution to political sociologyo Any acquaintance with the twentieth 
century state reveals that it has developed major functionsv which 0 
'--
whatever their specific rolep serve to strengthen the commitment of 
the populace to that statev and thereby to stabilise the existing 
political and socio=economic structureso Leaving aside the complex 
of problems associated with representative democracy 0 which might be 
legitimately excluded as conceptually different 9 the state apparatus 
as such clearly now has a crucial investment in the areas of economic 
m~nagement and welfarep~visiono In terms of costs these outweigh 
the repressive apparatus 9 and in terms of effecti~eness in securing 
social stability their indispensdbility is obviousa 
Althusser is 9 howeue~ 0 not concerned to· nots these d®uelopmentso 
Tha institutions that he identifies as the ~ideological state 
apparatusas 01 are· quite diffarentp beingg the Churchess the 
education system~ the family9 the leg~! aystamv the p@litical 
sy~terna the trade union movement~ the communication~ medisg and 
ths cultural domaino 
C~itical thought stands some~hat benumbed by this coup de thaatreo 
Refusing any intellectual discrimination o~ empirical ~erification 0 
Althusse~ has a!mply included in his list practically ava~y extant 
social institutio~o (His omissions are bafflingo The only elements 
not included in his list are those very structures that have undeniably 
become part of the state Apparatus in the twentieth centuryg the 
~elfare ay~tem and the economic management structtir~s)o The economy 0-
of coursep remains an independent domain for it is the capitalist 
economy which this panoply of state institutions is intended to 
service<> It would indeed be hard to conceive of a more ludicrous 
way of resolving the problems of political sociology0 
But .what can be the purposeo :of::~--such a _ploy? Notwithstanding-the 
ignorance Althusser displays of social reality 9 the barbarism with 
which he appreaches sociological theory, and the disdain he bestows_:_ 
-..... 
upon sociological research, the argument achieves its purpose~ By 
an eet of theoryp he has accomplished the absorption of civil society 
into the state; he has in fact abolished civil society by the simple 
expedient of redefining the state as including everything except the 
capitalist economyo This -solves a lot of problemso Specifically 
it solves the problem of the Soviet Unione It subverts criticism 
that in the Soviet Union the state is identical with society 0 ioBo 
no institution exists which is not part of the state 0 no activity 
occurs which is not directed at the state and made to serve its 
purposeo .Althusser now demonstrates that exactly the same state of 
47= 
sffairs obtains in the capitalist societies. Conssquently 0 th~ 
USSR can be seen to be a superior social formation 0 because at 
l~ast the ~conomy is socialisedo Thus Althusser can restrict 
his criticisms of the USSR to muted complaints about 0 personality 
CMlte 0 o More significantly for his present purposas 0 the argument 
for th~ dictatorship of the proletariat is restoredo The popLJlations 
of the capitalist states must realise that they already live under a 
dictatorship9 that what they thought was private is in fact public9 
what they believed to be public is in fact a tool of the statao All 
concepts of democracy 0 privata life 0 civil rights 0 voluntary 
assoc1ations 0 are consequently simply false consciousnesso 
think are ~9 and therefore worth protacting 0 ar~ in fact already 
theirs. There can be no purpose in seeking to maintain themo Thus 
is the totalitarian state intellectually (although hardly convincingly) 
legitimated a 
But other alternatives to Eurocommunism are similarly muted in 
~hei~ innovative attempts. Henri Webar 9 in "Eurocommunism0 Socialism 
and Democ.racyw articulates a radical.ahd ·anti=Stalinist tradition and 
asks~ 
00 l!Jh0 today WOUld deny that·-.the leninist theses 0i'1-=- -. - (~'+) 
democracy and socialism present certain ·excesses and ~acunae?" 
He argues that Lenin's denunciation of 0 bourgeoue democracyo was 
a case of Obending the stick 0 • Nevertheless his judgement on the 
question of institutions is ultimately uncomplicated - and unchanged: 
"••o the historical conditions that produced the good old 
days of parliamentarism have now ceased to e~isto It is 
really another institutional system which has tc be buil~ = one 
that will allow the distribution of power at the base of society 
and the active participation of the workers in managing their 
own affairs ooo In the articulation or parliamentary and council= ((~) 
type 1nstitutions0 the ieality of power must pass to the lattero" 
~ow can Weber 0 from ~he standpoint of his tradition 0 so 
conrldently reaffirm the heritage of Lenin? Xt ia bseausa h~ 
refusam ~ny problems inherent in the structure or SoYiat institutionso 
Th~ p~oblems that haYe in the past led to the collapse of such 
in8titutions into tha authoritarian state are ~e~knesses in the 
populace 9 not weaknesses in the structureso The impli~ations of 
this proposition are clear 0 as are its intimate connections with 
authoritarian practices 0 democracy shall not be constructed to 
meet the needs .of the people 0 but the peopls shall be reconstructed 
to make possible the functioning of the select~d institutionso 
This iscf' course simply a muted version of the account UJ~hich 
attrib~tes the disappearance of democra~y in the USSR to objectiYe 
conditionsg the culture of the popul~tion could n:ot sushin itg 
+o 
00 1118 say (that power must pass A_ the councils) 0 0 0 in ruu 
awareness of the difficulties involved in the es~ablishment 
and functioning of socialist democracyo Such dtimocracy 
must entail th~ reduction of ~orking time by at least a half 
otherwiss the ~or!(ers will have (lei ther tt,e energy nor the 
leisure to manage the eeonomi~c units and the stateo It also ··~. 
entails satisfacUon of the cfUzsns basic needs 0 relative! ~ --
consolidations of- .the netJ~ sociarl ordex- · '0-o o 9 s high J~ve!-:or.. -
~orking class culture 0 eki!ls 0 and consciousnessp d~mocratic 
traditions profoundly r:ootad in evsrlf sphere of social lif'a0 
and so ono 119 (!b) -
This l!lhole argument then begs the question as to how democracy 
is to be obtained and maintained in the period bsf'ore thess ideal type 
conditions are availableo The argument replicates the whole problematic 
-
of democracy in the Soviet Union under Lenin 0 and fails to advance 
beyond ito Thus the potent appeal of The State and Revolution is 
once more testifieda 
What is the significanc~ of these thx-ee contemporary te~tsg 
Clearly they will not represent 
all the contributions to the present discussion 0 all the comments that 
have been made 9 the cTiticisms advanced 0 the developments and insights 
achievedo The purpose of citing the te~is here is not ~o suggest 
that contemporary debate .. .is limited ta these paramste:rs and no_ mo:re 0 
~ound three intellectually respectabl~ and sseming~y distinct dia~ou:rses 
on problems of democracy 0 and 0 further 0 how each interpretation 0 w:r 
appreciation 0 of that te~t 0 can reinforce the failu:r® or its own 
discourse to communicate with the other two and th~s :rainfore~ ~hat 
ar® essentially partial appropriations of the substantiv~ prob!~mo 
The three contributions are singled out as e~~mplary because each 
:represents the way in which· specifically political traditions of 
E.Jnalysis (ioeo those which in some way acknowledg~ and seek to 
adapt Lenin °s heritage for the resolution of contemporary poH.tical 
problems) appear to engage in a repetition without davelopmento 
Each in its own way is trapped in terms of discussion and thinking 
initiated by Lenin himselfg each consequently does not-grasp what 
it is in Lenin that confronts their particular problematic as a problema 
Carillo articulates a -Classical social=democ&-atic ~;radit!ons. hs 
desires socialism and believes that possession of state-~o~er is 
necessary to achieve ito He wants 0 however 11 the efficacy ancLinnatei 
value of western European institutions to be reconsidered and 
appreciatado His argument is-directed against the term 0dictatorship 
of the proletariat 0 with its authoritarian implications of a monolithic 
and irremovable one~party regimeo But he attacks Lenin 9s theory on 
its weaknesses and not on_ its strengtho He leaves untouched ita 
articulation of dissatisfaction with the formal limits of parliamentary 
democraey 0 its expression of libertarian aspirations 0 its insistence 
on the state forms in which those aspirations can be embodiedo X~ 
this way Carillo fails to grasp and engage the issues which opposing 
~adical traditions conside~ to be sssentialz the inefficacy of 
parliaments as instruments of political participation and social 
transformation 0 and the possibility (cent~al to the broades~ 
radical tradition) or a truly agalitarian 0 emancipated 0 and ~ 
Balibar is in no less of a trapo He articulates a traditional 
concept of the problem~ not democracy 0 but power is the issueo 
The concern for institutions which can guarantee democracy 0 central 
to both the traditions ~epresented by Carillo and Weber 0 is ona he 
does not shareo He represenh s tradition on which the odegenerationo 
of th~ Bolshevik regime has had little impact 0 and thus suggest~d no 
problems~ Thus he simply refuses the problem that occupies the others& 
"••• the necessary-political foundations and the 
principal aspect of all these forms is what ~e can call 
mass proletarian democracta No~ this kind of democracy 
cannot be decreed~ it cannot be 0guaranteed 0 0 in s~or~ 0 
it does not depend mainly on institutions 0 ~o~BYer much 
freedom may characterise them~ but it can be ~anD at the 
cost of a hard struggleD if the masses intervene in person 
em the political sceneo 00 (~7) 
.-
Bali bar expresses a consistent rerusal to consider the impact----=--_ 
of Bolshevik autocracy~n European political thinkingo He criticises 
the Eurocommuni-st position on its l!ieSk- pointg -~it does not--off~er a 
clear means of achieving stata--power 0 or guarantee that .a -party ~ill 
be able to retain power in ordar to affect social tli'ansform~Uon 0 and 
contain its enemies while so doingo But he fails to appreciate its 
strong pointg the experience of fascia~ ~ @Dmmunism brought a new 
raspect for democracy as something not lightly to be dismissed or 
dismantled. Carillo is aware of what can be the devastating sfrects 
of a disregard for democratic institutionso Tg Bal!bar 0 democracy is 
still suspect 0 still a term with flaYours of prostration bef@ra 
bourgeois ideology = or utopian leftismo 
Weber 0 s position completaa:tnis e.ternal ~x-iang!a of mutual in= 
=)l·= 
comprehensiono On the issue of power 9 he .ts blind to the problem 
that his argument has displayed a record or success far less than 
that ret~ieved by Carillo9 certainly an absence where Balibaros 
~~adit!orn registers marked success. Weber further cannot grasp the 
telling point of Carillo 0 s argument~ whereas bourgeois democracy has 
sh@wn an ability to sustain and replicate itself in the post=l945 
period 0 there is no e~ample of Soviet or council based regimes being 
capabl~ ~f avoidin~ the collapse into the authoritarian stat®B 
indaed 0 neither is there real evidence of such a strategry approaching 
seriously the problem of obtaining powero Thus Carillo 0s argument 
gua~antees dembcracy 0 if not power~ Balibar 9 s guarantees power if 
not democracy a Weber 0 s promises neither = but promises botho 
lhis argument is not intended as a critique tif radical strategies 0 
and no judgement will be made between themo My point is to suggest 
the contemporary status of The State and Re~olution; one of e~ercising 
a peculiarly hegemonic power over the radical debate on democracy and 
t~a etata a status it has held since it was writteno iUl . participar~ts 
none can escape themo No real rupture:is_possibleo ---
On Reading . Te:lrts: A Hermeneutic S:llutlon? 
It is perhaps only a human failing to believe that where there-is 
a problem 9 there must be ~ solutiono Per~apa ~ produc~ of the 
eciantific culture 0 and the way the methods of science have been 
soffie~hat vulgarly appropriated by non-practitioners 0 there ie a constant 
temptation to assume the existence of solutions not t!JO ~ar fx·om one 9 s 
immediate graspo This gives the whole political discoursa an ~ir or 
confidemce that some would suggest is increasingly m!splacado 
Pou!ant~as 0 in a unique and moving conclusion to his last book 0 
~~pressed in full measure the anguish that cbnfronts t~osa who believe 
i~ ~ more ~sal form ~r democr~cy End sacia!i~m 0 yet at the same time 
EBfuse to accept the traditions! e~sy a~planations and rationalisations 
of the twentieth century e~peTienceo Poulant~as lays ba~e the problem 0 
and itsmemingly insoluble conflictsg 
~leninvs principal thrust ~as not ~t fir~t ~awards B 
varian~ of authoritarian statiarn ooo the original guiding 
thread of Lenin°s thought ~as 0 in opposition to the 
parliamentarism and dread of wor~are councils characteristic 
of the social~demoeratie current 9 the s~eeping replaceMent or 
Oformal 0 representative democracy by the 0real0 0 direct 
democracy of wor~ers councils ooo This leads ~ to ~he real 
questiono Was it not this very line ooo which principally 
accounted for ~hat happened in lenin°s lifetime in the 
Soviet Union 9 and which ~av~ rise to the centralist and 1~0 ~-<;1) 
atatist Lenin whose posterity is well enough known?w 
There is no straight road out of such a Tealisationo Poulan has 
concludes his bookg 
"It can naturally always be arguedp in the name of ~ealism 
(either by proponents of the dicta~orship of the pr@letariat 
or by the othersp th~ o~thodo~ neO=liberals) 9 that if democratic 
socialism has never y~t e~isted 9 this is because it is impossibleo 
Rayb~o We no lo~gar-sha~e that belief in the millenium founded 
on a few iron laws concerning the .inevitability ~f a democratic= 
socialist revolution~ -nor do-~e-~njoy the support of a fatherland 
of democratic socialis@o _ But 10na .thing .ie cexotliil!-n-g -'soc!al.iam--=---
will be democratic or it Qdill not-ba-~at-allo ~-Wtuit::!s -1!110~®-->­
opt!mism about the democratic r®~d to socialism should not-lead 
us to conside~ it hs a royal roadD smooth and fre~ of risko 
Risks there are 9 although they are no longer quite ~hat they used 
to beg at worst 9 we could be he~ing for camps and massacres-sa~ 
appointed victiiDSo But to that I reply: if we weigh up the 
risks 9 that is in any case preferable to massacring other peop~a __ 
only to end up ourselves beneath the blade or a Committee of (Si) 
Public Safety or some Dictator of the proletariato 
In his preceding pages, Poulantzas discusses the ~ay that he 
conceives the responsibility of Lenin°s ideas for the Russian state 
of affairso He suggests that the original intent of the concept 
ndictatorship or the proletariat 0 was strategicp and that ~ubs~quent 
inte~prettions ~aTe of a similar natureo Thus the concept was bound 
to end up an instrumental onep and no moreo The Soviets we~a to become 
01no~ so much an anti~·state as a parallel stataw. (&o) 
neverths!a9Sg be argued thai howave~ non=irist~umenia! ~he purpose 
of Soviet forms may be 0 those forms themselves contain rce:rtain in= 
adequacies which will subvert any particular intento These in= 
Gdequaci~e are at once mora profoundD and yet far simp1er 0 than 
those suggested by Poulantzaso 
Butg apa~t from anything else 0 the ~of Poulantzas 0 ~omments 
here is crucialo Its anguish is the anguish of an awar~nSs$ @f the 
living consequences of Lenin that confronts those ~ith an interest 
in emancipationo It is from this that W® might approach a suitable 
interpretation of Lenin°s te~t 0 and escape the limitations of 
critique e~p:ressed in Adorno 0s concept of the immane..nt and the 
transcenclento 
adorno 0 s attempts to define an escape from the unacceptable 
eonsequances of both these forms of critique = dialectical 
~ritieism = appears unconvincingo Tha form of this dialecti~al 
cri Ucism is uagua g -it must guard against 0 peK"ve&-sion into delusion u 
and 0 10n the other hand 0 a enthrallment -in the cuH:ural :object o o - :Xt 
must succumb to nsitheK' -0 the cult.of the mindu 9 nor to- 0hatr!llld (Qlf 
the m.ind 0 o The cultural critic must 0 both part.icip~te in culture 
and not participate 0 o-(61 ) These ~~a-precautionary admonitions-that 
smount to little in the w~y of an alternativeo 
Perhaps the, weakness of Adorno 0s alternative may be traced to the initia 
definition of the immanent and transcendento His K'ejection of the 
available transcendent CK'_itique is 9 clearly 9 wholehearted and sincere~ 
but it is not absolutaa He asserts that ~the traditional·transcendent 
*{lo~} 
edUquQ of ideology is obsolete v perhaps some different form of 
t~onmcondant cK'itiqu~ is still relevant and possible? And there 
are examples caf its reappear.ance in his latEir !!tork 0 sometimras to 
ludicrous and 0 barbaric 0 affecto Thus in 'his 1963 critique of 
existentialism he is loftily dismissive of problems considered by 
Heidegger and otherso His response to the problem of the shea~ 
contingency of the life of the individua~ 0 in the eontex~ of ~ 
reality that is disturbing 0 and ultimately fatal 0 is to resort to 
the most simple and superci~ious of Marxian solutionso Heideggex-
proposes the "needs for residences" as one of the great difficulties 
of contemporary man: the anguished rootlessness of the children of 
the enlightenmento Adorno responds: 
"However& that which announces itself~ in the game about 
the need for residences 9 i~ more serious tha~ th~ pose of 
existential seriousnesso It is the fear of unemployment 0 
lurking in all citizens of countries of high.capitalismo 
This is a fear which is administiativsly fought offp Bnd 
therefore nailed to the platonic firmament or the s,tars 0 a 
fear that remains even in the glorious ti~~s of full employmentoM 
What is this but an example of a ooia~t0 reductionism that 
would have earned any other writer Adorno 0s rebuke7 
It is arguable that the inability =to find a more comfor-table and 
serious stance for cultural-criticism derives -f-rom the continued ___ _ 
presence in Adorno 0 s thought of the transcendent critique as the 
"-
final arbiter of social phenomenao 'fhs inheritance of- the Hegelian ~--
search for absolute knowledge is arguabl~ present at a profound and-
unstated level through~ut ~is careero Even for a social critic of 
Adorno 9s sophistication 0 such a commitment may readmit through the 
back door a crude marxism which has been assertively dismissed ~ia 
-the fronto His profound distaste for the age in which he lived = 
summed up by the 0dialectic of enlightanment 0 thesis and the alleged 
transformation of the whole ~orld around him into a dull and 





cdtique 0 a yearning that 0 . as· he himsel'i" wot:Jld be the fi&-st to 
recognisa 0 could not possibly be fulfillsd~ 
Some kind of solution to this preble~ may 0 however 0 be availab~ 
~y moving beyond Adorno 9s somewhat simple dichotomyo The immanent 
and transcendent critiques may be accepted as ide~l types 0 but may 
be supplemented by a realization that the possibility of genuine 
critique lies within the terrain that separates the twoo It is 
necessary to abandon the idea of transcendent crltiqus as a methodological 
possibility 9 and occupy the gap it leaves with a realization of the 
historicity of all knowledgeo 
This may be appreached by the path of hermeneuticso The tas~ 
of hermeneutics is the same as Adorno 9 s cul tura1 cri ticismg to 
interrogate texts and historical or cultural art!facts 0 and find 
some standards by which to assess themo The original hermeneutic 
pr6ject was itself criticalo It originated in the Protestant 
Reformation 9 which was confronted by the problem of the interpretation 
of Biblical-textso The Catholic church claimed that the original 
fragmentary scriptures ware-obscure in-the!r-=meaningso TheiK' 
interpretation 0 therefore 9 could only be ensured by reliance upon the 
~stablishsd tradition of interpretation 9 which was embodied and 
instit~tionalised in the Catholic Churcho To ground their oppositional 
and critical practice 0 therefore 9 the Lutherans ~ad to presen~ a mode 
of reinterpreting the scriptures which could derive a universally 
valid interpre~ation from the fragmentary te~ts themselveso 
The nub of the problem of interpretation defined by~is historical 
conflict is thisg there is a distance between the interpreter and 
his objecto The initial task therefore differs from Adorno 0 sg for 
him the problem of the immanent critique was the lack of distance 
between the two 0 the manner in which the interpreter was 0engulfed 0 
1~ the culture he investigat~do 
hermeneutics revealed the pro~imlty of thia problem to the original 
project~ 
The Biblical hermeneuticists attemptadl ii::j provide s Mn!versall).? 
valid interpretation of fragmentary te~t~ by tr~a~ing a t®~t as s 
unityo A problematic single section of a work could be iVlterpret®d 
from the intention and compositlgn of tha wholeo The established 
linguistic usage of any time and place providecl the key to obscure 
passageso Grammar 9 philology 0 and 6tyle could further be buttressed 
as the keys to a teltt by the appreciation of the te:(t 0s own local 
characteristics 0 and an under~tanding of historical circumstances 
became part of the hermeneutic methodo Such mathbds 0 of cdurse 0 are 
not immune to problems of the historicity and distance of the 
interpreter 0 but aid was available in the form of 0 thriving Christian 
practice 0 which provided the interpreter with a common and continuoYs 
conte)tt in which was situated both the text and tha i·1;b~o&'ien himself o 
The subsequent school of historical hermeneutics daalt-t!lith these 
problems~~ but they were necessaril-Y- tK"ansformedo - Xn brDad 'tarmsv' ~21EL 
hermeneutic technique ..111as an attempted smpathy t11ith cultures tdistan~-­
in timeo Outside of Biblical_ arrd _c~s-~ic~l-int.erpr_s_tation 0 -~the. task 
was rarely one of the technical rsconstruct.ion gf_partial ta~ts 0 but 
an attelllpt to decipher the meaning and significance and origin of 
te)tts that often were available in their entiretyo This produced a 
concentration on the contsxt of a text rather than its contant0 and 
in particular on the position of the 'author in historical timao 
This suggested psychological rsconstructions 0 and such reconstructions 
were possible f6r another reasono The 0thriving Ch~istlan pr~ctlce 0 
that· aided the original biblical scholars could not be e,Yii!Hable to 
the interpreter of more secular textso 
the continuity that ~ould guarantee some communication ~etwe®n 
historian and ta~t? This could in fact be redue~d to @ non= 
quesHono logically 0 no understanding at all is possibl® bet~een 
~o~ally strange and unconnected wordso Bauman illustrate$ th!a 
with a sen~enoe from Wittgensteing 
01 Xf lions could speak 0 we would not understand themoooH"tt) 
Some ontological continuity between the historian and his object may 
the~efore be legitimately assumed 9 by the very act of constituting 
the tent as a problmmatic object to be interpreted 0 Thua before the 
K"esearch process is iroi tiated 9 some degree of understanding ia 
guaranteed by the initial understanding that th~t particular te~t 
e~ists as an object to be interpretedo Past and present ~re thus 
co~joined by some continuum which ~ill ma~e the meaning of the 
historical act available to the investlgatoro 
The consequence of this was articulated by Schlaiermacher 0 and 
his eontrJ.bution is summed up by- D.U they: 
00Tha possibili~y IDf un!var:M1lly YSJl!d inh&'pr~a~ation :can 
be deduced from -the na'ture of und®reun~!ngo- -__'~-xn this proc~ss 
the individuality of the inteJ:>pretar and that of his author do 
not f~ca e~c~ oth~r as t~o-lncomparable facts&- --~oth have been 
fo~med on t"he_ basis of a commo~uman_ nature 0 - and .. this "ma~es 
possible the common ground which all men shin·e and which is 
necessary fa&' speech and comprehen~ion o o o All ind!v.i~ual -
differences are 0 in the Unel analys.is 0 - not determinad by 
quaU.tstive diversities lletl!leen people but only by difhrene_es 
of degree in their mental processeso But when the interprets!:' 
tentatively pl"ojects hi@ own vltality 0 as it were 0 into a 
historical mi1.ieu 0 he is able from this standpoint mBJmentarily 
to stress and to reinforce certain mental processea 0 to let 
others take a lass prominent placep and thus to bring about (bS) 
a reconstruction of an alien life within himselfo" 
Dilthey speaks of the 0possibility of an interpretation that wil~ 
ba universally valido The distance between possibility and aetuality 0 
how~Bver 9 is still presento Not all historical ~~t!facts are accessible 
to inteTpretationo There are moments of the past whos® meaning ws 
cannot graspg the failures with which history is littaredo Has a 
te~t which has no significanca 0 other than ~he m~~ives and aspirations 
of its authorp a meaning for us? Dilthey mak~s a crucial poin~ when 
he asserts that ~only a moment of the past 1~ meaningful i~s~rar as 
it binds the future 0 11 (l,h) 
Dilthey is saying that te~ts which have had ~o impact beyond their 
immediate situation 0 which have not entered into the tradition that is 
the channel of communication between us and the past 0 are dead te~tso 
Perhaps such a fate is inescapable for many human endeavourso Therta 
is still 0 yetp a possibility that dead te~ts may coma to life 11 but 
such a successful resuscitation is the task of history0 not the hlstoriano 
The history of Mar~ism itself provides illustration of thiso 
recognised that the publication of Mar~ 0 s early writings some fifty 
years after his death coincided with and legitimised an entirely ne~ 
interpretation of his whole body of worko Arguably th'a philosopO'lical 
currents loosely grouped under the title 0Western °Aar~ism 0 tiOuld not 
have struck root without -these te~tac. ··:-Their ~rala11ancs to· the ·humQoist-
project of writers since Lukacs and Kersch was conrirmed ·in Marcuae 09--·---
a~camation that they "put the entire theory of 0scientific socialisrno 
-......... 
on m new footing~.~;(lo7) Althusser 0 s determination 0 as part of the 
restoration of scientific Marxism 0 to establish the 0epistemologlcal 
breakv that would consign these te~ts once again to obscurity 0 is a 
further 0 negativei confirmation of their significance in this developmento 
But the 0accident 0 qf the absence of these taxts 0 and the irony 
of their eventual publication by the Moscow State Publishing House in 
l932p should not suggest that their lack of significanc~ p~ior to the 
first blossomings of Western Marltis m was itself accidentalo Ida need 
only ask to whom these te~ts would have addressed themselves before 
the 1920's and VJQDs (perhaps Labriola? But who else?) and to .!!!h!!l 
perceived and felt social 2 _Qoli tical and historical eroblrams they 
would have been construed as relevanto Thus it was neesssary fo~ 
0 history to do its work 0 on the available 0 consensus inte~pretation 
of MaE'~ (and 9 converselyv for the established iniell:pK"eiat.ion of Marx 
to do its work on history) before the eaX'ly wr! ting~ could speako 
Th~ scientific positivism of 0 iron=law 9 Mar)(!sm of the Second 
Iftternational 9 and its disinherited child0 the voluntarist real= 
poli Uk 10concJrete analysis of the concrete situa Hon 00 Marxism of the 
Third International 9 had to first ~un their courseo 
Both these interpretations worked intimately with the culture 
of their times8 ths optimism bestowed upon the nineteenth century 
politicians by the successes of the natural sciences~ and the bitter 
desper~tion and millenari~nism born of the catastrophe that struck the 
heax-t of (uropean culturep the first world waro Only s~bsequently 
and then only among a handful of European Mar~ian intellectuals who 
failed to partake of the enthusiaam fqr the costly march of Soviet 
socialism = ~as ~he retrie~al- of the themes of- an --earlier f'lar~ a 
poss.ibilityo 
The argument here is not one of cause-and-effectp but of 
historical affinitieso Lukacs 0 and l<orsch 0s return to Hegelian 
. .___ 
Marxism pre=dated the publication of the manuscripts by tan years-~ 
or more (although 0 given that their publication ~as made possible 
by the despatch of the photocopied Manuscripts tq Moscow by the 
early frankfurt Institute 9 it is possible that they were familiar 
to certain writer~ before their official publicationo(L~) 
Obversely 0 it is bbvious that the texts themselves carried little 
implications for those who felt no qualms about the current state 
.of the sociali~t movement~ Clearly 0 if the ta)(ts were inherentlt 
subversive of official orthodox Marxism 9 the Moscow publishers would 
have thought twice about m•king them ava1lableo Yhus 0 &lad H. not 
been for the crisis of Marxia~ thought that spanned the p~rlod 9 the 
early writings would have had no more than archival sig~icanceo 
~s indeed was the case and presumably still .is with those copies that 
sit in massed numbers on the bookshelves of Party membs:r~ in 'Ghe p.arty= 
stateso Thus 9 texts iTiay be available in editions of millions 0 and 
still be dead te~tso 
Of course 0 ~van i~ the period of the birth of Western Mar~iam the 
early writings had meaning ror very fswo It was not until the grand 
public crisis of official FlaK"dsm after .1956 that the themes of those 
~ritings found a wider audienqe and became effective in historyo They 
presented a substantial ch~llenge 0 at least in the·West 0 to the 
intellectual and ethi~al respectability of diamat'Marxism 0 and 
indirectly 9 particularly via the work of Ma:rcuse 0 fuelled the g-adic~l 
movements of the 1960°so 
The story may ~e taken one step furthero 
the apparent inefficacy of humanist Maroiem as ~ politics for the 
appropriation of power -may ha~ve contributed afh&- !96® to~-a significant-
countei' to Hegelian themes and a return to ~he pK"ojact of e 0sciant!fic 0 
AaK"xism in the work of the Althusserian schoolo Thus 0 whatever the ...._ 
personal impulses behind Althusser 0s writings·(whic:h 0 ofcourse 0 all 
predated the peaks of 060°s radicalism)p it is probably inappropriate 
to see the brief Althusserian hegemony after 1968 as simply s 0polica 
action° designed to restore the authority of classical. Stalinism0 as 
EoPo Thompson suggestso(G,9 ) Its renaissance has perhaps more under= 
standable roots in the perceived limitations of humanist Marxism 
following the radical wave of the 1960°s 0 and a consequent return of 
the desire for a politics that can successfully address the p~oblsms of 
powe&>o 
This story of the changing interpretations of Mar~ism (piquantly 
confirmed by Al thusset v s !nsi,s tence upon his particular readings of 
te~ts) 0 intimately linked to the specific historical prtiblems display~d 
by any given period 0 confirms the unlikeliness of readings gjjf' ~e)(tS~ 
that will give them a final apodictically true interprstatlon 0 @ 
genuine and final historical objectivityo 
The historian 0 th~refore 0 judges and assesses from his own position 
of baing a contemporary or a specific histories! period 0 which has its 
own definition of the meaningful and meaninglesso This inescapable 
particularity of any historical age may only be ouercomli't if one is 
~illing to assume a future situation or a different order 0 that ia 0 a 
situation where history itself hds come to an ehdo From the sta~dpoint 
of such an authoritative position 0 the historia~ would be able to draw 
up tha final balance sheet of the signif!c~nce of all· that which is 
pas to By implication 0 consequently 0 the adoption or a tela ological 
philosophy of history can provide the historian with the standpoint for 
such an operation befor~ the final .situation has ~tsslf come to passo 
Xt should 0 howeverv be clear rrom· many -parb-of'- this argument 0 both _ -----
the precacting pagas and those that ars to fOlllllt!!v that -x believe: such----'- · 
an assumption to be unacceptab~e 0 both methodtilogically and ln-its 
........... "":-
political and intellectual consequenceso X shall-not here~attempt 
to justify the rejection of that assumption specifically 0 but rather 
to suggest the consequences of such a rejection for the project of a 
historical understariding of our present texto 
If history is charac-terised by changing cul tures 0 values 11 and 
consequently interpretations 0 the only possibility of an objective 
u~derstanding of history 0 true for all future time and placev is the 
advent of the end of history itselfo If this seems ynliksly 0 we are 
f'acad ~ith the problemg is there any escape from an undifferentiated 
historical relativism? Gadamer has proposed the~ssolution of this 
problemo He dismisses any claims that historical knowledge might 
have of an absolute natureo The romantic hermeneuticists believed 
that it was possible for the historian to gain a knowledge ~f a tex~ 
that was superior to the understanding possessed by its authoro They 0 
after all 9 had not only the text to study 0 but also the knowledge of the 
totality of the age in which the author livedo They could.d~~w out the 
impulses and constraints which produced the ta:Kt 0 factors of which an 
author at the time could be only dimly aware 0 if Ot allo Gadaliler is 0 
however 0 content to relinquish any claim to 0supsrior understandingog 
"It is enough to say that we understand in a different way 0 if we 
understand at allooi(10) Thus he dismisses also any temptation for a 
philosophy that will provide 0an end to history 0 ·and thus guarantee 
apodictic knowledge of historyo 
But Gadamer does not regret the temporal distance that saparates 
tha historian and his texto It is not\) for him 11 "something that must 
be ovarcome 11 o for a historian to regret time and its effects is_like a 
doctor reg~ting the ~act-that the human body has·s specific sat ~f---
organs 0 and wishing instead that it possessed the st&'YC~ural simplicity 
of an amoebao It is the complications that produce the possibility of 
·-..,..., -
knowledge\) that offer the historian something to work on 9 and 0 by 
extension provide human beings ~ith the possibility of intellect and 
imaginationo If 9 at some point in the futute 0 it were to become 
possible to reveal-history as transparent 0 no more than the workings 
of a single-celled uncomplicated essence or mechanism 0 the cons~quences 
for the human intelleci would be truly frighteningo And if we are 
conversely tempted by the hermeneutic antipodes of such a scientific 
holy grail 9 we need only ask the following questiong if it did become 
possible to shed all the products and prejudices of our situation in 
px-esent time P and an teE' 1!11 dialogue with the h!sto:i:'ica1 te~~ or event 
completely on its own termsp within its own culture 0 devoid or any 
~nachronistic pollutions = what then would we gain? Surely 0 nothing 
but the collapse into immanence; surely 0 nothing th~t could inform 
our ~nderstanding of our presento for when the obsa~~er becomes 
identiGal with the observed 0 ha .is by definition dissolv~d into the 
objecto It is our present that must be the drivi~g concern or the 
historiang otherwise the historian is a poor substitute for the time= 
travellers of science=fiction 9 and our best hope is ta await the 
development of the appropriate piece of technologyo 
Thus the attempt to completely rec~pture the spirit or a past 
age and to erase the preconceptiohs of the conte~porary age from 
our questioning~ is unnecessaryg 
~In fact 0 tha important thing Is to recognize the 
distance in time as a positive and productive possibility 
of understandingo"(?() 
That distance ls-~ot an empty gap 0 a 0 yawni~g abyss 0 0- but is filled 
the objac~ that now presents itself to us in a specific·cand contemporarl! 
By this passage of time 0 the investigation of the tel<t is · 
"-... -. ---· -'--· -·---· -
· ptoteetsc9 fx-om possible -sources of 9error v = those revealed =by 
atraightfor~ard historical research 9 as well as those born of an -
excessively close subjective involvement with the text and its tim~ 
But 0 valuable as th~sa gains are 0 they do not thereby convert a te~t 
into a prist~ne object safely located within a securely def-ined 
This would simply return us to the comfort of 
a traditional and unreflective objective histo~y 0 facing an object 
safely dead in the past 0 devoid of any ability to influence and subvert 
ou~ understanding through its effect on our tradition and inhar!tanceo 
Thus Gadamer ir•sistently reasser~s Dilthey 0s thsma g a tslti c:~Wn have 
meaning only to the e~tent that it 0 itself 0 addr~ssss YSo Its 
ability to do so derives from its vitality as s l!~ing and crsativa 
element in our tradition 0 and inasmuch as it is 0 therefo~~o ~a~t or 
the subject (the historian) a• well as the object (ths t®=t) 0 it ~ill 
rafuse all claims of those ~ho would reveal and possses its meaning ~s 
absolute knowledgeo 
Gadamer thus suggests that the passage of time may diminish the 
problems described in Adorno 0s version of immanent e~itiqueg 
~xt is only this tempera~ di•ta~ce that dan sol~e the 
really critical question of hermeneutics 9 nam®ly of 
di~tinguishing the true prejudices 0 by which ~e ~nderstand 0 
from the false ones by which we misunderstando uv (12...) · 
But there is no final escape from p~®judiceso lrus histoX'ical 
knowledge is that which takes account of its own situation in 
historyg its inevitable saturation with its own contsmporaneityo 
, Historical objectiviSm mey inch~ed claim some superior! ty to -usrsions 
of a her~eneutic method ~hichs~sults only in.arb!trary "easy 
recreationS Of the pasto 01 ( 1.3) Bi.Jt tO f~il t,g rSCDgnisa=thS·~. 
~xistence of historically produced presuppositions in our own thought 
,_ 
is to "fall short of re~ching that ir~tt. whichg despite tha fiii.ite 
nature or our understanding 0 could be raached." 
Gadamer is in this way arguing fDr what he calls Oeffective-
history 0 o Effective history escapes the complacency of the immanent 
c~itique and the barbarism of the transcendent by bein~ prepared to 
- -
accept the costs that fallow-·ftom ·not adhering to ei thero The cost 
of rejecting the immanent critique is a loss of intimacy with the 
objE!ctg but it is not a tohl loss 0 because such tal total loss only 
occu&-s if one instead adopts the transcendent critiquao Ths-cost of 
rajwcting the transbsndant tritique is the ~bandonment of the 
possibility of absolute truthg but it doe~ not ~mount to the 
absenc~a or .!!..!. truth 0 because such an absence Mill arise only if 
~• ~apitulate in the face of the obje~t 0 if ~e ~re ready to aeciapt 
if' ~1!1l submerga our rea!3on in immanenceo Effact.hte h!sttn:·y is 
capable or providing a limited trutho "To ~~ist historically 
means that knowledge of oneself can never be complste~ 0 but "every 
~ga has to understand a tx-ansmitted ts:~Ct in its own t1ay 0 foK"" tha 
ttB:~Ct is part of the whole of the tradition in which ~h(fl ag!B takes 
an objective interest tllnd in which it seek~ _to unde!"shnd itself o ,,(?t) 
This does not solve Adorno 0s problem of the criticism of 
contemporary cultural productso lacking any separation ~1111 ~!me 
from hia object 0 he cannot find satisfactory criteria by which to 
judge ito Time has not had time to elect the important and 
disenfranchise the me~ningle~s and ephemeralo Xt ie almost in= 
svitabl® 0 therefore that the cultural critic shall confuse the 
ssem accentrieo But the ~ultural critic has ~o choice ~ut to ta~e 
thb x-isk~ The historian°s situation may provide more Cof!~&"o~to _ 
_,_ -----
The effects of history will .have done their work 0 and separ~ted the 
meaningful ftom the meaninglesso 
But histo!"y doe~ not write itselfo Histo:r!ane disagtee about 
interpretations 0 and a large part. of this argument is a disl!tgreement 
with accepted interpreta~ionso Can qne interpretation - the one that 
follows = claim any privilege over the others? It ie my contention 
that existing interpretations have failed to trace tha effect ~f ~ 
St~te ~nd Revolution in history 0 and therefore its complicity in 






















moment of the past is meaningful irisofar as· i:t ~inds the fut11.n.·e 11 0 ws 
can identify the mystery of Leninvs text in the corrollaryg ~a may 
only grasp the meaning of the past I:Jy identifying how it bound the 
future 0 ioeo our presento No~ 9 in both schools of interpretation 
that we have examined 0 such a binding is lackingo The t®x~ does not 
enter into history 0 either due to its absurdity = an impossib!~ 
utopianism = or its innocence =a valid libertariardsm betrayed by thiS 
brutal necessities of subsequent history 0 or the bad faith of historical 
actorso Consequently the text is either meaningless = desd 0 hiatorical 0 
objective 0 a moment in one man°s biography 0 or exc~ssivelt 
meaningful 0 saturated with meaning = in fact 0 sacredo 
The 9 meaningless 0 interpretations fall into two categories., 
Firstly 0 the absurd 0 whereby not only can no connection be established 
between text and consequences 0 no connection can even be established 
between te~t and authoro Thus Conquest ascribes it to the 
0ambivalence 0 of lenin°s whole beingo Wilson attributes its form 
to 0 little thought 0 0 Ulam regards it-as 0 unrepresentative 0 and 
a unfortunate 0 0 Liebman identi-fies- 0glaring weaknesses 0 that revaal':":a-::--- -- · 
Dsurprising 0 lack of thoughto ·5hapiro and Daniels-Teinforce this 
versiono The text consequently had no meaning for its times or 
-,._ 
even for its authoro The second version may be described as-the cynicalo 
This interpretation puts the author back in control of the te~to The 
text could not mean what it said 0 but was a ploy directed to another 
end than that revealed in the te~t itselfo It was designed to wi~ 
the debate with the 0 revisionists 0 (Carr) 0 to legitimate the 
dictatorship necessary to overcome 'the inertia of Russian society 
(Hill) 0 to legitimate the seizure of power itself (Anwei!IB&-) 0 to 
garner the political support necessary for that seizure (Keep) 0 to 
















in the first interpretation 9 ths te~t is op~que 9 allowing no meaning 
to shine through 0 in the second 0 the meaning is distortad 0 but may 
be de~iphered by attributing deliberate and rational motivationso 
By contrast 0 the 0meaningful 0 interpretation asserts the 
transparency of the te~t 9 meaning shines through ito Put d.Hfsrently 11 
there is no meaning that is separate from the sutface of the te~t 
itself~ and the t®~t l!!scapes interrogation bacaus!BI of its honestyo 
The te~t is unassailable 9 and consequently 0 sacre-d o lenin is the 
channel by which the truth may express itselfo And because the 
tr.uth has not yet come to pass 0 it is not in historyo And that..which 
is not ~ history cannot be examined as an historical objecto lt has 
the s.tatus of a myth 0 and a myth may only be ~o 1t may not be 
examinedo We may remember L~vi-Strauss 0 definitioh or a myth as a 
machine for the suppression of timeo The mythical status of The State 
and Revolution within the radical tradition has been affective in 
suppressing aspec~s of the nature of Soviet atithori~arianism 0 and 0 
indead 9 thl:l myth of The State and Revolution has ensured_that the 
histort -!Of The St:a~e -and-·Revolution remains ,unt!lrit-tsno :..:=The 0 hiatory11 
of 1rhe State and Revolution has very little -~o_do with its:origins;-~=--=-~ 
its motivations 9 or its intentions. It must be realised that its-. . _.....__ 
i 
history is temporallr·situated affer the appe~rancie of the·texti_not 
I . 
prior to and simultaneous· with its production.,.-, -Only if- tile. can read 
the history of The State and Revolution in the subsequent history of 
the USSR and of ma-nkind will it have a history that contains any meaningo 
Thus, sixty years later 9 we have the benefit of temporal distance 
from the historical texto What is morep that distance will give u~ 
access to the effective=history of the text~ if 11 that isg it can be 
suggested that the text has participated in creating our contemporary 
If this proves possible 0 then it may b~ possible to 
resist the effc:rts of the historiam~ to turn the text into a dead and 
alien o:;ject. I'he next chapter, there fore, Will attempt to suggest 
the continuing effectivity of The .State a.nd Hevolution in the Russia 
of the Gulo..c::> 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE TEXT AND ITS CONI~NT 
It is necessary at this point to consider the content of Lanin°s 
tra)('i: in detailo The purpose will be to reveal the effect of Lenin°s 
arguments in reality: for I believe that those arguments had effects 
that are demonstrable and consequences that were profoundo Xn effect 11 
the Soviet state that emerged after 1917 bore the stamp of The State 
and Revolution in all its subsequent phasesp before ~ after the 
Bolsheviks secured the monopoly of powerg before and after the decline 
of the Soviets as sign•t~vant institutions? before ~after the rise 
of Stalino In this my argument differs from the interpretations 
discussed in the previous chaptero 
This will be a selective-consideration~ -and it will hope to 
Dattacko Lenin 9s position on its~rong points and not its weak ones. 
The 0weak 9 points are those whereby Lenin imp~citly gives some 
credibility-and-'!uthority to ~ubsequent authoritarian developments: 
' the phrase· Odictatorship---Of-~the- proletar.iatO-;c:,and-.its consequences!_ 
the insistence :on -the -temporary. --need for -:the ::-state as -:an :·instrument"::- ~-: -~ · 
of repressionv the ac"'"ceptance .that 0 bourgeois 9 norms of distribution 
will temporarily continue ~and =have to be enforced.;- ·-::.All _these· _are·· 
largely specific to- the Russian~-situationll--or at least they <3re in 
the degree of their intensityo Lenin's theses retain their power 
at least to some extent because it is always possible to conceive 
of the attempt at socialist construction taking place in conditions 
.• 
much less chaotic and underdeveloped than post-Tssrist Russiao 
The arguments X present will not deal with the openly 
authoritarian echoes that are occasionally present in the texto 
Similarly 9 the evidence I will seek to present from the history of the 
. Soviet state ~~ intended to have general imp!Cationso The evidence 
itself must of necessity refer to a situatidn where Utopian ideas 
were implemented in an almost 0worst possible case 0 situat!ono 
But it~.my contention that the a~guments this evidence seeks to 
illustrate are in no way confined to the e~igencies of such a 
difficult eituationo What follows may be read as relevant to 
utopian politics under~ conditions 9 even the ubest possible case 0 9 
and the reader is invited to bear this consideration in mind at all 
pointso 
The Problem of Bureaucracx 
The State and Revolution argues that it is possible to establish 
a state which will be more democratic than any previously conceived~ 
Partly this will derive from the fact that the state will be for the 
first time the property of the majority 9 not a minorityo But this 
assumption alone will not produce the profoundly radical concept of 
democracy that Lenin has in mindo It will 0 perhaps 0 make possible a 
state.that is less reprassive 9 .~ess secretive 9 ~ass manipulative 9 less 
repulsive 11 ,-and the -implications -of that change might. in themselves be--~.-­~. i 
profound{y ~mancipatoryc, ··But such a _limited conception of the· new-
regime~as not Len!n°si in_fact 9 the reformist Social Democratic 
parties- already adhered. to such a vi'Si.ono . · They anticipated the _day __ _ 
\when the mass working-1:lass ·parties would ·attain control of the· ·state~-
by means of the franchiseo lenin 0 it is well known 0 rejected their 
perspective by insisting on the unreliability of the bourgeois state 
machine: it would resist 11 sabotage 11 and destroy social-democratic 
movements that appeared. to be within reach of majority officeo It 
was consequently 9 he argued 9 necessary to 'smash the state machine 0 0 
But Lenin does not recommend the most straightforward alternativeg 
that would necessitate little more than replacing the staff of the state 
apparatus with those loyal to the new regimeo It is unnecessary to 
=7J= 
limit the sim to thiso The conditions are present that make it 
possib!'e to, reject the very .idea of the modern stateo 
His fuodamenta! assumption concerns the functions of the statag 
a socialist society will cause a radical reduction in those functionso 
This 0 then~ is'the conceptual starting point for the model of the 
radical state that will be elaborated in the pages of the textg 
"Capitalist culture has created large scale production 0 
factories 0 railwaysp the postal services 9 telephonesp etcoo 
and on this basis the great majority of the functions of the 
old 0state power 0 have become so simplified and can be reduced 
to such exceedingly simple operations of registration 0 filingp 
and checking that they can be easily performed by every literate 
personooo A witty German Social-Democrat of the seventies of the 
last century called the postal service an example of the socialist 
economic systemo This is very trueo At present the postal 
service is a business organised along the lines of a state 
capitalist monopolyo Imperialism is gradually transforming all 
trusts into organisations of a similar type o~; Once we have 
overthrown the capitalists ooo and smashed the bureaucratic 
machine of the modern state 0 we shall have a splendidly equipped 
mechanism ooo which can very well be set going by the united· 
workers themselves 0 who will hire technicians 9 foremen 9 and 
accountants 0 and pay them all workmen's wageso" (1) 
Only a minimum of the functions that the capitalist-state performs 
are there~ore ~ctually necessaryo- The greater part=of ~hat·~p~aratus---
is devoted--to ... a task that will clearly be redundant in the -future 
society: the oppression of-~the wo-rking class g 
..._ 
"The imperialist war has immensely accelerated and 
int~nslfied the process of transformation of monopoly~ - · 
capitalism into state monopoly capitalismo The monstrous 
oppression of the working people by the state, which is merging 
more and more with the all=powerful capitalist associations 9 
is becoming increasingly monstrouso The advanced countries ooo 
are becoming military convict prisons for the workerso" 
0 
Thus 0 when Lenin was later confronted with the fact of 
bureaucratisation in the state that he established after the revolution 
he attributed it to a specific cause that had nothing in common with 
the capitalist~state regimeso The soviet bureaucracy was the product 
of economic badkwardnessg 
(2) 
11 In our country bureaucratic practices have different 
economic roots 9 namely the atomised and scattered state of 
the small producer with his poverty 9 illiteracy 9 lack of 
culture 9 the absence of roads and exchange between agriculture 
and. industry 9 the absence of connection and interaction between them •• ( 3 ) 
Leriin°s argument stands in contrast to other work on the problem 
of bureaucracy that was developing during the same periodo Lenin is 
not noted as the most penetrating theorist of this problemv that 
mantle must fall to Max Weber. Weber 0 s work took a contrary line 
to that of Lenino He suggested that the phenomenon of the state 
had taken on a new complexity 0 not simplicityo Weber postulated a 
link between development and bureaucracy by suggesting the extension 
of administrative tasks in qualitative and quantitative forms. The 
oqu~litative 0 argument proposes that: 
~It is obvious that~chnic~lly the great modern state is 
absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basiso The larger 
the state 9 and the more it is or the more it becomes a great 
power atate 9 the more unconditionally is this the caseo The 
United States bears the character of a polity which 0 at least 
in the technical sense 9 is not fully bureaucratized. But the 
greater the zonas-of friction with the outside and the more· 
urgent -the ··needs-for--administrative lini ty at home 9 the more . _ 
this~ character -is-:-inev~tably and gr~dually giving way forma-lly T4\) ···-
to the. bureaucratl.c structureo 11 -~ ~-
Lenin°s argument may be consider!d immune ~o this thesiso It 
~as no part of his conscious aim-to achieve 9great power 1 status for 
Russia and his vision-of a soc].alist and fraternal world system9· while 
naive 9 cannot be accused of any lack of coherence with his theory of 
the declining tasks of the stateo This, howeverv will not prove to 
·be the case with the. other ~ore of his thesis: the effect of 
industrialisation and modernizationo Weber's argument on the 
oqualitativev development of administrative tasks suggests that: 
11 ooo incre~sing burssucrBtizstion·ia a function of the 
!~creasing possession of goods usad f~r consumption~ and sn 
increasingly sophistica~ad technique of fashioning axternal 
life = a technique which corresponds to the opportunities 
providsd by such wealtho This reacts upon the standard of 
living and makes for an increasing subjective indispensibi!ity 
or organiaed 9 collectiveg inter=local~ and thus bureaucratic 0 
p~ov!sion for the most Yari~d o? wants 0 ~hich previously were (S) 
either unknown 9 or ~era satisfied locally or by a private economyo 11 
The disagreement between the assumptions of Lenin and of Weber 
could therefore not be sharpero for Weber 0 the space for bureaucracy 
is provided by the disappearance of the 0small=scaled and scattered 
produceru 0 the increase in literacy and education 0 the rise in the 
general level of culture 0 the extension of methods of communication 
and the growing interdependence of the various sectors of the economyo 
It is now perhaps easy to assert the superiority of Webe~vs 
diagnosis over Lenin°so But it is also clear that the evidence for 
this argument was already present at the time both men were writingo 
The governments of all re~ively modernised societies were coming to 
a real~tion thBtthe traditional and limited tasks of administration 
were being.replaced~by_somathing ~ather more complex and intractableo 
... 
These -:-tradi tiona!·. tasks =indeedc'amounted to lit Ue. more --tnan-
oregistration 9 .filing 0 ~and checking~ in the performance of 
essentially limited taskso --But the 'nature of the newcadministrative 
problematic was __ characterised by a change -i-n functiong the 
administrative machine would have a much greater role in the guidance 
and resolution of conflicts of competing interests 0 and of performance 
of problematic t~ which had previously been the domain of the 
automatic and unconscious processes of culture and civil ~ocietyo 
ramily and community had performed the tasks now undertaken by the 
nascent welfare systems of Britain and Germany 0 had performed them 
according to norms and calculations unquantifiable in terms of rational 
administrative processeso Similarly 9 Lenin mistook his object when 
consida~ing the 0 economic aystem 0 itselfo functionally 0 an economic 
system 0 capitalist or socialist 0 is a mechanism for the allocation 
of economic resources and the distribution of rewards from those 
resourceso Lenin seems to suggest that the economic problem that 
can be resolved by the adoption of the model of the 0 postal service 0 
is simply one of efficiencyg where the multi=faceted confusions of 
the competitive mechanism have been removed 0 there is no 0aconomico 
problem of organisationo Howaver 0 the problem remains that the 
capitalist mechanism~ in the form of the market 0 accomplished the 
task of allocation and distribution of rewards and resources which 
still remains as a task to be performed 0 in the absence of the marketo 
Confident assertions of the possibility of extending the 0postalo 
model to embrace the whole of the economy ignore the fact that the 
absence of a market forces the state to inherit a task of immense 
complexH~Yo Again 0 it is the case that such problems were already 
being presented to the European capitalist states 0 not least in the 
problems of. economic~anagement arising from the experience of total waro 
The.- f~ct that al-l:: these tasks had been autonomously fulfi-lled'-by 
family 9 community 0 and market did not-make their execution one lalnit 
less complicated once they became the province of -the rationalised 
........ 
procedures of administrative processeso Lenin's' framework was not 
i 
equipped to copd with these considerations9 and it is of course 
arguable that precisely these considerations made themselves very 
strongly felt in short order 0 playing no small part in the multiplication 
of tasks that was to fall to the Sov~et government in its formative 
years., The process of industrialization upan which all Russian · 
revolutionaries were determined to embark could not but emphatically 
contr!buts to the decisive destruction of non=administrative means of 
social provision 0 involving as it did large-scale rural depopulation; 
daatruction of traditional forms of social cirganisation 0 and rapid 
occupational mobilityo And the allocation of resources to competing 
interests within the fields of social provision and economic activity 
is s dacision=making processg it is more than the simply mechanical 
proc®ssee of 9registration 9 filing 0 and checkingoo 
Weber believed that the nature of even the simple and routine 
tasks provided a basis of power for the administrators that was 
potentially dangerouso If it can be further established that the 
complexity and technical content of these tasks increases to the 
point of transformation as development proceeds 9 such dangers are 
obviously mangifiedo It is necessary at this point 9 therefore 9 to 
take note of these dangers as Weber initially defined themo 
Weber 9s Bureaucracy 
Weber defined a series of features which gave his concept of 
bureaucracy a specific charactero The following account of these 
features is by no means exhaustive 9 but provides the elements that 
this argument will attempt to bring to bear on Lenin°s modelo 
According to Weber 9 a modern state exists w~ere a political ·coinniunitr-
possesses the characteristics of an administrative and legal order 
that is 'SUbject to change by legisla.t'ion; an administrative apparatus 
that-eonducts official .business in accordance .with-legislative 
regulition; binding authority over all persons and over most actions 
taking place within its jurisdiction; the legitimation to use force 
within this area if coercion is permitted or prescribed by legal authorityo 
Th• legal authority of the modern state thus implies that: 
(i) Any norm may be enacted as law ~ith the claim and 
expectation that it will be obeyed by all those who are 
subject to the authority of the political communityo 
(ii) The law as a whole constitutes a ~ystem of abstract rules 0 
and governmental administration is bounded by rules of law 
and conducted in accordance with generally formulated 
principles that are approved or at least acceptedo 
(iii) The people who occupy positions of authority are not 
personal rulersn but superiors who temporarily hold 
an office by virtue of which they possess limited authorityo 
(iv) The people who obey the legally constituted authority do 
so as citizensp not subjectsp and obey the law rather 
than the official who enforces ito 
Where the rule of law thus pre\Sil.s 9 a bureaucratic organisation 
is governed by the following principlesg 
(i) Official business is conducted on a continuous basiso 
(ii) It is conducted according to the rules t.hat (a) the duty 
of each official to do certain types of work is delimited 
in terms of impersonal criteriap (b) the official is given 
the authoi-it.y necessary to carry -aut his assigned functions 11 
,- (c) the means "'"Of--compulsion at his disposal..are _strictly 
limi ted 9 and ~the conditions -of .their ·1eg1 timate employm·ent · 
are clearly definedo~ · 
(iii) Every official's responsibilities and authority ar·e ·part 
·of a· hiera·rchy of--authorityo (6 ) 
Weber then analysed the dangers presented by this social 
institutiong the institution itself has certain regrettable featureso 
Bureaucracy is· part and parcel of the process of 1dis-enchantment 9 
that was central to his worko Bureaucratic decision-making tends 9 
by definition to be 'inflexible 0 o It is difficult to adapt the 
processes of rationalised thought to particular cases of partictilar 
individualsp when this might be precisely what is required if a humane 
and sensible decision is to be reachedo We might consequently feel 
ambiguous about: 
"•oo the old-type ruler who is moved by sympathy 0 (?) 
favour 0 graca 0 and gratitudeooo" 
when faced with thQ modern bureaucrat who adheres rigidly to 
established rules anrlthe principle of calculabilityg sometimes to 
the point of obvious absurdityo This 0depersonalization° of 
decision~making underlies tha common complaints about 0faceless 
bureaucrats 0 o 
A further regrettable 9 and at times apparently irresistable 0 
feature of the bureaucracy is the~ndency to "the concentration of 
the means of administrationo" The general te~dency for pre~modern 
forms of social provision and decision to be 9 on their own direction 0 
replaced by bureaucratic forms may sweep up in its flood such forms 
that are still viable and should not be relinquishedo Not all 
administrative functions must by their nature be performed by state 
officials~ many may_- reasonably be claimed by those involved -in the 
institutions of a local 9 voluntary ·or -:-autonomous cnature.-- But the.:_~--~-
bureaucracy has an impulse to absorb all .these 0 an impulse which it 
may be difficult to refuse because that bureaucracy can so often do 
-....... 
the task more efficiently and cheaplyo Or at least 9 it can pretend 
sop even if its real-colonising power derives only from the momentum 
of the already established bureaucratic machine. 
These two problems are inevitable when a bureaucracy does no 
more than strictly follo~ its prescribed and legitimate roleo 
However 0 we are faced with a far greater set of problems in the 
possibility of the bureaucracy overstepping the boundaries that a 
democratic society would wish to set for ito Bureaucracies may 
move into a realm where they have no right to be~ they may aggregate 
to themse~ves powers of political decision-makingo 
xr thers is sny normative content to Weber 0 s work on bureaucracy 
. . 
it must be understood as s theory of appropriate limitationso Weber 0s 
work does not propose a rejection of the bureaucratic instjb.Jtiong 
sue~ a rejection would be an impotent gesture 9 and he had anyway clearly 
spelled out that bureaucracy cam as part of a historical 0 packageoo 
Modernisation brings improved health 0 genuine popular access to 
aducationp a standard of living previously denied to all but a small 
msjority 9 a rise in the laval of culture and opportunities 0 and so ono 
It also brings bureaucracyo This is 0 at least in part 0 a costo But 
before t~e cost is judged 0 the value of the commodities it pays for 
must be appreciatedo Of this basic value 9 Weber seems to have had 
little doub~o 
Weber also pointed out that the rise of bureaucracy was associated 
with the rise of democracyo Bendi~ summarised the argument~ 
"Bureaucracy developed with the support of democratic 
movements that demanded equality before the law and legal 
guarantees against~arbitrariness ~n judicial and ~dministrative 
decisions~~~ In meeting these.demands~bureaucratic organisations 
had a· levelling·,~f-:f-ectg' otheo people subject to the law and the.__ - (8 
officials who-exercised -authol'i ty under "the., law- became formall-y· equal a" 
This did not t~mpt-Weberoto anodyne and vacuous conclusions about 
..... . 
the innocuous :nature of:bureaucratic-powero We bar 's ·theory as ta blishes 
-- t~~ro symbiotic .but distinct domains.. .As we shall sea, problems ominous 
for democracy 'arise-from the b~i.Jrring of divisions between these domains, 
or the colonising of one domain by the othero One domain is that of 
bureaucratic administration, which is ruled by the considerations of' 
rationality and calculabilityg it is the domain of instrumental values, 
and its responsibility is to seek the most effective and economical 
implemantati~n of policies and decisions that have been arrived at 
elael!lharao It coexists,with the public 0 or politicalp domaino 
This domain cannot expect its policies to arrive from elsewhereo 
Those decisions are the prerogative of the ~olitical domain and of 
no othero · It is here th~ the basic value.:.orientations of the 
society must be determined 0 and this 9 ideally 0 is achieved by a 
process of 0discursive will-formation° 0 as Habermas has termed ito 
This distinction is an important one for Weber 0 who speaks to 
the widespread fear of bureaucracies that exists in the modern worldo 
It is common in popular culture and in radical political theory to 
conceive of bureaucracy only as a standing abuse to the principles 
and practice of democracyo For Weber 9 it is the relationship between 
bureaucrat and politician that is crucialo For while the latter is 
legally master 0 the relationship is easily tiltedo Experts de facto 
carve out for themselves spheres of discretion and control despite 
their formal subordination to a political will~ 
"Under normal conditions 9 the power position of a fully 
developed bureaucracy is always overtoweringo The ~political 
master 0 finds himself in the position of the 0 dilettante 0 (g) 
who stands opposite the 0expert v o o o 80 
Given that day-to-day authority rests ~n the hands of the 
· administrators 9 every -public-political struggle in which a politi-cian 
engages - electionp parliame~tary.Mote mustp if successful 9 be 
followed by a private struggle to eri--sure impleqtentation by the 
bureaucracyo If the politic ian is __ ~he loser in such a struggle 
and it-is~ as we have ~ointed outp often an uneven one - then the 
bureaucracy has usurped the process of political decision-makingo 
Bureaucracies have a "fundamental tendency to turn all problems of 
politics into problems of- administrationo"(lO) 
Gouldner has attempted to elaborate more fully the source of 
the bureaucratVs power over the politician~ this power may be seen 
as undergoing subtle but profound changes as the bureaucracy responds 
to changing taskso The ability of the traditional bureaucratic 
official to ss~ape rrom political control was a function of the 
comple~!ty of the tasks assignedQ however routine and mundane the 
skills involved in the performance of those tasks might have beano 
Xn Most instancesQ the old bur~t conformed to Lenin°s picture 
of the regulator 9 the filer 9 the checkero He wasg 
00 ooodesigned to be an agent9 uncritically obedient to the 
organisation 1 s top managers ooo the old bureaucrat 0s skills 
sre of ten __ little mora than being able to read 9 write 9 file 9 ( 1 ) 
and are limited to their employing bureaucracyo" 1 
But the rise of the 0modern° bureaucracy makes it less and less 
a clerical phenomenom 9 .and increasingly part of an intelligentsiao 
This 0 technical intelligentsia 0 possess 0 e~tens!ve cultural capital 0 9 
which 0increases their mobility 0 9 and thus their potential independence 
from and lack of subordination to the specific norms of a bureaucratic 
cultureg 
"The technical intelligentsia ooo is controlled by those 
incompetent to judge its performance and whose control 9 
therefore 9 it e~perien~es as irrational ooo In contrast to 
the bureaucrats·"o·o o -the intelligentsia seek nothing for its 
own sake 11 gives. reasons_without"invoking author.ity 0 and regards 
nothing as·settled-once arid'--f-or-all;, To them 0 ·:nothing· is 
s~empt from re=e~aminatiimo --unlike the· bureaucrats 9 the ----
intelligentsia are : ~ot..:-:!x::itualists 9 pursuing something without- {12 )-
regard for effec~ivenessotD 
If the power of the old bureaucr-acy rested on its 0 myster-y 9 9 
' ' 
its detailed knowledg~ of the procedures and possibilities 9 the 
history ahd the comple~ity 11 .of .-the administrative apparatus 9 the 
power of the new bureaucracy derives from contrary themes. The new 
bureaucracy possesses an interrogative capacityo This perhaps makes 
it less susceptible to the. routinism of formal rationality and 
secrecy that Weber identified as the inherent failing of bureaucracy; by 
the same token 9 however 9 it describes an administrative machine that 
can posssss an ethic of independence and decision-making that is 
strongly counterposed to the idea of control by political masterso 
Indeed 9 Gouldnar sees this new potential as ~ntimately connected with 
the attempt of a new ruling class to establish itselfo Prerogatives 
of political=decision-making will be claimed with increasing openness 9 
and not just assumed by stealtho The viability of this prognosis is 
a matte~ for debate 0 but it is clear that if Gouldneros typology or 
the new bureaucracy is close to the truthp the problems of democratic 
control can only be intensifiedo 
Bureaucracy in The State and Revolution 
For Lenin economic development demanded a reduction in the tasks 
and responsibilities of ~he stateo It is then perhaps not surprising 
that to the developments in the European state form in the early 
twentieth century 9 which included the first major attempts at welfare 
provision 9 economic _management and planningp and political 
participation 9 he can only ascribe a uniformly negative charactero 
But if it is accepted that Lenin 9s conception of the tasks that any 
state-must at a minimum perform is inadequate 9 the consequences must 
be examinedc; '-- Such a 111eakness must --put in question the integrity of 
the model ~f-the radical state that he=expoundedo We must consider 
whether Lenin°s prescriptions for democratic control 9 for policing 
"-.. the powari and the boundarias 9 of the bureaucracy 9 are rendered 
unacceptably naive by this growth of-the administrative functiono 
Despite his extremely modest assessment of the functions of the 
modern state appar~tus 9 Lenin ~ aware of the tendency of the 
administrative organs to establish their own autonomy = whether in 
their separate territ9ries or over society as a wholeo Howeverp 
when he turns to this it appears that it is the issue over which he 
feels least impelled to extend or improve in the writings of Mar~ 
and Engelso He gives a lengthy quotation from Engelsg 
~'Against this transformation of the state and the organs 
of the state from servants of society ~nto masters of society = 
an inevitable transformation in all previous states = the 
Commune used two infallible means. In the first place 9 it 
filled all posts = administ~ativev judicialv and educationalv by 
election and on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned 
subject to recall at any time by the electors. And~ in the 
second place 9 it paid all officials~ high or low~ only the wages 
received by other workersooo In this way a dependable barrier to 
place=hunting and careerism was set up 9 even apart from the 
binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies 0 (l3 ) 
which were added besidesooo 81 
The theme of Vcareerism 0 and 0 place=hunting 1 is a pregnant oneg 
it replicates the mistaking of the object that LeninVs critique of 
bureaucracy has already showno After Engels~ comments Lenin 
,_ -
underlines the centrality of this problem for him: a career in 
bureaucracy is no more than an avenue to economic gains of the most 
vulgar kindsg 
"o•o if careerism is to be abolished completely~ it must· 
be made impossible for 0 honourable' though profitless posts in 
the ·Civil Service to be used as a springboard to highly 
lucrative posts in banks or joint=stock companies 9 as (l4 ) 
constantly happens in all the freest capitalist countrieso" 
It is in fact remarkable that the onl-y _prescription __ for the--
control of officials that receives detailed attention- soma-two 
full pages - is that uf the reduction of~1 the r~muneration of all 
......... 
servants=of the state -to the level of ~workmanas wage~ 0 " (20)o 
The unquestionably-more complex--':issues of'-- the election of all officials 9 
the constant right of recall0 and the necessity for binding mandates 
for delegates~ receive no further elaborationo Lenin's 
thought in this whole area is ·constantly voided of relevance to the 
real problem by the re=emergence of a theory of motivation cast solely 
in te~ms of casho 
Xt is of some interest that Trotskyvs theory of the bureaucracy 0 
markedly more sophisticated in its argument and elaboration than 
Lenin'sv written in the middle of the '30•s' 9 replicates tllni.s basic 
fallacy. Trotsky 0 in his concern to pronounce anathema on the 
Soviet bureaucracy0 stressed the 'parasitic' nature of that bureaucracy. 
It had 9 he stressed 9 no necessary role in the process of production 0 
no economic role at all. Its interests were divorced from its 
functiong that is 0 it had a natural interest in maintaining its 
privileged access to consumption in a situation of grave material 
scarcity0 and to secure t~s practically 'invented' a job for itself. 
Mouzelis has summed up the thesisg 
"Trotsky holds to the basic Marxist positions a social 
class always has its roots in the sphere of production 9 the 
domination of one class over another is essentially an economic 
domination which reflects itself in the legal 9 political·9 and 
ideological sphere. If~ this is· so 0 the Soviet bureaucracy does 
not constitute a social class 9 and its domination has a .purely 
political non-economic character. Indeed 9 the economic roots 
of the bureaucracy are very weak. If the bureaucrats regulate 
the distribution of income 9 they are very far from regulating 
production. Thus·the function of the bureaucracy in the 
productive process is not organic. It disposes of the means 
of production only by delegation. And this fact makes the 15 situation of the bureaucrat uncertain and his dominatiOn precarious.,.( ) 
It ·is. difficult to conceive of--:what ~the -Soviet bureaucracy were 
doing during Stalin's 'second revolution• which launched the 
~ 
collectivization and industrializat~n processes if they were not 
'regulating ~reduction'~ 
It is not. intended--here- to engage in the dubiously useful debate 
as to whether that bureaucracy actually constitutes a class. What is 
interesting is 9 again 9 how Trotsky's immense labours on the problem9 
and indeedp the sincerity with which he condemns the bureaucracy for 
its gigqotic 'betrayals' 9 and later 'crimes' 9 end up in a minimisation 
of the problem itself. Lenin•s solution to the process of 
bureaucratisation is modests maintain standards of behaviour until 
rescued by the development of the forces of production and the elevation 
of the nation's culture. When the bureaucratic corruption of the 
USSR was finally borne in on LeninD his only solution was to intensify 
the concentration of power. It was impossible to distribute powerD 
inasmuch as the source of the corruption came from sources external 
to the state machine itself. We can recall Lenin's definition of 
the roots of the bureaucratic problems economic underdevelopment. 
Translated into political sociology 11 this meant the penetration of 
the administrative strata by the 'low cultural level' of the populace 9 
in particular of the peasantry. In such a situationp Lenin's answer 
to the problem of bureaucracy wasp in Lewin's words 11 thats 
"It was necessary 11 therefore 0 to fall back on the more (1 6) advanced workers 11 on the proletarian elite 11 or rather 11 on the Party." 
In the light of our previous ,argument 11 this was 11 of course 11 
to make the cure worse than the disease. 
Trotsky made a defence of the Soviet a central part of his 
programme for combat ing bureaucracy11 and as such the institution 
occupies an important place-~n the 1927 Platform of -the Joint 
Opposition. - Yet what "is-clear-~-i-s-=that- Trotsky- can propose no 
constitutional or institutional changes to the existing state of 
affairs. The oppositionists are ;:.~uced to anodyne suggest,ions 
whose guarantee of implementation lies only in willpower and good 
faith. It is,necessar-y to "adopt-a firm policy of struggle with 
officialdom", to wage this struggle on the basis "of a consistent 
development of worKers• democracy in the party, trade unions, and 
Soviets" ("as Lenin would".); it· is necessary to "adopt a slogan" 11 
to "heighten class activity" 11 to "draw the broad mass of people in", 
to "bring it about" that the working people are "convinced ~y 
experience01 that the State institutions are on their side. Even 
the constitutional demand for "a complete stop to the removal of 
elected Soviet officials0' is rendered vacuous by the proviso 
1'except in the case of real and absolute n.ecessity. oo (l7) 
Trotsky'S solution later became profoundly radicals a political 
revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy. But a solution of ~uch 
magnitude is 11 paradoxical1y0 just as simple as Lenin°s ~and as mis~ 
directed. Such an act of brutal rupture could certainly have removed 
that specific bureaucracy at that specific timev but only if that 
bureaucracy is seen as the unique product of a unique conjuncture will 
such a solution satisfy. For if the re-establishment of a stable 
situation were once again to present complex tasks which demanded the 
operation of those necessary functions which the bureaucracy had indeed 
performedD the situation returns to square one. The inadequacy of 
both Lenin and Trotsky's solutions is perhaps voiced in the failure 
of either to take root in the USSR. 
An unsophisticated anti-bureaucratism ends up conspiring with the 
bureaucracy in the maintenance of its power. Lenin sees bureaucracy 
in terms of careerism11 which allows the bureaucrat to 0cash in' his 
service to the state through .~irectorships. ····Trotsky sees that the 
bureaucracy of- an administered society has· di'rect -access· to material. 
privilege. Both .. con'Strue·-the motivation of the bureaucrat as economic 
gain. Their inability to avoid th'is reductionismcof-- the bureaucratic 
interest to somethilg·outside the-specific function of the bureaucrat 
robs -them of the insight that has made an alternative body of work 11 
from Weber to Haberrnas 0 so fruitful. That insight involves the 
recognition that the bUreaucrat 0 - expert 11 administratorD or 
' intellectual technician - derives a motivation from the function he 
performsp and a power from the necessity of that function and the skills 
tbat he possesses to fulfill it. ' Thus a reasoned understanding of 
the problem of bureaucracy depends upon an acceptance of the necessity 
of the function of that group 11 rather than an assertion of it as an 
unambiguous evil. 
-n-
Lenin °S 0i"ight of recall" will not overcome the power and moral 
autho~ity granted to the bureaucrat who can lay claim to some measure 
of expc~rtise. If the power of the bureaucrat comes from knowledge 0 
if knowfedge is power 0 the situation will evade the control of 
procedures designed to monitor a situation where the only commodity 
involved is power itself. Power 0 construed as simple authority 
deriving from the holding of office 0 can easily be transferred from 
one holder to the other. Power deriving from the possession of 
knowl7dge and skills may exerci~.e two defenses against such simple 
control proceduress the bureaucrat has the power of 0 Sabotage' in 
its widest sense 0 i.e. he can extract concessions in return for the 
obedient fulfillment of his functionsp and the citizen will be 
vulnerable to an awareness of the imbalance in the power relationship 
he inhabits with the bureaucratp and tlllus grant to the bureaucrat 
licence to perform his tasks without constant supervision. Thus to· 
set up crude mechanisms of control as a result of seeing the bureaucrat 0 s 
power as deriving only from authority is to allow the genuine power of 
the bureaucrat to garner strength unchecked by realistic balances. 
,.· 
Only as a result of conce ding--to the·bureaucr,acy i-ts genuine 0 
legitimate0 and distinct functionsp can one begin to determine the 
boundaries of its powers -and: construct political control procedures 
that may .successful~}' police those boundarieso It is this·concern 
with 'bureaucratic forms • ·as -necessary objects of analysis which is 
almost entirely absent from the work of Lenin and Engels. The 
Engels/Lenin model has further problems. I have just suggested that 
-
the misunderstanding of the nature of bureaucratic power is likely to 
result in the mechanism of recallD etc. 0 falling into disuse. This 0 
as ever 0 is not ah absolute case. We can consider the possible 
effects where such measures do in fact become the norms of political 
practiceo 
It is worth noting 0 to start with 0 tha~ the consequent 
instability of office-holders will obviously hinder the smooth working 
of an apparatus whose functions are by definition c~1tinuous. It will 
further set limits upon the freedom of action of the official = indeed 
it is designed to achieve precisely that. Clearly the possibility of 
a conflict between the general interest and the particular interest 0 
however these are construed 0 does arise. A state machine that is 
avowedly charged with the task of administering a transition from an 
old way of life to a new one will face this problem rather acutely. 
The industrialization process itself unfortunately has the character 
of a •command' situation 9 just as does any attempt to affect radical 
social and cultural change in an already developed economy. To 
propose no judgements on the moral acceptability of such attempts; 
the attempt itself simply raises issues of conflict between the 
interests on each side of the attempt. It should be recognised that 
when the position of the bureaucrat is unstable and temporary 0 as it 
would inevitably be under-the Commune formula 9 the curse of 'careerism' 
could _b_~come a genuine one.· =-- I have._suggested- 'that such ·concepts<are - -
.~ 
not. very helpful in understanding the culture· and motivation ooof-=-.:an. 
established administrative stratum. But a situation where position 
is constantly threatened could well have the consequence of making·the 
official constantly concerned about how to maintain his position; his 
knowledge of the indispensibility of his particular skills in the face 
of popular ignoran~e could only reinforce an opportunist and populist 
attitude to those who,held power over him. 
We are thus faced with the possipility of corruption becoming an 
institutionalised practices by corruption I mean a tendency to give 
undue weight to the interests of prominent and powerful in the decision-
making process. The removal of the membrane between the world of 
rational administration and the world of value-laden practical interests 
which is involved in Engels' proposal harbours the risk that the 
latter will overwhelm the formers not by a considered process of 
political change 0 but by counterposing opinion to legalityo 
Bureaucrats may by such means be prevented from actions which their 
electors find unpalatableo They may also be induced to initiate 
actions Which their constituents find desirable 0 but are not in fact 
within the powers granted to them by whatever constitutional processes 
the society has seen fit to construct. 
De Tocqueville noted such possibilities in his study of.the 
society which makes the widest use of the principle of election to 
administrative offices 
"In general the American functionaries are far more 
independent tllla.n the French civil officers within the sphere 
which is prescribed to them" Sometimes even they are allowed 
by popular authority to exceed these boundsp and as they are 
protected by the opinion and backed by the cooperation 0 of the 
majority0 they venture upon manifestations of their power as 
astonish a Europeano By this means are formed habits in the 
heart of a free country whli.ch may some day prove fatal to its 
liberties.'' (18) 
Such weaknesses -in--Engels' scheme -can· only. be· dismiss~d in a model· of 
society which presumes a degee of conflict'far more limited than is 
reasonable a It must presuppose within the citizenry the existence 
' ..... -~. 
of a single will 0 with conflict arising 0 if at allp only between 
citizenry-and bureaucracy. 
Rousseau asserted the existence of such a 'general will'" 
However 0 the genera~ will was an entity apparent only in the 
functioning of small-scale city states like his adopted Geneva; and 
the larger a state or nation became 0 the more likely was the 
possibility of 'dysfunctional' dissidence arising. For this purpose 
it was, necessary for Rousseau to make a distinction between the 
'general will' and the 'will of all'. The latter is the sum of 
•particular wills' 0 which may be misled 0 while the 'general will' 
--~~-
0 
derives only from an original contract and from the subsequent 
accumul~ted wisdom of a developing societyp .which cannot fall into 
erroro Much has been made of the ambiguity of Rousseau's legacy 
but the first chapter of Book 4 is an uncanny prefiguration.of 
the Soviet ~egime's legitimation process 
The history of the Soviet regime is the history of the 
construction of a general will. It had to be constructedp it was 
not giveno T~e general will was constructed by firstly defining 
certain classes of people as non- citizens i.e. class enemies 0 and 
then e~dying in the Bolshevik Party the quality of the •accumulated 
wisdom• which constituted the general will as against the 'will of 
all' that might arise from the 'contradictions among the people. • 
This derived from the possession of •scientific' marxism. Differences 
within the leadership of the Bolshevfk regime in its early years were 
disagreements over the interpretation of the general willD not over 
the legitimacy of such a concept as the basis of the state. It may 9 however, 
be argued that the usurpation of power by a bureaucracy was rooted in 
their cSubstitution Of .:an incorrect version of the general will _for-a 
,.. 
correct ~one~ 
Lenin's strictures~n the growth of a bureaucratic cultureD and 
Trotsky's later attempts to attl'ibute 'the consolidation ·of bureaucracy 
to a matter of self-interest ofa matB:'ially privileged stratum are 
examples of such arguments.. But such-views simply continue the 
legitimation of the bureaucracys it possesses the general will, it 
assumes omniscience in the determination of values as well as 
techniques a Lenin and Trotsky criticise th~ bureaucracy for mis-
interpreting the general will 0 (i.e. Marxism), or reading their self-
interests as identical to the gen_eral willo But the real error lies 
in their possession of the right to determine the general will at allp 
and that error is inescapable as long as the idea of a general will 
itself is not rejected as politically author.itarian and sociologically 
nonsensical. 
A bureaucracy that has acquired illeg~timate power is one that 
has short-circuited the normal processes of the articulation and 
resolution of conflicts that are properly the domain of a public 
sphere. We have seen that bureaucracies contain natural tendencies 
to this as a result of wider developments in tHentieth century 
economyp society~ and culture. But for such tendencies to be.con-
summated~ other determinations must be present. One such tendency 
is simply the cultural legitimation of such a domination. Whatever 
the material and conjunctural conditions that constrained Soviety 
society in its early years - and much has been made of this by 
observers - the weight of this cultural legitimation must be appreciated. 
It was not the bureaucracy that had to provide this culture legitimation, 
it was provided in full measure by the culture of Bolshevism. 
The Bolsheviks had a particular and specific theory of political 
differences. Political differences among the citizenry were defined 
as either the remnants of alien .class forces, or as symptoms of ~in-
adequate political culture demanding educational corre.ctionp-~ as 
.. 
historical 'contradictions among the people' which in time would find 
-....._ 
a suitable 'aufnebung' at the hands of economic development'. At 
various times in the early history of the USSR the response_ to 
political problems in the public sphere involved one, or a combination, 
of these three options. If particular initiatives were identifiable 
as directly or indirectly the product of bourgeois forces, repression 
provided a straight-forward answer: as with non-Bolshevik parties 
and institutions from the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly 
onwards. Kronstadt is the most obvious example. Wi~h issues where 
the enemy and source was not so immediately personally identifiable, 
as with the situation resulting from 'War Communism• and leading to 
the N.E.P. 0 the problems we~e handled with a combination of direct 
repression 0 educational initiatives 0 and administrative and policy 
adjustments to ameliorate the conditions of the unhappy peasantry. 
An exception to this 'administrative politics' may be found in 
some of the arguments of Bukharino It may be significant that 
Bukharin was one of the few Bolsheviks who had any acquaintance with 
contemporary developments in European social theoryo He was clearly 
familiar with the work of Michels and Weberg and was prepared to quote 
Weber in support of his arguments in 'Historical Materialism'D albeit 
only in the more academic parts of his argument. The last pages of 
that work take the form of an attempted refutation of Michels • 
theories of bureaucracyo (l9) Clearly Bukharin would have had only a 
hostile response to suggestions that the problems these writers 
discussed were relevant to the problems of the USSR. But it is 
perhaps not too much to assume that Bukharin might have from this 
encounter absorbed some of the important and relevant insights 
embodied in their work. 
For it is only in ~ukharin~that we faintly hear any echo of 
the real problems dL bureaucracy 9 politics, and industr1alisatiDn. _ 
Those who are commonly~regarded as the natural and democratic 
opponents of Lenin's bureaucracy- sha'red the same naive assumpt-ions as 
Lenin 11 demonstratirig-a resurgent intoleranceo -The Workers• Opposition 
of 1921 stressed heavily the need for a purge to effect the wholesale 
removal of non-proletarian elements from the Party; the Democratic 
Centralists proposed measures to guarantee high proletarian 
representation on party c~mmittees. (20) Their ~alysis of the 
problem of bureaucracy here foreshadowed Lenin's: the guarantee of 
democracy lay in the preser-Vation of the purity of an elitel> albeit 
an elite as widely defined as consisting of a whole class. 
In the wake of the Kronstadt revolt 9 the Bolsheviks solution to 
political crisis was 9 in Daniel 0 S words "both repression and compromise"~ 
'' compromise with the non-proletarian elements whose 
interests had suffered most under War Communism 9 but a ( 2l) 
campaign of extirpation against the critics on the Left ••• " 
T~ compromise involved was that of NEP. For Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks 0 these compromises were of a specific kind. They involved 
the exchange of political rights for economic ones. The peasantry 
would be allowed a degree of freedom of action in selling his surplus 
to markets 9 and even determining the fate of that surplus 9 in return 
for accepting the Bolsheviks' monopoly of political power. These 
were concessions granted as purely tactical steps 9 a retreat in the 
face of necessity 9 and nothing is clearer in the thoughts of the;, 
leading Bolsheviks than the understanding that these were temporary 
compromises which would be dispensed with as soon as possible. 
Bukharin's appreciation seems to have been different: 
"Bukharin did not interpret the granting of rights .to 
the peasants as 'concessions'g as purely tactical steps. 
In Bukharin •s implici-t -and -explicit interpretations, both 
the NEP arid the market-ceased to be seen as tactical retreats; 
they -were good strategy.for the ent-ir-e· •transition period' 9 if 
not longer •• ,, .. (22) - - · · · · 
Such~ position 9 once thought through 9 ·would have had major 
implications for the political .processes of .the SoViet regime~ Tlhle · 
continued existence ~or NEP would-:: surely have meant the emergence of 
definite interest groups which would at some point have been able to 
articulate positions - of whatever sort - which would have oontested 
the Bolsheviks claim to define the 'middle-range' objectives and 
policies rf' the society. 
The prOblem at the end of the twenties was that not only were the 
Bolsheviks thus forced to rapid collectivizationo the previous policy 
of NEP had generated a distinct interest group - if not a class -
against whose bitter opposition collectivization would have to proceed. 
The consequences of the decision to resolve this problem are well known. 
But it can be argued that the path that Bukharin suggested would have 
obviated-the fantastic human- and economic- losses sustained during 
the collectivization drive. A policy of fostering agrarian 
capitalism was not incompatible with some degree of diremptive 
industrialisationp nor was it even hostile to the long-term strategy 
of a socialist society. It was 0 however 11 utterly incompatible with 
the maintenance of the Bolshevik monopoly of political power. A group 
as powerfully based economically as the capitalist farmers would have 
become would have demanded some pa~ticipation in the policy-formulating 
processes of the government. But it is unnecessary to assume - and 
Deutscher points this out in his discussion of the 1928 crisis - that 
such a political group would necessarily have been committed to the 
i 
ending of the socialist projects 
'"••.• the peasants had no clear political motives. 
They did not aim at the overthrow of the soviets ••• the 
mass of peasants were driven to apply that peculiar form 
of $abotage (refusing to neliver food to the towns) by 
economic circumstances." (23) 
It is- difficult- to know what might have -become_of the Soviet-
regime had Bukbarin•s cQnception of NEP been accepted 0 and the 
1 
develop_ment of the Soviet economy allo-w.ed to proceed in_ a different 
direction to that imposed on it after .1929. Lewin argues that NEP 
was bound up with certain •nonstatist-1 consequences& -cultural and 
relative political pluralism 0 curtailment of the terror apparatus, 
the absence of a too rigid ideology. More definitively: 
"Whereas NEP had erected an elaborate legal -edifice 
and seriously strived to achieve 'socialist legality" 0 during 
the Five Year Plan this framework was utterly qestroyed and (24) 
replaced by a system of extralegal 11 crude coercion and mass terror." 
This may well be an overstatement of the benefits that NEP broughtz 
- '1~-
compared with the period of War Communism that preceded it and the 
'Second Revolution • that followed 0 it is bound to appear as an oasis 
of legality and civilization in a desert of arbitrariness. Even in 
NEP we are still tandng about a political process almost hermetically 
confined to the Bolshevik Elite. Nevertheless Bukharin's model of 
NEP in the •transition' underlines the 'elective affinities' between 
the existence of differing interest groups and the viability g even 
necessityg of relatively open and democratic political processes. ltg 
converselyg underlines the consequences of the orthodox Bolshevik 
interpretation of NEPs just as in the economic field any concessions 
were merely temporary •retreats • 0 so in the political field any 
consequent liberalisatian was counted as a clear costp not a gain. 
The contrast between Bukharin and mains.tream Bolshevik thought 
is nowhere clearer than in the discussion of the problem of bureaucracy. 
By the end of the twentiesD Lenin's primitive analysis had become an 
article of faith. In 1929 the Central Committee submitted to the 
16th Party Congress the first -~ and probably the last - resolution 
specifical;Ly devoted to the problem of combat · ing bureaucratism •. _ 
. ~ . I 
In presenting it to the Congress 0 -Yavkovlev0 the Deputy Commissar of 
the Rabkrin reaffirmed- the- analysis of the problems 
· .......... 
"He who is against-industrialization, he who is against 
collectivisatiorr;· stands I whether:...he means or does not. mean to, ( 2S) for the perpetuation of the roots of bureaucratism." · 
Lewin expounds £ukharin's analysis, which was counterposed to 
such "nonsensical ascripti~n of every uppalatable fact of life to 
"bourgeois survivals" or to "petit bourgeois pressures 11 • ( 26) Bukharin 
wanted to defend the craftsmenp small merchants 0 small industrialists 0 
and small agricultural producers 0 as well as cooperative and 
governmental small-scale enterprises and serviceso against their 
'crushing' and absorption by the state. For·the state to take on 
these tasks unnecessarily 0 along with the tasks which of necessity 
it had ass~med due to the government's long term project» was to fuel 
the source of bureaucracy. Bukharin thus made in passing a silent 
acknowledgement of Weber's connection between bureaucracy and 
industrializationp and this was clearly connected with his far more 
subtle appreciation of the complexities of Soviet problems. His 
argument 0 however0 was subject to furious rebuttals 0 ~1d what might 
have been the consequences of the insights he displayed about NEP 
and about bureaucracy can only be a matter for speculation. It must 
be remembere.d that it was Bukharin 0 of all the Bolsheviks" who held 
faith with the model of the 'commune state'. In 1928 he reiterated the 
themes 
uwe are far too centralized ; we must ask 
ourselves whether we cannot take a few steps (27 ) towards Lenin's state of the Commune." 
Whether 0 given time and experience, he would have arrived ata 
more sophisticated and appropriate model-for the correction of the 
.~ 
mistakes and-problems that he saw·-must similarly--:r=emain a -matt-er of 
speculation. For us 0 the real educational value of Bukharin's 
protests is-the light they throw~ tn~-a~guments he was opposing. 
None of these responses crossed the threshold that divides 
administration from politics.··· Administration concerns the carrying 
out of an already determined policyz politics involves the discussion 
and negotiation of such policies. The Bolshevik government de-
legitimised politics within- the citizenry. Such differences were 
either criminal (bourgeois class remnants) 0 ignorance (low political 
culture of the masses) 0 or transitory (the peasants were a historically 
doomed class 0 therefore their grievances had to be catered for 0 but 
not legitimised)o What the Bolsheviks could not do was accept a 
characterisation of any political differences as genuine~ i.e. an 
opinion which a person or group had a right to hold and negotiate 
over as an equal partner in the process of will-formation. There 
could be only one genuine politics amongst the masses~ a politics 
which coincided with the politics of the government 0 and consequently 
with the administrative bureaucracy. 
Clearly 0 this is the path to the authoritarian state. Because 
the government and the bureaucracy were already the expression of that 
one genuine politics 0 and by definition a more coherent and profound 
expression than ~auld be found among the people themselves 9 the politics 
of the people were rendered redundanto Politically 0 the peopl~ were 
abolished. Thus the analysis suggested here is not the classic model 
of a bureaucracy establishing itself as a ruling class or caste over, 
subaltern classes. Such subtle concepts of hegemony are not necessary. 
The bureaucracy necessarily became 9 not the ruling class, but the only 
class. 
It was 9 after all 9 the case that the bureacracy/Party/g,overDment 
:! J 1 
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was the only location where differences could in fac.t"be debaled; and 
discussed as differenceso i.e. debates on practical questionsp rat~erl 
than as deviation from an increasingly-narrowly constituted apd E!ef;ined 
gene~_al wil1 11 at least until ~he logic of domination finally worked 
itself out in the dictatorship of Stalin. Surely the submission of 
all oppositions to the concept of the single party 0 and 0 even more 
fatally 9 the illegitimacy of taking discussions beyond the Central 
Committee 9 let alone the Party 0 indicates a tabu whose strength cannot 
only derive from some misguided sense of loyalty or group solidarityo 
··-------
To appeal to the masses is to implicitly revive them from the mortuary 
whence they have been·mnsigned by the dictates of the general will: 
it is to call in quemtion the viability of such a general will itselfo 
And that is to bring down the whola edifice of legitimation which 
sustain~d the Bolshevik regime 0 not the Stalinist faction aloneo 
Thus Lenin°s possible response to Weber 0s probl~msp his 
simple mechanisms fa~ cont~ol of the state 0 are profoundly flawedo 
Xnstant recall mf administrators initially dissolves the administration 
into the peoplep and makes them subject to the same norms of political 
interest as obtain in the public sphereo The consequence of that is 
corrupt administration 0 where instrumental rationality is prevented 
from applying in the areas where its writ mu~t 9 for the sake of evan= 
handedness and stabilityp runo This threatens not only the performance 
of the necessary functions of admlnistration 9 but 9 futther 0 the safe-
guarding of the access of minority opinions to the decision-making 
processo lf this problem is overcome by the denial of the existence 
of such minority opinions 0 ioeo by denying the legitimate existence 
of politic~! differences 0 then the rights of not only minorities 9 but 
also of the majority are threatenedo Only the existence of minorities 
gives. meaning:-:to the concept ·of:·a ·majorityo A citizenry_which 
displays ne~special and particular· interests separate from and evan-~-
discordant with the gan~ral interest has no need of politicso And 
thus( the rula of,the bu;eacracy is lo~cally ensured and embedded in a 
\ . oatio\ cultureo 
lenin's Democracy 
\ 
Lenin°• model does not 0 however 9 lack putative institutions for 
- J 
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the axprassio~''of-th~ will of the citizenryo So far 9 the discussion 
has dealt with the administrative machinery and the relationship of 
the citizens to ito Lenin also discusses directly political forms of 
confronting .the problem 9 a substitute for the parliamentary form which 
attempts to fulfill that task in bourgeois democracieso His theme is 
ones again taken directly from Marxg 
00 0 The Commune 0 0 wrote Marx9 9 was t'o be a working not 
a ·parliamehtary body 9 executive and legislative at the same timeo" 
Lenin expands into a critique of parliamentarism: 
01 The way out of parliamentarism is not 0 of course 0 the 
abolition of representative institutions and the elective 
principle 9 but~ conversion of the representative 
institutions from talking shops into 0working 0 bodiesooo 
0 A working 0 not a parliamentary body 9 - this is a blow 
straight from the shoulder at the present day parliamentarians 
and parliamentary lap=dogs of Social Democracyg Take any 
parliamentary country 0 from America to Switzerland 9 from Franca 
to Britain 9 Nor~ay 0 and so forth - in these countries the real 
business of state is performed behind the scenes and is carried 
on by the departments 0 chancelleries and ~eneral Staffso 
Parliament is g{~en up to talk for the spe~ial purpose of fooling 
the 9 common people 9 .n 
But this criticism applies to radical democratic forms as wello 
Even the So~iets have reproduced the problem: 
"The heroes of rotten philistinism ooo have even succ~eded 
in polluting the Soviets after the fashion of the most disgusting 
bourgeois parliamentarism 9 in converting them into mere talking 
shops 0 In the Soviets 9 ~he 0socialist 0 Ministers are fooling 
the credulous rustics with phrase-~ongering a~d_resolutionso 
In the government -i tBelfo B -sort of -.perinanenLshuffle is going -
oo in .-order_ that 0 . on .·the one hand~' -'as· :many ·Socialist- -
Revolutionaries and Mensheviks as possible -may in turn get near 
the Opi·e0 0 the lucrative--and honourable·posts 9 and that 9 on the· 
other hand 11 the n"'"attent-ion° of the people- may be 1 engaged 0 o 
Meanwhile 0 the chancelleries aQ.!! army. ·staffs 'do 0 the business~ 
of 1 state 9 o (28) •- · 
Lenin ~reposes an alternative that will negate the possibility of such 
deceptions~ 
"The commune substitutes for the venal and rotten 
parliamentarism of bourgeois society institutions in which 
freedom of opinion.and discussion does not cJegenerate into 
deception 9 for the pa-rliamentarians themsefves. tiave to work9 
have to execute their own 1aws 9 have themselves to test the 
results achieved in reality 0 and to account directly to their 
constituentso Representative institutions themselves remain 0 
but there is no parliamentarism here ~s a special system 0 as 
the division of labour between the legislative ·and. the. (29 ) 
executive 0 as a privile~ed position for the deputiese" 
~JOI= 
There is here an intimate connection wlth previous elements 
of the discussiono If the 0 parliamentarians 0 of the Soviet system 
have to ~e~ecute thai~ own laws' then we are here talking about the 
same people as in the discussion of administrators and bureaucratso 
The section of Lenin°s work cited above 9 titled 0 The Abolition of 
Parliamentarism 0 is in fact composed mainly of the discussions on the 
0 postal service 0 concept and the payment of 'workmens wages 0 etco 
There is clearly no conceptual distinction in Lenin's mind between 
the nature of the 0representative 9 institutions and any other branch 
of the state apparatuso Lenin is talking about deputies as much as 
about functionaries when he pauses to remind us 9 immediately after the 
paragraph containing the above quotation 7 that: 
"It is instructive to nota that 9 in speaking of the 
functions of those officials who are necessary to the 
Commune and for proletarian democracy 0 Marx compares them 
to the woikers of "every other employer'' 9 that is of the 
ordinary capitalist enterprise 9 with its "workers 9 foremen 0 
and accountantso·" 
There is no trace of .utopianism in Marx 9 in the sense 
that he made :.up --or:~invented.-a· 0 nel!l 8 society. Wo 9 he studied·--· 
the' birth of .. the· new· society out_; of cthe oldj -,andJhe forms. cQf--
transi tion from the- former--to the latter-0 -as a .natural=. (30 ) _ historical process~ •• ~'-
This is cert~inly no ~topianls~r if Lenin is se~ious in 
recommending the relationship of wage labour as ideally suited to 
effect-ive- democratic insti tutioi:ls. tiaudrillard has elaborated a 
persuasive argument here~ insisting that Marx's thought ultimately 
fails to be radical because it is no more than the 0mirror of 
production°: that is 0 alf ~he fundamental categories upon which Marx 
chose to construct his theory of emancipation were simply the 
categories of the capitalist mode: productionp value 9 humans as 
t (31) tool making and labouring animals 9 e Co His mature criticism 
of existing s~ciety was based not upon the rejection of such 
conceptualisations of humanity 0 but upon a demand that they be allowed 
to speak liberated from the fetters that bourgeois society hypocritically 
laid on themo Baudrillard would argue that it came·as no surprise that 
a new society constructed upon such estimations of the human subjec~ 
turned out to be the most obsessively 0productivist 0 and 0reductionist 0 
imaginable a Whatever the virtues of Baudrillard 0s argument 9 it is 
certainly striking to note how Lenin°s ideas are permeated with 0 
firstly 0 a concept of people as helplessly programmed for the pursuance 
of cash and acquisitions~ and 0 secondly 0 an admiration of ~a most 
insttumental elements of industrial and factory production as the 
condign mode for the manage~ent of human affairso This most 
emancipatory and optimistic of documents is·based upon a vision of 
human beings perhaps more bleak and demeaning than can be found in 
any previous work of political theorisingo 
To return to the substance of Lenin°s new version of parliamentarismg 
the suggestion that this is a formula for succe~ful democratic control 
· of governmental machinery is quite vacuouso The elected-deputies are __ 
to be civii eervants 0 ministers 0 and representatives of their-constituents-
at one and the same timBo They have to make the laws 0 carry them out 0 
and criticise themo Here Lenin summarily overthrows any previous claim 
'-
he might have had to treating bureaucratisation as a serious prablemo 
If he is accepting that there ·ar~dangerous potentialities in the roles 
of a representatiyev of a legislatorv of a civil servantp and of a 
minister 9 his answer to those dangers borders on the absurd: conflate 
all these roles into one 9 embody them in a single individualo No 
grounds are ·offered for presuppo~ing that the norms of the representative 
would win out against the norms appropriate to the other functions 
allocated to the individualo The only question seems to be of what 
such an individual would die: overwork or multiple schizophreniao 
further 9 of course 0 and the implications are majorp there is 
here no conceptual space for a parliamentary oppositiono Delegates 
are described as being representative 9 legislators 9 and executiveso 
A delegate who is only a representative 0 who wishes to bear no 
responsibility for legislation with which he or his constituents 
disagres 0 but claims the right for his opposing and critical arguments 
to be heardp who refuses both a legislative and executive role 9 is not 
catered for within such a systemo In fact he is specifically ruled 
outg hs it would be who conceived parliament as a 0 talking shopo and 
his job to go there and talk very sharply against those who were 8 doing'. 
So here again we have the insistent emergence of the theme of the irYF 
possibility of divisions amongst the people~ the people must have a 
unitary set of interests and the possibility of political conflict 
which can only come from representatives becoming careerists = is to 
be avoided by the tight bonds between representatives and electorso 
Here the very possibility of part~ - that is of organisations expressing 
diverse views and value orientations - is abolished long before any 
exigencies of the 0.particularly ~hostite~0 _conjuncture persuaded the 
Bolsheviks to get rount!, to --it- in- practice a-- -Liebman has constructed an 
apparently painstaking ac~ount-of th~eluctant process by which the 
6olsheviks--eradicated the Mensh~viks 9 SoRs. 0 and anarchists 0 tragically 
I 
forced to by the pusillanimous and hostile activities of those groupso 
The existence in Bolshevik theory and culture of the norms we have just 
discussed indicates that such an account should be tr~ated with 
0 .(32) 
considerable caut1ono · 
As Lenin°s hermetic model slowly seals itself before our eyes 9 we 
should perhaps take into account one possible objectiono It is wrong 
to consider the Soviet as a single institution on the model of bourgeois 
parliamentso The Commune is after all a local body 9 both in linguistic 
-104= 
origin and arguably in Marx 0s original intento Is there not th8refore 
a possibility of oppositional politics proceeding through local 
oppositions to central authority? 
. . 
But Lenin is concerned to specifically deny that possibilityo 
The commune-state is emphatically not a federalist stateo Bernstein 
had so characterised. the Commun-e 9 and criticised Marx 1 s adherence to it 
on those groundso Lenin will have none of it~ 
"federalism as a principle follows logically from the 
petty-bourgeois views of ~narchismo Marx was a centralisto 
There is no departure whatever from centralism in his observationsooo 
ooo if the proleta~iat and poor peasants take state power unto 
their own hands 9 organise themselves quite freely in communes 9 
and unite the actions of all the communes in striking at capital 0 
in crushing the resistance of the capitalists 0 and in transferring 
the privately owned railways 0 factories 0 and land and so on to the 
entire nation 9 to the whole of society 0 won°t that be centralism? 
Won°t that be the most consistent democratic centralism0 ( 33 ) 
and moreover 0 proletarian centralism?" 
Bernstein°s abjection was that the decentralisation of power and 
administration inevitable in a commune-state contradicted the necessity 
for centralised state action, which he construed to be essential for 
socialist~developmento- Lenin does nat disagree with Bernstein over this 
aspect of sacialismo -.He 1$ simply insistent tha~the commune-st~te 
itself ~0 nevertheless, be centraLi.sed and unitaryo · What Bernstein;. 
fails ·to see ~-with@ one might add 9 good reason- is that the communes 9 
with-all their local powers,~~nterests 9 and differences~ will voluntarily 
transform themselves into B Single-willed pervasive state structure 0 
abandoning any federalist pretensions that might be suggested by the 
commune form itself: 
"Berstein simply cannot conceive of the possibility of 
voluntary centralism9 of the voluntary amalgamation of the 
communes into a nation 0 of the voluntary fusion of the 
proletarian communes 9 for the purpose of destroying (34 ) bourgeois rule and the bourgeois state machineo" 
Perhaps caution is necessary here 0 as Lenin 1 s points seem to 










revolutionary act itself 9 loBo destroying bourgeois ruleo This could 
be e i~ansitory need 9 still leaving open the possibility of a 
0 volunta~y 0 reclamation of local powers and interests by the local 
communes once a relative!~ stable situation is establishedo Lenin 
himselfo howeverp nowhere makes such a pointp and the discussion of 
the federalist commune state is practically concluded with the above 
quotation a Other parts of the te~t 9 in fact 0 leave no room to assume 
that lenin entertains any reversal of this 9centralismo and 
0amalgamation° of the communeso Chapter 4 9 Part 4 9 attempts a 
refutation of the vittues of federalism under any circumstances 9 ap~rt 
perhaps from being a temporary stage in the 0 transition from a monarchy 
to a centralised repu_blico 0 ( 35) . Otherwise 9 a federal republic 11 even 
under bourgeois rule 0 is definitely less prefe~rable than any centralised 
' 
form: 
"It is extremely ~mportant to note that Engel~ oo• disproved 
ooo the prejudice that is very widespread ooo that a federal 
republic ne6essarily means ~ greater ambunt of freedom than a 
centralised -republica - This is. wrongo It is disproved by the 
facts cited by Eng(:!ls- regarding .-the centralised french Republic 
of 1792~98 -and ~the- fedax-iH-- .Swiss ,-Republica The really democratic 
. centralised -_republic gave more _-freedom than -the. federal. republico __ _ 
. -1il other· words~ .,tlie greate~rilo-unt:::or~locai ~_regionaL;. ani:! other 
freedom_ known. in history -~:~~as accorded by a centralised an'd not by 
a federal repui:JlfCoDD (3~) :' 
; ,_ 
Whether Engels 0 facts really ~isproved this 1 prejudice 0 is none 
of our concerno-- The quotation ~aimpiy illustrates lenin° s own 'prejudice o 
against federalism and reinforces theassumption that his commune-state, 
even in a situation of established proletarian power, would be devoid of 
federali~t featuremo 
Thus does Lenin rescue his commune-state from the one remaining 
threat to its effectivity as a monolithic authority structure. 
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THE TEXT AND ITS ASSUNPTIONS g 
THE NIS~DERSTANDING OF A CENTURY 
This argument has deliberately treated the field of political 
practices and institutions as a distinct and relatively independent 
domain. This approach departs from the standard interpretations of 
Soviet historyp it is also open to accusations of an 'idealist 
approach to a prOblem whose determinations must be found in more 
profound roots~ notably the economic sphere. I have dealt in passing 
with the arguments that attribute to the decay of Soviet democracy to 
economic practicalities 8 the low productivity of labourj) the atomisation 
of the working class; the desperate administratiVe· needs of a disrupted 




to argue a distinct, specific and major responsibility to another domainp 
that of the.theoretical assumptions and cultural norms of the Bolsheviks 
l 
with regard to the question of state form. It seems to me that unless 
the question- of·· politicalp institut-ionalp -and. constitutional forms isc". 
regarded .as a distinct and separate subject for· examination 0 there· is···· 
an overwhelming tendency and temptation for the very significance of 
"' the question of political forms to be forgotten. Thi s at>pli es as 
·much to critiques that reject the Leninist inheritance as to those that- .. 
are complicit in it. The approach adopted here may be further justified 
by a consideration of a recent argument that attempts a new critique of 
Leninism. This argument at~ibutes the authoritarian outcome of 
Lenin's activities to an insufficiency of radicalism at the core of 
his thought» in his conception of the economic. Such writers do notp 
howeverj) question the position of such a domain as the organising 
principle of a radical politics. 
Coletti argues that the cansetvati ve nature of the politics of the 
' -1 
-10'1-
parties of the Second International was due to their appropriation of 
a positivist version of Harxism which sought to reduce all phenomena, 
social and natural~> to the abstract laws of a 'dialectical materialism'. 
Such a Marxism was resolutely determinist~> and could contain no element 
of the dialectic of subject and object. It consequently founds its 
paradigm in the 'base-superstructure'. 
In this context~> the economic activity of human societies was 
reduced from a ~oblem of social relationships to one of more technique. 
Colletti arguess 
10Social productkn is thus transformed into •production 
techniques' z the object of: political economy becomes the 
object of technology. Since this 'technique' which is 
material production in the strict sense of the termp .is 
separated from that other simultaneous productionachieved 
by menp the production of their relations' •••. the materialist 
conception of history tends to become a· technological conception 
of history."(!) 
Subsequently 11 Santamaria and Nanville ( 2 ) and Corriganj) 
Ramsay and Sayerp among others 11 have rooted the degeneratim of the 
Russian revolution in Lenin's adoption of ,capitalist industrial 
technique and manageJJien_!: ·methods;, ·- Within a. 'posi,tivist • Marxism11 
such capitalist innovations would be regarded as unproblematic. 
Corriganp Jtamsay and Sayer attempt a'C.adical critique of Bolshevism 
by opp_psing this version_of -Marxism. Their thesis is sui-tably bold s 
all radical ·cr-itiques of the contemporary--Soviet state fail, because: 
"Bolshevism as such is rarely invokedp anywhere on the 
left, in the explanation of the alleged Soviet malaise. (J) 
It figures solely and monotonously as that which was betrayed." 
Citing the "vulgar and naive conception of the 'economy'" that 
Colletti has identified11 the authors find the source of Bolshevik 
failure in the fact thats 
---- -·-- ----
.. I 
•·· ' .. 
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••• the emancipation of labour wi thip production was never 
contemplated by the Bolsheviks. Their programmes on the 
con·trary without exception enforced various relations~ and 
experiencesp of production reminiscent of the regime of capitalg 
experiences that replicated capital's division of labourg capital's 
hierarchies of technical and managerial 'expertise'D capital's 
divisive 'incentives' P capital's inequalitiesu andp by no means 
least 0 capital's coercion of surplus labour and appropriation of( 4) its product to fuel an incessant and insatiable accumulation. tt 
l'-luch of this is valid. The whole of the Marxist movement to Lenin's 
time partook of the same naive approach which held sciencep technology» 
production» efficiencyp and rationalisation~as unambiguous in essence 
and open to criticism only in terms of their use or misuse by specific 
social agents. But does this really identify the differentia specifiC:a 
of Bolshevism as a state philosophy? That difference, whoever the author 
and whatever their standpointg must have something to do with Bolshevism •·s 
ability to bring about the physical liquidation of problematic social 
classes and political oppositions in very large numbers.~~ and to the 
present day deny to the average citizen the protection afforded by the 
basic democratic freedoms and human rights D the rule of law.~~ the right 
to travel.~~ etc. 
It isp-- thereforep a .serious- assertion when the authors attribute 
to the theoretical error outlined in the quotations above those aspects 
of Soviet political system to which they objects 
'--
"In short, and unsurprisingly-D to foster capitalist forms -of 
productive activity eventuates in the reprodu~"'tion··of various 
defining rel~tions of the bourgeois state form that is thei'r 
ctli'tditi·on azld consequence. II (5)-
This seems to Be a fine lack of conceptual discrimination. It 
is of course possible to see the political norms that prevail in the 
Soviet Union as identical in essence to-those of a 'bourgeois stateform•.~~ 
but only if certain major assumptions are made. It is necessary to 
assumethat the particular form of the state is illUllaterial, epiphenomenal 












constitutes all non-Soviet regimes within th~ twentieth century 
world system as unified by their essence as ·bourgeois regimesp 
with the essence being the subordination of certain specific classes 
to one specific class. By this assumption it is possible to elide 
the differences between liberal democracies and other mote authoritarian 
and repulsive regimes of a fascist or totalitarian nature. No doubt 
such a distinction is heuristically viable~ focussing as it does on 
the putative alternative of the transparent and self-governing society 
of the radical vision. But such an approach is intellectually dubious~ 
leaping as it does to the most general level without seriously pausing 
to consider the particular. For what is this concept of 'bourgeois 
stateform' that is introduced so diffidently into the discussion? 
There is at least an argument that the distinguishing features 
of the bourgeois state form are precisely those that are most absent 
from the Soviet regime. To wita the separation of state and civil 
societyg the competitive electoral process inscribed in the norms of 
social life; the right to form political - and other - organisations 
without .. ob .. taining pennission...:from the state apparatus; the right 
within· very broadly defined restrictions. on obscenity and libtu··to· 
~· 
publish and distribute material without ..sanction of the state apparatus; 
......... 
the formal -and actual separation of powers9 the-absence of a single and 
hegeemonic ideology-and restricted political process embodied-in a 
unique ruling institution;. the protection of an independent judiciary 
under legislation duly and constitutionally established. It is in 
fact the case - and the case is presen~ed by Harx among others - that 
it was the introduction of these forms that marked the specifically 
bourgeois form of the state - not the simple rule of one class over 
another. This latter~ of coursep is a fairly common characteristic 
of state forms thropghout history - and nowhere is this point made 







Th.e authors thus fail to grasp the real object of their study» 
the very thing they are at such pains to explain. Before it is 
necessary to discuss why and how it has come about that existing 
regimes of a socialist type fail to achieve the radical vision of 
freedomv it is logically a prior necessity to explain how those 
regimes fail to provide a system of juridical and political freedoms 
to any degree equivalent to those prevailing in the western capitalisms. 
It isv after allp the absence in the USSR of the latter, and not the 
former» political forms that creates among the populations of con-
temporary capitalist societies a hostility to radical political change. 
Arguably» capitalism has been able to utilise all of the productive 
practices itemised by Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer, and utilise Rhem to 
a far greater and more effective dgree than the Soviet Union. While 
the brutal history of various capitalist regimes gives proof enough 
that there is po guaranteed connection between contemporary industrial 
technique and political liberties, there is enough evidence to suggest 
that they are not incompatible. There is a lack of evidence to .support-----
.-
the author's theory that the- existence -of. csuch techniques_ :can. account_ -::,. 
for the degeneration of the Soviet regime. 
This argument has implications Which Corrigan, Ramsay & Sayer 
have since made explicit. This is despite the fact that these 
implications, once made clear, will illustrate how this critique of 
Bolshevism ultimately justifies the Bolshevik regime. The authors 
buttress their demonstrated indifference to the institutional specifics 
of the bourgeois state by defining Soviet poliucal processes as, in a 
distorted formv superior. 
"The empty and ritualistic character of much 'official' 
Soviet political life - single candidate elections, a 
rubber stamp 'parliament' (the Supreme Soviet) - is ••• 
double edged in its significance. Too often it is taken as 
simp~y another index of the Soviet workers' powerlessness. 
-U?:i-
What this ignores~ in the simple-mindedness of the search for 
equivalents of 'our• institutiOns~ is that the formality of 
SoViet politics also testifies to a diffusion of politics 
throughout the society and a partial overcoming of capitalism's 
separation of the political sphere. Soviet politics is largely 
ritual because most areas of Soviet life are subject to directD 
though not necessarily democratic~ political discussion and ( 6) 
controL There is less place for a separate polity. oo 
The lack of discrim~tion referred to above is here applied to 
the Soviet regime. The authors believe that a distinction between 
the democratic control of social life 9 and direct state control of 
the same can be in good conscience passed over in a subordinate clause. 
Nevertheless the argument does derive from a proven feature of Soviet 
society that this argument must take into account. Lane has argued 
that the actual degree of participation and involvement in organisations 
on the part of Soviet workers is far greater than any comparable 
phenomenom in the West. He cites .~ources to the effect that the 
average amount of time spent on •socio-poli tical' activity has increased 
seven.times over the period of Soviet rule 9 and the proportion of working 
people involved has increased by eighteen tim~s. Given the rather low 
base ~ine for such -comparisons, .this indeed mp.y .. not amount -to .. very __ 
.-
much in real time. But Lane_ p_q_iiJt:s ·out what iS anyway mi1>sin~_ ·in-_. 
such a-situation. The political influence of the Soviet worker is 
categorically limited: 
"He participates in improving production and he is ·closer 
to the administration both socially and politically than the 
worker in a capitalist society. But he does not actively shape 
the overriding values of his society, which are largely ( 7) determined by- the ruling political elite." 
In fact, he or she does not even participate in improving 
production in any meaningful ways control over even this limited 
domain is successfully undermined by the political structure. 
Ostensibly, the most powerful of low-level ·control structures would 





their impotence. Firstly 0 he concurs with ~ane~ 
_ "At best (the criticisms of the ordinary party cell 
member) could be directed officially only against marginal 
phenomena 9 because the party has asked for criticism only 
to expose defects in the implementation of plans not in 
the plans themselves 9 so that such critid6m may be turned 
exclusively against nonpolitical officialso The patty 
simultaneously has erected barriers against more 
effective and broader criticismo 11 (8) 
But even the second-order tasks of monitoring implementation of 
policy are rendered unachievableg 
11 0n paper 9 (the party cells) are supposed "to supervise 
the administrations" and to mobilize party 'members and the 
masses for the implementation ofplanso However 9 it is quite 
obv!ous that they are not {n a position to 9 supervi~e 9 because 9 
in fact 9 they are asked simultaneously to support the 
administrations they are _supposed to Vsupervfaei 0 to strengthen 
the1r au·thorityp and to help them fulfil th~se plans by dis~ (9) 
ciplining the workerso And this happens to be their re~l task." 
These points hardly amount to a revelation 9 and doubtless Corrigan at 
al could embrace these points as supporting their critique .of Soviet 
political processes.· .But such.a response is hardly legitimateo 
1 Corri~an -and Sayer \!IOuld attribute these~-deviations~to cont.ingent- __ 
causes derived from the~illegitimate-political power of the ruling 
aliteo On the contrary 11 the power of"that elite must be seen-as co-
deriving f»om the ability of the institutional form of tha~oviet 
regime to-render democratic processes-impossibleo 
Corrigan at al identify political participation with a right to 
partake in the monitoring of administrative processeso In this manner 
they simply replicate Lenin's fatal conflation ofthe political and 
administrative domain and the reduction of the former to the lattero 
Xt is then a simple step to perceive in officially sanctioned processes 
of partici,pe~tion in administration a genuine process of political will= 







will be one of degreeo A discussion of th~ problems in meeting the 
quotas for the produttion of pig-iron can therefore be supplemented 
by adding to the agenda of the meeting an item on the priorities of 
the plan 9 the inadequacies of the government 9 or whatever the members 
feel inclined to discusso This is only prevented by the political 
determination of the rulers not to allow ito 
On the contrary 9 it must be stressed that the difference between 
politics and administration is most fundamentally a matter of available 
siteso Administration is a process that exists internal to a 
particular institution 0 be it factory 9 office 9 college 9 regional 
pl~nning authority 0 or wh~tevero The political struggles that Corrigan 
et al refer to ~ internal structures: they are the offspring of 
institutions already present and formado The issues tha~ the worker 
is empowered to discuss are consequently determined in advance by sheer 
conti~gency: it depends upon which institution they happen to find 
themselves working ino Thus the pig-iron worker cannot discuss what 
is happening- in the cutlery factory across the ~oad 9 ,as he suffers 
. 
from a lai::k of rights--to do- so reinforceo-by -a --lack-of -knowledge and __ 
information to make such a discussion possibleo The most basic 
processes even of administrative mon~~oring~may be rendered impossible 
by ttliso But if administrative control is evis~erated; by the division 
into separate institutions 9 what of political control? ' politics 
can be defined as the consideration of a particular problem in the 
light of all the other social institutions, factors, forces, interests 
and problems extant in soci~ty; or, conversely 0 the consideration of 
the general direction of society in the light of adequate information 
about the relevant component parts of the organism. Above all P . of 
coursep it involves the ability to judge and select those elements of 
information 9 those forces and factors 9 which are considered relevant to 
tha issue under discussiono Such a right is' not denied simply by 
the absence of a free press 0 although that perhaps constitutes a 
necessary ~omponent of the control mechanismo It is denied by the 
entrapment of politics in disparate and isolated institutionso A 
politics that is registered within separate institutions and which 
lacks any mode of articulation beyond the hypostatized and frozen 
boundaries of those positive institutions is not a public politicso 
And a politics that is not sited in a public domain 0 and which is not 
empowered to transcend the institutions of the status quo 0 is one that 
lacks the most basic means of reflection on the status quoo Politics 
can only 0 therafore 0 be a reflection of the status quo 9 not a reflection 
A reflection Ef. a phenomenom is simply a mirror image of it 0 a 
reflection on it is a critical processo 
The Soviet stat~ does 0 of course 0 include institutions which over-
come the limitations of the single factory or authorityo These are the 
public political structures 0 notably the Soviet structure itselfo A 
Supreme --soviet---formally therefore_ fits my prescription of institutions 
possessing- the :1-ocationaL abili-ty· to--'ob!l;Sin .a--unified overviewc_of a 
reality that 0 for the lower level structures 0 is fragmentedo from 
this therefore may derive a .genuine political processo -aut this is ,....,. . 
not the:case 0 :~nd not only.b~cause-the supreme Soviet may be elected 
by a deformed political process wh~ch ensures that its members will bs 
those most uncritical of the status quoo Again 0 it is a matter of 
institutions a Official institutions are part of the status quo9 
therefore their definition-of reality coincides with the status quoo 
They are denied e critical access to the existing arrangements because 
they lack a stance from which to grasp the whole 0 or elements of it 0 as 
something other than themselves. At best 0 therefore 9 they are condemned 
to an Oimmanentv critique 9 which must concentrate on details of 
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~hich can gsnuinaly bring to bear a critical ~dge on the current 
situation 0 must 9 therefore 0 be allowed to claim a distanca between 
itself and·what iso Such a distance can only be embodied in a public 
ephers separate from the official structures 0 a public sphere which is 
constituted by voluntart associationso If official bodies can only 
replicate the official reality - and this is a structural fact 0 not a 
contingent sit·uation derived from the attitudes of the rulers = any 
differing reality that will provide the foundation for a genuine 
criticism of official reality must lie outside the control of that 
realityo Citi~ens must be entitled to form associations articulating 
their alternative reality - otherwise called a political party and 
programm~ = in a sp~ce betweeri the fragmented ignorance of the work-
place and the unified ~ositivity of~e governmental authorityo In 
fact 0 not only is this a fundamental precondition fo~ safeguarding any 
form of popular and democratic power 9 it is 0 as we have already 
euggesteq 0 an inescapable condition for sensible administration 0 
Relevant here is Piccone~s-concept ofartifial negativity 9 which will 
be· more fu1ly dis_cussed -1.ater9=but .whi-ch suggest~:-~tha~ _if_ ~ri tic ism 
does not e;cist 0 then gov!'lrnll)ehts wi~l have to invent it if ·they are to _ 
fulfil their function .. --- Otherwise.-the~ are blind 9 and the problems of· 
the contemporary ~oviet government~.the gross costs-and w~stages it 
produces in ~anaging only very inadequately to administ~r and steer·---
the Soviet economy 0 are example enougho 
~e thus experience once again the effects of the hegemony of 
Lenin°s constitutional disc~urseo The collapse of politics ~nto 
administration 0 is repe~ted in the Corrigan thesiso Their assertion 
that "there is less place for a separate polity" in socialist society 
expresses a signal failure to transcend the crudities of Lenin 8 s thesis; 
indeed 0 they dignify ito In the light of the terrorism of this concept 0 
I 
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it cannot ba repeated too often that without's genuine process of 
discursive will-formation 9 there is no politics that merits the 
namep and there is no democracy that is not a travesty of the 
meaning the concept holds for ordinary men and womeno And such a 
process of will formation can only take place in a polity that is 
composed of voluntary associations of individuals who are legally 
constituted as trans-situational citizens 9 entitled to a framework 
of legally safeguarded institutions wherein a public sphere may form 
reinforced and sustained by informal and myriad modes of communication 
and publicityo To argue for anything else would seem to be a new 
version of the Vtrahison des clercs 0 o 
The purpose of this latter discussion has been twofoldo 
to indicate soma points of refutation of the Corrigan analysis 0 and 
thus strengthen the case for the treatment of the political and con-
stitutional sphere as not reducible to determinations of another domaino 
Secondly 0 it i~ an instructive example of how such theories can be not 
simply~wrong 9 but can themselves_conspire in that which they genuinely 
seek to~oppose: the authoritarian .stateo- -It is an example ~f .how~the 
discourse we are examining manages to police itselfo The discourse· 
.., 
instructs that liberal democracy might be no worse~ but it can certainly 
. ......_ 
never be any tietter 9 .than the political insti tutior.a born of the 
discourse a Like Oedipusp the discourse blinds itself so it may not 
see the offences that it has unwittingly committedo The discourse 
will entertain no difference between the vreally existing' freedom 
·and the 8really existing' ~uthoritarianismo Certain things cannot be 
thought of, certain phenomena will not be legitimised as 0facts 0 o 
How else can we explain this enormous lapse at the heart of a serious 
work of emancipatory theory written in 1978? 
Corrigan and Sayer have made an effort to confront the 
degeneration of Soviet democracyo It is ultimately a sorry effort 
) ', 
because 0 despite their intsntions 0 they fail ~n their efforts to 
reject Leninismo Their model of socialism remains polluted with 
Lenin°s h~ritage at the most fundamental levelo They are not the 
first to mak~ such an attempt and ~agister such a failureo Radical 
critiques that have directed their fireagainst both the dictatorship 
in the USSR and problems of politics in the West have been crippled 
by this same unconscious Leninist burdeno At least a part of this 
hegemony is not attributable only to the power and simplicity of 
Leninqs theory~ it is also due to a serious failure to gra~p the 
distinctness of the model of the modern state constructed by Weber 9 
and to an attempt to subordinate Weber 0s model to a Leninist logico 
Only if we truly appreciate what sets Weber 0s model profoundly apart 
from Lenin°s 0 will we be able to define the true nature of the 0 problem 
of bureaucracy 9 in the USSRo 
After Weber 2 After Lenin 
WeberJs definition 0 the tendencies of bureaucratics to escape 
' . 
and nullif.Y democratic -coritrol proved an indispensable- and influential-"-
~- 1 
: 1 source"'-for subsequent--theories-:-of:::-t.he · contemporary -state i>--- '-The per ~od--. 
after -his ,death was dominated by- the rise of state systems -whose, 
integument appearad to ::be :a-n exceptio~ly powerful bureaucracy a The 
most extreme-and _ _brutalcexamples of this phenomenom may now be seen to 
have possessed a more temporary character than analysts at the time con= 
templated. But the examples that still exist 0 ~hila certainly less 
randomly brutal, are characterised 9 after the disappearance of the 
apparatuses of mass extermination 9 by an apparently undiminished role 
for the bureaucracyo 
The existence of bureaucracy as a common feature of modernised 
societies provided th~ opportunity for the school of Critical Theorists 
to identify a commonality between contemporary state systems. It also 
allowed such writers to min_imi.se important di'stinctions between 
state r<egimeso It is 0 possibly0 an example of the 0barbarism' 
of the transcendent critique that elides vital features and differences. 
I will argue that the theory of the authoritarian state as 
developed by the most influential body of Frankfurt theorists = 
Horkheimer0 Adorno0 and Marcuse commits this unacceptable elision 0 
and this is made possible by their reading of Webero Weber became 
a central figure in their writings to an extent greater than any 
contemporary or subsequent Marxian school 0 ·and ultimately Weber's 
complex concept of 'rationalization a was transfigured into the ground 
for a universal critique of the 'dialectic of enlightenment 0 • It 
is my contention that this development was based upon a reading of 
Weber that may be seriously chalilengedo It was a reading polluted 
by Leninismo While the Frankfurt theorists certainly rejected 
Lenin at a conscious levelp this rejection perhaps involved only 
the transparent and public face of Len.inism0 particularly the 
concept of the. Partjro ---There remains at the core of their .tbinking 11 . 
j 
if not- tlie- fundamentaL themes· of,. Lenin!>- an acceptance ::or-- the· same 
trad~tiorial themes ·that give The State and Revolution the character 
. j 
of sue~-' ~ ci_ang_e~~us -docum~to 
i 
Horkheimer 0 s t940 article on 'The Authoritarian State' was : . .. 
' 
one of the first.at~empts to-suggest that the three major state 
regimes that dominated in Europe were variants of a common model. 
The fascist state 0 the totalitarian socialist regimep and the 
remaining liberal-democratic states differed only in the position 
alang a broadly similar line of development. All three s-tate forms 
seemed to have many features in commons the manipulation of the 
masseso the d~ise of genuine democratic processeso the expansion 
of bureaucratic powerp the technologization of social life and 
culture 0 the aggressiv~· extension of the prerogatives of the stateo 
But ~is argument amounted to a theoretical conflation that violated 
the actual distinctiveness of the three state regi~s in realityo 
References to the oauthoritarian state 0 are present in Frankfurt 
writings from some five years before Horkheimer 0 s &rticle0 but 
exclusively ;;referring to German fascismo Initially0 the Nazi regime 
was ;;represented as the naked terroristic dictatorship of monopoly 
capital 0 the final and barbaric stage of capitalist societyo Such 
an analysis was not dissimilar to that of the official Comintern 
positiono But Horkheimer 0 rapidly moving away from the orthodoxies 
of Marxian political economy 0 in 1940 identified the organizing 
principle of the new epoch of domination .as technology and its 
consequences on culture and understanding 11 rather than on the 
imperatives of capital and its needs for coercion and open forceo In 
tllnis 1ight0 the German version wasM imperfect and prototypical attempt 
at a form of domination much better represented by the USSRo The 
crudeness and internal conflicts that characterised the process of 
domination_,·in Germany ~stood in -stark -contrast ·to_ the· relatively· 
better·ordering of matters that prevailed in the-USSRo: The threat_ 
to the future of humanity noo -derivedo at least .to .somao and an 
"'-,. 
increasing 11 extent 0 not. f;rom the commodity economy 11 but from the_ 
political plan and the state~at promulgated~and guarded ito Thus a 
nThe most fully developed kind of authoritarian state 0 
which has freed itself from any dependence on private (lO) 
capi tal 11 is integral Etatism0 or state socialismo 11 
Thi~ reassessment of the German and Russian regimes made possible 
a different analysis of the libeli':al-democratic state form0 one that 
was bound to be markedly pessimistico Horkheimer was well aware 
that the difference between living in a fascist or 0 reformist 0 







the st311dpoint of human emancipationD all contemporary regimes were 
almost equally ominouso Bureaucratic domination existed0 or was 
imminent in each regime 0 and those Where freedom was the most 
distant prospect were not necessarily those where domination was 
most terroristic. 
Horkheimer suggested that little distinction remained between 
the openly authoritarian regimes and the liberal democracies. He 
gave a scathing description of the relationships of domination that 
existed in Weimar Germany 0 between the political and bureaucratic 
elites and the masses. This relationship was.· replicated within 
the workers• movement 0 which 00 ooo negatively reflects the situation 
it is attacking. "(li) Capitalism had evolved into its monopoly 
form. Tbe institutions of the liberal state were increasingly 
evacuated of real content 0 and ultimately became a mere facade for 
the introduction of the irrational authority of the fascist regime. 
For Marcuse0 - therec=wa.S ·an- organic_ process involveds 
••.a~ o ~we .can -say that it ~is liberalism tRnat -.!produces • 
the tota1-authoritarian~st~te out of .. itself 0 as its-own(l2)~- · 
consummation at a more advanced stage of development." -
Jay reports Hor~eimer•s OT~m argUJDent as stressing "the end 
of the liberal mediations 0 ~-economico=political or legal 0 that had 
previously forestalled· the. realization of the domination _implicit 
in capitalism."(lJ) Thus while the transition to fascism may not 
yet have been effected in the western democraciesD it was argued 
that the continued existence of liberal institutions signified little 
in terms of real democracy ando anyway 0 the actual disappearance of 
these institutions was probably imminent. 
For our purposes 0 it is this estimation of the institutions of 
liberal democracy that is important. · The 1940 article is seminal 
in the development of the Frankfurt theorists~ or more precisely0 
in the careers of Horkheimer 0 Adorno0 and Marcuseo 
Others 0 particularly Pollock and Neumann 0 at the timeregarded 
these institutions Bith less pessimism0 Bith consequences that we 
shall seea But for the most renowned of the Frankfurt writers 0 this 
original pessimistic estimate0 the identification of liberal democracy 
as a society cast in the same mode of bureaucratic domination as 
Nazism and Stalinism was fatefulo Technological dominion by a 
bureaucratic apparatus as the generic quality of both democratic and 
authoritarian regimes mapped out the path to the argument of the 
'Dialectic of Enlightenment' 0 wherein European rationality inevitably 
produced a society of total and hermetic dominatiano The most 
influential version of this thesis was ultimately expressed in 
Marcuse's analysis of 'one-dimensionality'o The combination of 
mass consumption 0 government regulatian 0 and the culture industry had 
finally transformed an outmoded entrepreurial capitalism into a totally 
administered-society characterised by a simultaneous process of 
atomization ~and -homogenization ·of~the-=populaceo · · ·-:-In 1965 Marcuse 
discusseds 
"0 0 0 the tendencies that linked the liberal past m th its 
totalitarian aboli tiono This ab'oli tion was not restricted 
at all to the totalitarian states and since then has become-
reality_in many democracies ·(and especially in the most 
developed ane)ooo Today~total administration is necessary0 ·-
and the means are at hands mass gratificatian 0 market 
research 0 industrial psychology0 computer mathematics 0 
and the so-called science of human relationso These take 
care of the non~terroristic 0 democratic0 spontaneous- · 
automatic harmonization of individual and socially necessary 
needs and wants 0 of autonomy and heteronomyo They assure the 
fr~e elect.ion of in~ividuals ~d policies necessary for (l4) thls system to contlnue to exlst and growooo 10 
Thus 0 in a startling phrase 0 he summed up the paradox and the 
pessimism of this world as the ''frantic expansian of totalitarian 
mass democracyo"(lS) 
The thesis of the 0 totally=adnii.nisterd society o was briefly a 
persuasive one. But the events of the 1960°s 0 in which Marcuse 0 s 
ideas th~elve~ played no small part 0 served to undermine its 
This was the pe~iod of large-scale popular movements of 
protest which effected 0 ox: at least contributed to0 political change 
by utilising a combination of conventional and innovatory political 
channelso Aware of this 0 Piccone 0 has attempted to amend the theory 
from a position basically sympathetic to Marcuse. 
He holds the thesis to be valid 0 but only for a distinctly 
limited historical period0 a transitional period between classical 
capitalism and cantemporary capitalism. The dri V:e towards one-
dimensiooallty wa$ 0 he argues 0 a necessary part of the ~nttoduction 
of a state=regulated capitalism. Without such massively increased 
intervention by the state 0 the conditions of existence of capitalist 
society could not be secureds its rampant crisis mechanism would 
have brought about the conditions for widespread social dislocation 0 
the pQsition of tre subaltem classes· in their non-integrated state 
would .have-~m~de them available _to:::oppositional political doctrines._ .. 
But the process-of bureaucratic.:_extension must 11 he-argues 0 ~7_bave·:Lts 
limits. - - The sllrlft from entrepreneurial capital ism to the New Deal 
....._ 
may be necessary 11 but so is th¢ shift ·from the 'New Deal society~ to 
a subsequent arrangement.::..: - An administrative -process -that has absorbed 
the whole of society will be bereft of the critical inputs which are 
necessary if it is to successfully fulfil its functions of rationally 
st~ering the SO(!iety. 
The administrators must therefore provide 0artificial negativity 0 o 
In order to avoid the consequences of administration without 
informative and critical input from outside the apparatus 0 the 
apparatus is driven to create opposition to itselfo This could be 
·'·· 
an interesting line of reseal-<Chs there &re cert~inly examples of 
c6ntemporacy administrations providing fmHis and personnel with 
which citizens may be encouraged to criticise and point out the 
inadeq~acies of policy decisions and implementationo This is 
p~tietilarly relevant in attempts to roain~ain the integration into 
the body politic of the more marginal and anomie groups of 
contemporary societyo In connection with discrete problems of 
modem administrationv •artificial negativity• is an evocative thesiso 
But is it really adequate as a •grand t~eory• af the current state of 
western society? ObViously/} if •artificial negativity•. is to be an 
•important • theoryv it must explain important thingso And so it 
does. For example, it can ~plain the Vietnam Warp· and 0 more 
importantlyv the ending of that waro Piccone derides the way in 
whichs 
••the US ••defeat'• is still celebrated in c;c:mventional New 
Left nostalgia as the g~reatest achievement of the student 
mov~ent and the successful mass D1obilizatio:n that it 
provoked a But what. was the --Vietnam War other than the 
extensiOn. . of . the.:logie. of transition. (io eo of the totally 
adml,~isterecLsociety: P) after that logic h~d become c·:-::-::::c-
historically- obs.olete?,00.:. ,(]Ji). . .: ~ . 
Thus those mo actually .fought· ·against the war-deceive·. 
~ 
themselves if they believe they- played -a-signficant political role 
in that conjunctureo · For Piccone·;:--the -reality--4.s either that the 
war was ended when the •progressi ve • sector of the capitalist class 
won out against the- 0backwar4 • sector0 or9 at mostv the an~i-war 
movement was created and m.~ipulated t? a specific end by the 
capitalists who realised that a United Vietnam would be easy to 
exploit via the terms of trade0 whatever the government in powero 
The same logic applies to the removal of Nixon over Watergate0 
the ~eduction of the powers and apparatus of the CIA and •strong 
The dismissal of those ~o 
·!. 
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a.ctuaHy struggled in these issues is rather regrettableo But the 
revealing aspect of this analysis is what it ·says a.b9ut the one-
dimensionality thesis itselfo One possible e~planation of the 
events that Piccone cannot discuss = even seems unaware of = is that 
thf!Y had something to do with the cexistenc~S of a con~titut:i-onal state 0 
fundamental democratic freedoms 0 and a functioning public sphere of 
debate and dissento Piccone seems to retain the traditional Marxian 
dismissal of these concepts as not only bourgeois 0 but vacuous and 
in reality non=existento He is bound to do this by the on~ 
dimensionality thesisn if this regime actually existed for a period0 
and if dissent JDUZt now be manufactured by the ruling class 0 it follows 
that at some point these elements of democracy disappeared - if they 
ever had any real existenceo 
As a mOde of historical explanation 0 the thesis of 0artificial 
negativity' quickly reveals itself as rather ludicrous in its crudityo 
In a weird Hegelian inversion 0 it presents the °Capitalist class o 0 or 
at least one- section of it 0 as a -version -of the 'subject-ob1ect 
identical 0 .o manipulating ·political movements to its own desired end 0 
and doing so s~ccessfully o. In a model of breathtaking simplicity0 
it reduces all the ~ompl1ities of-'th~political sphere0 ·even the al.neady 
simplified vei'SiOn-"expounded in· same Marxian versions of political 
science,!) to the maneouvrings of -an au ... pcmerful ruling group_o cit is a 
condign fate for Horkheimer and Marcuse 9 s original theoryo Piccone 
has the intelligence to realise the inadequacy of the Marcusian vision 
of the contemporary sceneo His discomfiture arises from his attempt 
o\:W.o.t 
to redeem aspects of that model~are irredeemablep because they are 
based on a profound aporiao This is the misappropriation of Weber's 
theory of bure~racy that entered into the theories of the authoritarian 
state from the 1930's onwardo 
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of artificial negativity are evidence of the· fact th;;nt the liberal 
democracies have not 0 and did not 0 enter the state of total 
administration. Once this fact is grasped Piccone ~s tortuous sub-
Hegelian schemes are redWldant. But both Marcuse and Piccone are 
forced to such resorts by the misuse they make of lfilebero 
In fact 0 a reinterpretation of Weber is the pivo~ upon which 
Marcuse 0 6 argument shifts. In Hl41 Marcuse was still analysing 
bureaucracy in liberal democracy in a positive manner which echoes 
certain of Weber 0 s themesa 
00 ln the democratic coW1tries 0 the growth of private burea~cracy can be _balanced -by the strengthening of 'the 
public bureaucracy<". o; In the age- of mass_ society -the 
power- of -the_- public ·bureaucracy can 'be the weapon whic:h 
protects the- people from the encroachment o{ speciai 
interests upon the general welfare. - As long as the will 
of. the people can ef~ectiveiy assert i~sel~ 0 .the public (l7) 
bureaucracy can be a lever . of democrat~zat~on. oa 
But by 1964 Marcuse 0 S reading of the Weberian mo1e1 is crucially 
different. Contemporary industrial society tends towards the absolute 
power of the bureaucracy&_ 
0
'het us o .•. present -the" connection --betwean capitalism 
rationalftYo and~'domi'nati.on in the work of Max Weber ••• o 
the :specifically ·western- idea of- reason-,-realizes -i-tself in 
a. ~system of mate.d.-.ll- and intell:ectucll. culture .o o o _that _ 
develops to- the fu~l in indpStrial capitalism and this system 
tends towards a--specific..:tYP,~.of domination~ which- becomes the(lS) 
fate of the .-contemporary penods~ total bureaucracy. oo _ -
Piccone's discussion of 0 Steering problems' offers a convincing 
refutation of the possibility of a totally administered society. But 
' he falls into error_by trying to maintain that for a .time this 
represented an accurate description of the tendency of western societyo 
To do this 0 be bali eves that he must correct Weber. 
0
'Contrary to the Weberian vision of a constantly rationalizing 
and bureaucratizing process of capitalist devielopment 0 
bureaucratization becomes couriter~productive men it successfully 
, . 
penet.Jrates what it seeks to ra.tionalizeo What makes it~ 
fraglll2nting formal meChanisms successful is the lingering 
resistance of that yet~unratiooalised specificity whh::h it 
constantly destrdys~··(19) 
Piccmve here conflates Weber with Marcusea Marcuse may indeed 
have tak~ from Weber a terminally pessimistic vision of social develo~ 
ment 0 but that vision is not necessarily Weber•sa The delicate and 
crucial distinction that is possible here is put thus by Salvador Giners 
00Although he viewed the advance of this complex process 
(bureauctatiza.tion) with resigned pessimism0 Weber nevertheless 
refused to identify •rule by officials. andadml.nistratox:S with 
political power0 so that a view of_ contemporary ~oCiety' as a 
bureaucracy appears nowhere _in his work. a"~ Weber recognised 
a threatJ). which is serious engugh~ and whiCh no observer of 
the modem outlook. should ignoreo ·but 'he was at pains. to' express. 
it ~n the ·conditional.~ •if· and when_" 0 ·•perhaps•~ Moreover0 he 
WaS also at pains to explore the many mechanisms· through Whi.cli· 
the excessi ve"-power of bure&::racies i's or can be' curtailed; such 
.as,_political democracy 0 collegiality of'c:aecisiori:s 0 decentralization 0 
Md the separation of powerso 00 (20) 
We"t>er did not need to explain in detail why bureaucracy could 
not take over the whole of society0 as Piccone attempts to doo The 
Jeeason for. this is simply. ~hat ihec possibility. t:Jas mlikely to occur · 
to him., .-:· -· .1-hi.s is not dtn~ .to.~naivety--cr _lack' of~--:tn~ight J,nto .the-~ 
horrendous state .formatiOns -that::-the future held in storeo-· . It is due 
to the fact that -~e_bureaucracy that~e .was describing-and analysing 
di~~O~v in reali-ty0 ~cantain that possibilityo In the ev~t-of the 
disappearance of 'the 0 checking 0 mechanisms on bureaucracy that Giner 
., 
refers to0 the consequence is ~ a society ruled by the norms of 
bureaucratic rationallty0 but something quite di-fferent~' where formal 
rationali,ty all but collapses mder the pressure of illegit~te value 
considerations a 
S~ch an argWilent involves an aspect of Weber 0 s analysis that 
appeara to escape the Franldurt theorists., Surprisingly enough we 
shall once again 0 even here0 encotmter the corrupting influence of 
Lenin ° s model of the radical democrat:ic stateo 
It has been esta.bHshed tha.t bureaucFacy contains problems 
But tJ:le polhical (iomain also. cont~ins problems and 
threats a If the discussion of these is less developed in £,Jeber 0 s 
~itings 0 ·this is doubtless attributable to his experience of Wilhelmine 
Germany 0 where an excessiyely powerful ~ure~cracy treated an inadequate 
But ~e can nevertneless 
construct !from his m-itings a theory of political d~rs relevant to 
the iss\Aes under discussiono 
Mass democracy ccmtains one great dangers the predominance of 
emotional ower rational eleJilents in the process of political decision~ 
makingo This is not meant to imp),.y a pe:.jorative view of the capacities 
of the eitizenry o The political realm has to deal with qt1estions to 
"Which so far no answers have been found that have t.he status of 
absolute truth and can command the assent of an entire populaceo 
Politics 0 therefor.ep is ftmdamentally the contest of conflicting valu~ 
orientations a The answers to these fundamental issues can never be 
derived ·and formulated in the lang~ge~of .. ra.tionality 0 calculability 
and scienti:&ation that is the .proud possession:of ·,the- administratorsc,-
I' 
_The st;&"uggle against- the, 0 bureaucratizati.on~.Of· the ~rldcO-.is.cpr.esumably--'--
a struggle .to retain for: the citizenry-the right-to debate and decide 
issues according· to . standar.ds .. other th:an _ that that gu_ides -the-
administrators s. instrUJJ~ental eff-iciency~ Nowp if a political domain 
is considered desira.bleD it makes no sense to assume that such a domain 
will always produce the 'right" ioeo ethically.acceptable value 
orientations a Politics is the name of the field defined by the 
absence of such certainties. As Habermas sununed up Weber•s basic 
thesis on this domains 
••m the l{!.s.t analysis political action 
cannot rationtllly justify its om premises. oo (ll) 
Thus while many of the forms of thought - value orientations = 
which a- political sphere con-cains may be repugnantv and demand 
refutation and vehement opposition 0 those who would combat 
bureaucratism must accept that t.he political sphere they seek to 
defend will contain a multiplicit-y of ideas 0 approaches 0 arid 
perspectives. It is not possible to achieve the same standards of 
certainty as obtain in the administrative realmo The only exception 
to this lies in the possibility of discovering an ethics which is 
irrefutably grounded in an a·~ictically true science and philosophy 
that reveals the pristine essence of society 11 hurilanityv and historyo 
In the light of contemporary experiences such a possibility is at 
least distanto and at most unlikelyo Andv be it mderf?tOodv Such 
a discovery would truly mean the end of politics and the advent 6f 
the age of total bureaucracys for there would be nothing left to discuss. 
What 11 thenv is the precise nature of the danger that emanates 
from the political sphere? It is that it may seek to colonise the 
administrative .sphereo This is no new ph~omenons it is in fact 
the very situation .that the establishment, of .bUreaucratic organisation 
sought to supersedes a :sitl!ation ·wherein-'- administrative deci.sions··are"-
taken on the basis of .gi::-ace 0 favour 0 influ_enceo prejudice0 and even 
corruption a The extent of tllllis -problem ~11 b_ecome apparent i.1'l a 
discussion of-the Soviet Uniono·--- What- lrill also become ·clear is 
that the necessary division ._of labour, the necessary balance and 
equilibrium between_ the two domains of administration and politics 
must be carefully prescribedo This task cannot be ignored by 
clinging to either of the naive assumptions that underlie the theories 
that construe excessive bureaucratisation as the only dangeruthat 
ign~e the complexities of the political field that is supposed to 
act as panacea to this threato lt is equally as naive to assume 
that btireaucracy can ami will be banished from the face of societyu 
... 
leaving nothing but a political sphen bathing in limpid clarity and 
mutual enlightenment3 as to assu~e that politics can be sufficiently 
~ationalised and scientized to make the relationship between the two 
domains a perfect fit 11 devoid of conflicts and permeated by fraternal 
daferenceo 
This 11 of course 11 is precisely the naive assumption of the model 
constructed by Lenin in the pages of The State and Revolutiono It 
is also the assumption upon which Horkheimer based his critique of 
state regimes in uThe Authoritarian State 0 in 1940o This first article 
to unequivoeally include the USSR in the collection of authoritarian 
regimes expresses a faith in the regime of the workersu councilso 
Horkheimer 9 s tciuchstone 9 therefore 11 is still the possibility of tbe 
transcendental class subject of traditional Marxis~o His critique of 
the Weimar re~ublic derived its sweeping character from the actual 
absence of this subject~ 
"Insofar as the-proletarian opposition to the Weimar 
Republic did not-·meet it_s downfall a.s a sect 11 it 22 fell victim to -the.:spirit~.bf·c;administraticinci 0' ( ) 
.·· 
The tiny oppositional 'SB.cts -Or-e the mass--Social--Deiinocratic and 
~-
Communist Parties offered no-hope of the emancipated societyo~-~ut 
. ........ 
hare Horkheimer drew no conclusions about the viabilfty "Of .the project 
of emancipationjl on the contrary 11 -the Marxian subject is still presan·ti _ 
and provides the foundation for a conception of the post-revolutionary 
st~te that 0 while allusive in keeping with Horkheimer 9s ·style~. expresses 
the same assumptions as Lenin: 
"~fter the old positions of power bave been disaol~ed 0 
society will either govern its affairs on the basis Of free 
arguments 0 or else exploitation will continue o•o the future 
fcifm of collective life- has a chance to endure not because it 
will rest upon a more refined constitu-tion but because 
domin~tio~~s e~hau~ting it~elf in state capitalis~ ooo in a 
~ew society 0 a constitution will be of no more importance than 
train schedules and tr~ffic regulations are nowo" (23) 
'· 
It should perhaps be re~embered that train schedules are promisaa 
that the relevant authorities rarely manage to fulfil 0 and that traffic 
regulatiohs are often treated by the citizenry with a fair degree of 
selectivity or indifferenceo This does not seem to be a promising 
metaphor for the political processes of the future societyo 
Xt is cleat" that Horkheirner still shared with traditional Marxism 
theory a great deal of ground 0 in particular he still believed in the 
emancipatory potential of Mardsmo This led him to surmise that the 
USSR 9 while being the most efficient example of the authoritarian state 9 
!!las also the one most prone to overthrow in an e·mancipatory directiono 
This was due to the fact .that the legitimating ideology cif the ruling 
group was Marxism itself o The n~ivety of this position has b~en 
summar is ad by Ara to x 
qooo the assumption of Horkheimer 0s immanent critique t~at 
tbe admittedly mos,t ~onsistent form of the authoritarian state 
w~s because of its working clciss ideology the most open to 
liber-at-ing 9 ·cataclysmic--social~ change (based pn a new council 
movement)· deri-ved from an inadequ~te analy,sis' of Soviet conditions 
apd of the·natura-of-Soviet--Mar)(ism-as-a-~eudosclence of 
·· · 1 u·(24) --.·-. · · ···-· .· leg;&. tJ.mat ono --- . . - ' - - . . . - . . .· . . 
This dubious asseasment.of-~he nature of Marxian ideology was 
presumably. a- major cause of HorkheimB?,~s' weakness ;for ·the· tradiHonal 
council""ty.pe sqlutj.ol)a ·to the :problems_ of politips and administration., 
In contrast to the theories-cof absolute-bureaucratbation 51 
Weber 9s far more modest model of ~e bureaucracy is relevant top and 
revealing of 9 the fundamental ~ature of the 0authoritarian state 0 • I 
have referred to the less pessimistic attitude to the institutions of 
ihe liberal state that was adopted by Neumann and Pollocko These 
theorists stress the juridicial-legal protection of civil rights and 
the survival of so~e forms of popular political participation under late 
capitalism a Pollee~ announced the advent of a new socio=economic 
·,.-._--_-:;.· 
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formation termed 0state=capitalism 0 9 which was applicable in a generic 
form 9 just as was Horkheimer 0s 9 to the varied regimes of advanced 
capita lismo But he maintained a distinction between the totalitarian 
and democratic forms 9 and the democratic form enjoys a profound 
superiority~ 
01 Under a democratic form of state capitalism 9 the state 
has the same controlling functions but is it~~lf controlled 
by the peopleo I~ is based upon institutions which p~event 
the bureaucracy from transforming its administrative position 
into an instrument of power and thus laying the basis for fue 
transshaping the democratic system into a totalitarian one 0 11 ( 25 ) 
Pollock 0s recognition of the still profound difference between 
authoritarian r~gimes and the liberal democratic state led him to a 
series of questions which he could ohly IJO~e l;!peculativelyo But 
these questions 9 it may be suggested 9 have a vibrancy and relevance 
forty years later 9 which (for all their profound insights) is lacking 
in the political w:d tings of Horkheimer and marc use~ 
"What measures-are necessary to guarantee control of the 
state -by .the majority-of 'people instead of by--a small minority? 
What ways and means :·can _-be .devised- to prevent the abuse of- the 
enor..mous .power vested in~the'=state-'-'industrial 0 ·-and party--
bureaucracy under state capitaH:sm? . :How can- the lossc-Of -~. 
economic liberty be· rendered compatible with the maintenance-
of political liberty? Holli can the disintegrative motive 
forces of today be- replaced :by- integrative ones?_._:: How will 
the-roots from which lnsurmoljntati1e~social -antagonisms develop 
be- eliminated so -that there will- not arise a political alliance- --
between dissentient partia1.:...interests and the bureaucracy-aiming 
to dominate the majori ty?o'o o" ·{26-) 
It is precisely these problemsv and developments of themv .that 
have provided the comple~ of issues that Habermas' work has sought to 
investigate a The period df European totalitarianism has 9 at least 
for now 11 receded into the historical past 0 and taken with it the 
viability of the inevitable grand generalisations and horrific 
prognos~icationso We may consider Habermas' work as an example of the 
fruit to be gathered from Weber 1 s basic model~ a contrast to the 
barrenness of the Leninist heritage. The starting point must surely 
be a realisation that it is false to present the dangers embodied in 
the modern state as consisting only of the tendency of the bureaucracy 
to conquer the rest of societyo That such dangers existg and constitute 
an ominous threat to civilized society is hardly worth repeating. My 
argument assumes this 0 and certainly does not seek to contest its 
significance. But if the cure is not to be worse than 0 or identical 
with 0 the diaease 9 the other dangerous tendency we have described must 
be appreciated. The theorists of absolute bureaucracy are too e~t~e: 
the problem is the existence of any bureaucracy and the only answer is 
zero bur~aucracyo Weber's crucial insight consisted d:n understanding 
that 9 while the political sphere acts as a restrai~t on the administrative 9 
the administration is also necessary to defuse the dangerous tendencies 
of the politicians (a term which may mean the whole of the citizenry)o 
Habermas has a typology of problems that Weber 8s model points 
to in contemporary society; -=he has also opened a -discussion that 
gives Weber's distinctions_their-true weight 9 by Dntologising the __ _ 
distinction~etwean politics and administrationo 
This latter ·theme occurs-~in the.._!irst Chapter of his 0 Theory 
end Practice e ,,- published in --197-l., ___:: o:Here he· def~nds the assumptions 
of the classical doctrine of-politics, with its origins-in Aristotleo 
This doctrine asserted a distinction between forms of human knowledgeo 
One form is that of-techne, 01 the skilful production of artifacts and 
the expert mastery of objectified tasks"; politics ia th!.l field 
constituted by ·a different type of knowledge, 
"Aristotle ~mphasise$ that politics 9 and practical philosophy 
in general, cannot be compared in its claim to knowledge with a 
rigorous sr;:fanc:e, •doth -the .apodictic epistemea for its subJect 
matter 9 the: Just apd the Excellent, in its context of a variable an~t:l cbntingE!nt praxis@ ,l~cks ontological constancy as well as 
lqgic~l necessity., Tl'le capacity of practical philosophy is 
.e,tiroflesis 11 a -prudent und~~,standing of the situation 9 and on this 
thee tradition of clessic.al politics has continued to base itself o o 01( 27) 
Haberrn~s contrasts t;he; classical doctrine of politics ~itp 
attempts to define m science· of politics 0 initiated by the work 
of Hobbes and Machiavellio From Hobbes emerges a quite different 
set of principless firstly it is deemed possible to devise ~ 
scientifically grounded social philosophy whose asser'tions will be 
valid independently of tim2v place and circumstances 0 secondly 0 
the translation of this knowledge into practice is a technical 
problema Prudence can be replaced by calculationo. Thirdly 0 
human behaviour is now considered to be the prmrince of science 0 
which will recommend the necessary conditions and institutions 
that will ensure that hunians behave in a °Calculable 0 manner 0 
Politics is separated fr6m moralitY8 if the task of preparing· 
individuals for life in the commt.mity was previously that ofthe teacher 




We have here0 therefore 0 in this modern political science 9 
a ft.mdamental confusion and confl~tions the technical is presumed 
·"' 
to fulfil . .t~e responsibilities of the 0p):'actical'o That in 
, .. ~, .; . 
contemporary parlance there appears to be lit-tle9 if any9 distinction 
between the two terms is evidence of the degree of success attained 
......... 
by the scientizers of social thoughto As Bernstem says s 
. -- ·- '' o o o our very 'difficulty in grasping the differ-ence 
between the two ~ for we now C01tlJUOnly ,think of the practical 
as. being a matter of technical application or know how -
· helps Wlderscore Habermas • pointo We nqt only oonfu~e the 
·'practical wit:h the technicalo but in both thoosht an·d 
act·ion terid to redl;lce .distinctively practical issues to the 
matrix of technical. appl~cationo" (28) · 
The consequent tendency to reduce all questions of 0action ° 
to issues of -technical ccmtrol and manipulation clearly underlies 
the threat of bureaucracyo Habermas grounds this threat separately 
-::::. 
and more fundamentally \:han in the bureaucratic pouer=complex itself. 
The problem arises from the hegemony of contemporary thought exercised 
by science 0 its methods-0 and its practitioners. In the light of thisv 
Habermas can then provide us m th his models of possible relations 
betaeen •expertise a.nd political practice •. 
He describes firstly the •decisionistic• modelp the pure form of 
Weber•s theory0 whereby ·there exists a strict division of labour 
between experts and politicians!) the former pursuing by means of 
rational calculation the ends prescribed by the latter. These ends 
themselves are not subject to the dictates of administrative 
rationality. But for Habermas this situation leaves much to be desireds 
••Rationality in the choice of m~ans accompanies avowed(29) irrationality in orientation t() va:iuesv goals and needs. •• 
While politics certainly has 0 and must retain 0 its own modalities 
of thought that ar0 quite distinct from those of administrationp it is 
difficul't for Habermas ·to accept that --these must continue to take the 
form of irrationality. In the last section -of--•Legitimation· Crisis 0 -
-· i - ' 
Habermas-_acknoaledge6cothe -contradiction- and cdifficulty--,iXF-which 'be--'-."-· 
finds_ himself a A •pa¢iality fqr reason • is a partisan position 
that -depends upon the as~umption of reason. - :He is :farced- to -an 
admission of his •irrat:i6llal• starting pointn a passion for •old 
- h d" . 0 (30) European uman 1gn1ty o 
Nevertheless a clear dil!ltinctien exists betaeen the 
'decisionistic • model and ~the more contemporary •technocratic' cmes 
Technical and intellectual developments hav;.e made an alternative possibles 
••s,yst~ms analysis and especially decision t:hmty do not 
mex.:elymake ne~ technologies available0 thus improving 
tr:a'ditional -m:S,t;ruments8 they al~o ratiOJ1alize choice as 
~uch,by means.of calculated strategies and automatic decision 
procedures-:•• (Jl:) 
. - "'., 
f 
The •technocratic • model is that where ,the politiciM becomes 
dependent on the expert for definition of aims and ends 0 as well as 
meanso The extension of rational techniques and calculations into 
the options available in the social world itself (Weber•s 
""disenchantment•• writ large) v and the ability to prognosticate the 
long-term COnSequences Of the selection of a.ny set of goals meahS 8 
•• o o o the politician in the technical state is lef"t m th 
nqthing but a fictitious decision-making powero •• (32) 
As I have already indicated 0 Habermas suggests neithertbat 
this state of affairs is inevitable 0 nor that it can resolve the 
problems it is designed to tackleo These· new tnethcxis still cannot 
. . 
impinge upon the fnndamental problem-comRlex from which poli.tical 
decision ultimately derive 9 from value systemso In the light of his 
belief in the inadequacyo both descriptively and 0 of course 0 
normatively0 of both the decisionistic and the technocratic modes 0 
he suggests a model that may connter the weaknesses of botho This 
is the 'pragmatistic • _model 0 whereby.::he- attempts to replace ·the 
.. 
\ 
relationship-of ·domination b.etween~politician and exper.t by one of 
'critipal interaction • o ~ ·His a]:gument benefits from t11e fact that 
this is .not a purely speculative modeL$_. --
"Despite the technocratic viewD experts have not -~become --
sovereign over pblitlcians ·subjected< to ·the~:demarids -Of :the 
facts ·and left with a purely fictitious power of decisiono 
Nor 0 despite the implications of the decisionistic inodel 0 
does ~he politician I:~tain .a preserve outside of the· 
necessarily rationalised areas of practice in which 
practical problems are decided upon as ever by acts of 
the willa Rather 0 reCiprocal collllht.nl~cation seems 
possible CUld neces~aryo 0 0 00 (33) . . 
The formulation is arguably optimistico The pragmatistic 
model is at least on one l~vel a respcmse and reply by Habermas to 
those visions of a •totally administered' society that were 
articulated by Horkheimer,0 Adorno, and Marcuseo . . . He both rejects 
the pqssibility of the development they predicted 0 and manages to 
indicate that such a rejection opens up equally fruitful approaches 
to the problems that do undeniably exist. But 0 operating in the 
Weberian mode 0 Habermas has clearly constructed only ideal types 0 
he has mot described anything that in reality and as yet exists. 
He mll 0 therefore 0 be aware that just because neither the· decisionistic 
or technocratic model in reality have occurred 0 it must not be assumed 
that the pragmatistic model prevails. The degree of decisionism 
and/or technocratism which is necessary if a democratic project is 
to be thwarted is not an absolute. These tendencies need not be 
present· in gigantic and publicly transparent form0 ' contemporary 
society abonnds in examples of them frustrating the possibility of 
a genuine democratic society. In his later work 0: Habermas has 
demOnstrated the difficulty involved in defining the conditfuns that 
would make possible a model of_politics and-administration based upon 
0free communication between equals 0 • But that difficulty is a 
necessary-difficulty0 _one that ·is contained in the reality of the 
I 
and others which .reduce:=the. problem to removing- simple barriers to t~e -----
democratic .. control of administration. · ·Rat·h~ 9 a remarkable job of :. 
-........ 
philosophical 0 -cultural 0 and -institutional construction is .iniolved.: ~ .. · · 
I 
· Weber and Lenin& The Problem~·of the Rule of Law 
The Weberian model cannot describe the state regime of the 
Soviet Union 9 although it will help to explain it. The USSR cannot 
I 
·j 
be read through Weber's fUndamental categories or through the typology 
that Habermas has derived from them. The USSR is neither of the two 
extremes that might evolve from the regime Weber describeds political 
power developing into the hands of the apparatus 0 or administrative 
process corrupted by political interference. The puzzling thing is 
that it appears to display the symptoms of an extreme case of both 
diseases a At one and the same ~ime it is an all~powerful 0 rigid 0 
and highly structured administration unconstrained by normal modes 
of political control$ and a totally politicised structure wherein 
norms 0 laBS 0 regulations and procedures may be overturned at a moment's 
notice by political decreeo Perhaps Serge•s Comrade Tulayev is the 
victim of the former 0 Koestler•s Rubashev of the lattero Yet both 
are victims of the same instrument at the same hou·: of its powero 
How may this be explained? Does not the reality here point to in= 
adeq~acies in Weber•s model 0 inas much as it appears to be unable to 
bring its explanatory categories to bear? 
Tbe ~titho-rity of Weber 0 s model is in fact restored by a dis-
tinction that is crucial to my argumento This distinction has been 
indicated aboves Weber never constructed a model of totalitarian 
bureaucratic society because his bureaucracy contained no possibility 
of achieving total power and consumating the expropriation of the 
pdlitical -clomaino ~~~He recognised regrettable costs 0 ·the costs of 
mpcternity-~and he -recognised possible -corruptions~ __ .:c But every .syst.em--~--= _:_ 
I 
that contains human-beings is open to corruption 0 and perhaps Weber's 
mllingness to _reconcile -himself. to ·the bureaucratic age 'C8.Jile from the-
' .· . ........ ·. 
appreciati~that these corruptions took the form of possibilities 0 
not inherent qualities in fixed ·quantities a -- Countervai-ling t'endencies 
could limit these possibilities 11 but only so long as it was possible to 
maintain the two domains of politics and administration as distinct 
and separateo 
Thus Weber•s bureaucratic society is not a totalitarian oneo 
Although totalitarian regimes depend upon a vast bureaucratic 
apparatus 0 any similarity this suggests ~ith the society that Weber 
was analysing is ·s\lperficialo What emerges from a proper understlllllding 
of Weber 0s model is the momentous aspect wherein the two regimes have 
nothing in common. This is what Weber defines as 0 the rule of law 0 • 
The existence of the rule of law is the primary precondition for the 
existence of the modern staten an administrative and legal order that 
is subject to change by legislation and an administrative apparatus 
\ 
that conducts official business in accordance with legislative 
regulation. The rest of Ueber 0 s model is built upon this simple 
assumption3 and if this assumption does not apply 0 all of Weber 0S 
comments on politicians and bureaucrats 0 on norms and authority0 on 
domains and responsibilitieso on citizens and officials 0 .are simply 
irrelevant. They are tools too sophisticated to apply to the brute 
structure of a totalitarian regimes it is naive to expect them to 
have ariy relevance. It is like trying to t.mderst~d the workings of 
a bicycle by reading the workshop mariual for a car. A categorically 
different object is under discussion. 
There are certain situations where the rule of law cannot 
exist. Clearly0 the rule of ·law cannot be assumed in a society 
undergoing-revolutionary reconstruction. As_Bendix put its 
00 Where' norms can be changed at a moment-s 
notice 0 the rule -of law is -destroyed. o• · (34) 
""-.. 
Revolutionary .regimes-by_. the very act of the seizure of power 
dismiss "the existing structure of law and its processes 0 anq it is 
unlikely to restore that old structure once the new regime is secure. 
The norms embodied iii that old system of law will have been a primary 
motivation for the revolutionary initiative itself 3 revolution is a 
statement that existing procedures of enacting and changing legislatiOn 
hawe been found ineffective or inadequate. The new regime must 
p~force construct its own legal assumptions anew0 in line with its 
ideological preconceptions. This reconstruct~on is at very least a 
-lit-\ 
time~ccns\:.uning and complex process. A multitude of contradictory 
int~rpretations of the newly dominant ideolbgy will for some time 
obtain 0 until the features of the new culture are firmly established. 
Competing versions uill abonndD both publicly and privately. The 
political struggle of the Bolsheviks against all other political 
tendencies D from liberals to anarchists D is the evidence· of this 
public struggle. No less important 9 although certainly less 
apparent 11 will be the conflict between the new public nqrms and the 
assumptiOns upon which the everyday private lives of much of the 
population will continue to be ordered. 
Consequently 11 the law becomes a more overtly political 
instrument. Law may foilow in the trail of new soCial arrangementsD 
often to confirm themD but perhaps as often to contradict themD as 
with the decree on °0ne-Man Nanagement o that opposed the popular 
syndicalist control that to same degree existed. Additionally, 
the law becomes an instrument by which attempts are made to undermine 
and destroy old- social relationships I) and thus clearly come into 
conflict ,..with majority- norms,---as in the prolonged,_,conflict_ tietween 
. l - . . . - . ~-~- ---
--
the Soviet -·government,-and ·the peasantry.-,.; Laws thereforoev-:-in ,-a 
revolutiunary regime 0 may be very -f.ar from being: based upon an 
--ac~eptanciei let alone an understanding, of the norms that li-e: behind 
it as :far as large -sections -of-the population are_ concerned. Even 
if it may be asserted that consultation.would in fact reveal a 
coincidence of norms between the government and the majority of the 
populaces the process of ~enactment of_ such norms is problematic. 
Revolutionary governments legislate by decree not by debate. A 
vast new legal edifice must be established in a brief time~spani 
all the greater is the task if .the new regime is distinguished from 
the old by its belief in modernizations a process which I have 
already i,ndicated produced a huge increase in the areas of society 
that are considered as the legitimate sites of government intervention. 
The sheer magnitude of the tasks allows little room for the deliberative 
delays of due process. The habits consequently inculcated into ad~ 
ministrative officials ~ill be such as to aggrandise their powers 
considerably. 
All these are perhaps inevitable costs of situations where the 
crisis of a social formation forces revolutionary change. It would 
be foolish to suggest that such situations do not occur 11 and that the 
problems posed by them can be avoided. But if the process of change 
inevitably undermines arid banishes the rule of law, the question 
remains as to the possibilities of 0 and the conditions for; a ret,urn 
to a regime of the rule of law once the inunediately transitional 
situation' is passed. How is the ruling party11 for whom the law has 
become an instrument in their own possession 11 to return to a situation 
where they themselves are once again subordinate to that law? 
This problem exercised previous revolutionary actors. All 
i 
revolutions are made in the-=name of ·some· kind of freedom,- and a --:comnlon 
core of these various definitions 'of-freedom-'-is-the--£-reedom -ofrom - . 
arbitrary rule. The »roblem for the makers of constitutions is how 
such a freedom may be established out. of, an --act which is -itself -
arbitrary an~ necessarily -repressive0 -wh_~C:!t had observed no laws -
and has exercised-violence-against -8 legitimate a rulers. The new 
laws cannot be written before the new--lawmaking body of the 
revolutionary regime is constituted. The authority of that body 
cannot therefore derive .from the lawz but if it does not possess 
this necessary authority, how can the laws stand above man? 
Rousseau described this ass 
0
'The great problem ill politics 0 which I compare to the 
problem of squaring the circle in geometry • • (!&) s How to (JS) 
find a form of government whltch puts the law above Jnano ' 0 
' 
Apart frClJl1 any putative corruptian 0 therefore 0 which a 
revolutionary government might suffer (reluctance to relinquish the 
power 0 and the fruits of power) there is a genuine conceptual problem. 
·How are those who have placed themselves above the law to suborttinate 
themselves to the law? The legitimations that previously applied 
can no longer satisfy. An appeal to a transcendental authority 0 
or to the authority of tradition and custom are clearly no~ available 
to revolutionaries who have proceeded against precisely those 
legitimations. the concept of the 0General Will o D a more 
appropriate fQundationo reveals itselfo if attempts to determine that 
will are genuinely madep . as 9 in -Arendt's wor'ds 'built on quicksand 0 s 
00The canst:itutional histor:y of FranceD Where even 
durj,ng-:-j:he revolut1oh carfstitution follow~d'.an- c(msti.tution 
while those in power were tm~ble-to enf_orce·any'of the 
revolut;lenary decre~s _ (i:nd~cate's) • ·•• that the .. so-caU:ed 
. mil. of a mui tit\ld~ (if tllllis is to be mor'e. than a legal 
fled.. on) is ever~ changing by definition ••• n -(;3~) 
In the .absence of any alternative firm foundation 9 there exists 
. 
simply the con$tant temptation.~- and -of-ten demand~ for-some '--,--. 
~·· I 
individu-al to elJlbody the general will· and impose its interpretations-
~ 
upon the rest o~. the societys · ---.:. 
. 
00ZiapQleon Bonaparte· was only tl:le fi;st in a ·l,Qilg series 
of nati-onal statesJilen- eho0 to ·the applause .of. a whole · "'(:~)) 
natiort 0 c()Uld-declares 10 ! am the pouvoir constituent. o• 
An appeal to the authority of the revolution contains no 
solution to this problem. The revolution can only legitimise the 
power of those who made itp of those of its heirs who are considered 
to be the most legitimate claimants to its tradition. The authority 
of .the revolution legiti,.mises exclusive power 0 not the transfer of 
power between competing parties in the consequent regime. Those who 
1,- .. '~ _; 
:j 




were not instrumental in making the revolution 0 or more precisely in 
leading it 0 are de facto deprived of the credientials it bestows. If 
the appeal is to the authority of the revolution 9 the Mensheviks have 
no right to dispute policy with the Bolsheviks in the n~w USSR. 
Ths American revolutionaries managed to avoid these consequences~ 
by virtue of an remarkable stroke of good fortuneo Thomas Jefferson 
pointed to it in his explanation of how America was able to maintain 
the republican form of government when the french revolutionaries lost 
ito Republican government in france failed 0 he argued 0 because "the 
party of 10 un at indivisible" had prevailedo" There existed no other 
organs of a~thorit~ to which the people might have turned to combat the 
dissolution of democra.tic formso 
"But with us 0 sixteen out of seventeen states rising in 
mass 9 und~r regular organisation 0 and legal commanders 9 united 
in obJec.t and action by their Congress o o o present such obstacle 
to a usurper as forever to stifle ambition in the first conception 
of that objecto 11 (38) 
The point is not simply~that power was dec~ntralised 0 but that· 
legi timata author! ty ·lay a~-j;hia .'level,~·-and any central--power::.could-o.=·-
only derive-its right-to rule-f':rom ·tha·local institutioriso··;._aut-even. 
. ~ 
this ·does not fully account for the ~silience of American democracyo 
The local institutions embodied the continuity ~f the rule of.lawo 
Authority 11 not least the. author-i:ty oft'. the men who drafted the 
Declaration and the Constitution 9 derived from the complex of bodies 
that pre-existed tfie revolution - the districts, townships 9 and countieso 
And their a~thority derived from the tcpnstitution ° which the 
Mayflower colonists agreed ~mongst themselves for their own security 
in the Ostate of nature 0 that awaited themo The American ~evolution 
was made in the name of established legal conventions 9 and not against 
them; the revolution was against what were interpreted as attempts to 
impose a tyranny upon a previously free societyo(Jg) raw creators of 
. modern states have been able to ~raw upon such cl~ar and incontrovertible 
""·- ~-
lineages of legH:imacy 9 deriving from a 0 free contx-act 0 arrived at 
in a territory previously without government. But the example is 
relevant for those-who would attempt similar tasks in less favourable 
conditionso 
For it may be that neither the problems that the Russian 
revolutionaries were'attempting to solve 9 nor the fundamental 
assumptions with which they approached these problems 9 were profoundly 
different from those of the American revolutionarieso He:re 9 of course 9 
X am minimising the differences that are often held to separate and 
distinguiah 0 bourgeois0 revolutions from 0proletarian° ones. I am 
particularly concerned to set aside arguments that would attribute to 
the thinkers of the American revolutions no other motive than that of 
e§tab~i§hing a new class power 0 the ppwer of the indi~enous bourgeoisie 0 
in its own righto Similarly 9 I am similarly concerned to avoid 
attribution to the Bolsheviks of fundamental motivations in specific 
class terms~ either the determination to establish the class power of 
Jthe proletariat 0 or_9 more deviously 9 .to establish the power of a 0 new 
1class 0 9 -=:~ bure~ucracy 9 state bourgeoisie 9 inte_lligentsia or whatevero- :.;_ 
' irnste~d 9 it is·worth.~ugge~ting that ~oth bodies of revolutionaries 
... 
partook of a tundamental eihica~ aim 9 and drew in significant measure 
.._ 
upon a~~o~mon intellectual.tr~ditiono 
I want to' present -two- sets of themes· that our; revolutionaries 
appear to possess in commono Firstly 0 that involved in Jefferson°s 
concept of 0self-evidence 0 and the Marxian concept of its own status 
as a science9 secondly 9 i!h.e possible .congruences between Lenin°s 
concept of the commune-state and the American concept of 0public 
happiness 0 o On the first theme 0 I have previously commented on the 
manner in which the Bolsheviks 0constructed 0 a 0 general wil!Oo The 
attribution of a scientific status to Mar)(ism provided the Bolsheviks 
with a re~dy-made and almost automatic method of excluding various 
fore~~ from the p9litical pr~~ess 0 and relegating pol~~ical problems 
=14bQ 
to the stcrtus of conflicts between those who 'knew th!3 truth and those 
l!lh0 0 out of ignorance 0 malice 0 or self=interest 0 l'efused to acknowledge 
that trutho But in thi!:l context the words of the American Declaration 
of Independence are evocative g "We hold these trt,Jths to ba B?lf=evidento 11 
It was upon the assumption of self=evidence for ce~tain rights that the 
~ase against British tyranny was built 0 and the revolution madeo 
Jefferson°a choice of words is crucial 0 because it is an assertion 
of John Locks 0 s epistemology of self=evidente against the docttine of 
innate ideaso The concept of innate ideas 9 it was held;was a secure 
buttress for 0dictators 0 o It was necessary to admit the ~se of reason 
into the prqcess of the judgement of political insti tuotions P for the 
use of reason would ,p-ersuade everyone o·f the prec_ep.ts upon _which 
d~mqcratic governm~nt was basedo . It was therefor~ self=evid~nt that 
ell men were created equal 0 entitled to inalienable rights including 
life 0 liberty 0 and the putsuit of happiness 9 that ~overnments were 
instituted to secure these rights 9 end that citizens had the right to 
(lverthrow ·such governments as failed .tO-..discharge satisfactorily their. ,_ 
obligationso -~ ~ " 
But the political.conaaquences of .such philosophical assumptions 
... 
m~y prove problematico ,H~s avery- c~zen. the right 0 simply by 
claiming"to·be-moved,by reason, -to reject the legitimacy of the 
_ government if he so wishes? It was necessary for the sake of political 
stability to introduce certain distinctions: 
"When we speak of a tyrant that may l~~fully be dethroned 
by the peopla 9 • we d~ not mean by. the ~p~d peopl~~ the vile 
ROpuiaca or rabble of the country 0 nor tbe cab~l'of a sm~ll 
number of factious persons 9 but the great~r and more judicious 
part of the subjects 9 of all rankso 11 (40) . 
Locka's arguments ware therefore called on to stress that reason 
was a faculty 0 and one which it was entirely possible that ~aople might 
. 
-, 
fail 9 or ~efuse 0 to useo There are those~ 
11
ooo whose opportunities of knowledge and inquiry 
are commonly as narrow as their fortunesp and their 
und~rst~ndings are but little instructedp wh~n all their 
whole time and pains is laid out to still the croaking of 
their own bellies 0 or the cries of their childreno o• 
This may appear to be an elitist attempt to a~clude the labouring 
classes from the democratic political processp but Locke does not 
confine himself to such classaso There are those 17 morally infe1•ior 0 
persons who have the opportunity to use reason 9 but lack the will 17 
"Their hot pursuit of J:?l8asure 9 or constant drudgery 
in business 17 enge~ges some !n~n v s thoughts eli?ewhere: i'aziness 
and cif!cita,ncy. in general 9 or: a particular avei_rsion fr:fr bo1Jk; 0 
study and medi tatii;lh 0 keep oth~rs from any ser-.i'ous thoughts at 
aii; and some out of fear that an impartial inquiry wo1Jld not 
favour those opinions which best suit their pfejudicesp lives 
and deliligns 0 content.themselv8~ 9 w.j.thou~ exami?ation 11 to take (4l) on trust what they f~n~ conven~ent and ~n fash~ono 11 · 
lt is thus clear that the assumptions of the Americans appear to 
contain;implications that we could consider dangerously undemocratico 
for~ those who ;are not capable of using 11 or who refuse to use 0 reason 0 
- ~. 
~~t. only haveJa very dubiou~ claim to participate in a democratic 
. ! ~ 
._process founded on re~son 9 their constant pollution of the public 
li-fe with the politics of unreason, might threaten the sur.vival-iof the 
republic itselfo Surely 9 we are not far from Lenin? Loc_k"e~s latt~r 
quote could refer equally to Lenin°s bourgeoisie~ impelled either by 
moral degeneration 9 or 'class situation1 9 or cl~~s interest 9 to deny 
the truths of Marxism; and how reminiscent of Lenin's complaints about 
' 
the low cultural level of the masses is Locke 0s description of the 
labouring pood In this crucial 0 over-riding sense• then 9 both 
Jefferson and Lenin were children of the Age of Reasong claiming 
their authority on the basis of reason 9 and then driven to use reason 
=1451 • 
. 
to halt the corrosive undermining of their own positions that reason 0 
onca loose 9 may effect. Without pursuing the comparison any further 0 
we may simply suggest for consideration the effect of the following in 
producing the very different results of the two revolutionsg firstly 0 
of course 0 the tasks that the American governments w~re subsequently to 
take upon themselves were minimalg the American populace lived in a 
state agre~d by all as one alrea~y of 0prosperity0 0 and it was a long 
time before industrialisation became the central objective of a 
revolutionary governmento How to deal with the vunreasonablev did not 
b_ecome a g_enuine political problem once the War of Independence was '!JOn 0 
at lesst: until fhe l!i\iil War a century le~tGro Sectindly 9 in~~much as 
the Americans were w_orking within a tradition of avowedly moral 
philos6phy 0 which did npt claim to conquer and systemise the whole of 
ht.iman knowledge 9 or claim a fundamental rupture with all that had been 
previously thought 11 the imperious claims of reason were balanced by 
inheritances from a Christian tradition. Locke himself declined to 
writece handbook of-athics,based upon~is concept-of reason because~e 
ali,-eady available 9 through faith 0 'to-the nt:m..;anlightened. further 11 the-
. ' 
Americans were prob_ably --far more con~ned j;han lf;'lter<imitators ,tcr - --i:~ 
intellectually jus-tify .. the form~f,.-government they-had .. created 9 and -
tbare·cis evidence- that. in his later career Jefferson !!las-prepared to 
admit the existence of e 0moral sense 0 that pre-existed the u~e of 
re.ason 0 although it was still the inescapable duty of reason to judge 
and verify these pre-rational responses. The existence of a 0moral 
sense 0 w~ll admit to the political process those who~ clumsiness in 
the field qf re~son might have axcludedo 
Arguably we might be able to·find a further parallel between the 
eighbsnth ce'ntury concept Of moral sense and Lenin°s concept of the 












to the btitgeoning bureaucracy via Ra:bkrin and similar measures 
suggests Lenin 9 s continuing acceptance of a proletarian moral 
~hat is 0 he believed in an essential fatul ty of a 
sociological group"' that depended not upoo dre~ ~pility to absorb 
Marxism 0 but rather that makes it possible for t_he proletariat 0 or 
its best elements 0 to absorb and understand Marxism and avoid the 
corruptions of powero But Jefferson°s 0 moral senseo was a capacity 
qmdo»ed on people by a Creato~ 0 Lenin °S being dependent upon _an 
exclusive sociology0 was rather more attenuatedo Ind.eed:0 far more 
than J'efferson 0 L~in lac:;:ked co.nfid~ce in both the willingness to 
reasOn arid the' iiU)ate moral capacities of the peqplep and· t·hat its.elf 
could' not be without consequences. 
The. second theme where we may find parallels involves the 
conception of the purpose of t·he revolution. It was very far from 
the mind of both Lenin and Jefferson simply to remove a set of specific 
grievances that a tyrannical govern~ent imposed upon the people. It 
was not_ their_ aim merely -to' :free ·people to once more live their ~ives 
as they mi.ght once ~ve .:.dane 0--without~a;tyr.annicaL.:gov~rnJilent.; ._~:Arendt-;.._...::_ -~-. 
argues that it was not--simply .t:}le colonists·o -.intention to regain 
liberties which ""Were 0 - or had been possessed by n~tive Englishmen 0 and_ 1. . ........... . 
»hieh were denied them due t~ their .sta~us as colonistso ( 4:Z) -That was--:-_ 
no longer. enough •. ~The claim to -the 0right .to.htJ>piness o was·0 for the 
Americans 9 not simply a right to private happiness 0 the happiness ·of 
the subject secure tn his domestic and professional pursuits 0 Un-
trammell~d by arbitrary interference of unpredictable government. It 
»as also0 and most significantly0 a claim to a new 'public happiness 0 • 
This claim derived from the assumption that the right to participate 
in the affairs of government was a central element of the highest 
happiness at which men might aim. Pcu:-ticipation in public affairs 
. _--· .. 
wa,s no longer 0 as in the piist 0 a burden that·some must bear in order 
that others might pursue unhindered their private happiness. Where 
critics might ascribe the h4ll..ppiness that the American legislators 
derived from their work simply to an °inordinate. passion for power o 0 
those men would reply that their enjoyment merely confirrped that such 
activities would affocd the same reward to all and any who engaged in 
them. Thus the entitlement of all citizens to participate in the 
public realm was a central motivating theme far the Americans. 
It is clear that Lenin conceives of the politics of the new 
society in terms similar to Jefferson. He also was not content that 
the new state should simply avoid the abuses of the old and allow the 
citizens a life free 'from material deprivation. and political abuse. 
Thatp again 0 was his argurrient with the Social Democrats. He also 
lilanted a state which would itself expressand encapsulate the new 
happiness. of the peoples the happiness that derives from nmning 
their own lives~> from taking to themselves decisions that had previously0 
for good or ill~> been made for them. 
Per!Japs it -"'-is. possible:.to~speak.--Of--thi~ .aspect of~he American.:~--
Revolut-ion- being~> in a sense·t>·-:o_betrayed • 9 just as _wei'e Lenin °S __ 
... 
aspiration~ for the new Russian .. .state. -- Arendt -points out that. 
-....... 
Jefferson failed to articulate the concept of public happiness clearly _ 
in the- Declaration 0 as distinct from 'private happiness'. " The two 
are 11 arguably 11 canflated in the term 'the pursuit of happiness'. 
For Arendt 11 the rapidity with which the specific concept of 'public 
happiness • was forgottens 
" ••• and the term used and tmderstood without its original 
qualifying adjective may well be the standard by which to 
measure. In Am~ri:ca no less tllran in France0 the los$ of the 
Ol';"igirial meaning and the Oblivion Of the spirit that had been 
manif.~st in the Revolution. oo(43) 
Fpr ·the concep_t of the pursuit of happiness 0 in its attenuated 
form of the pursuit of private happiness 0 can be seen as the basis 
for a cul-ture of aggressive accumulation of personal wealth 11 of the 
elevation of ma-terial happiness at the expense of public good 0 of 
th~ worship of the technology that promises the satisfaction = and 
the constant expansion - of those desires that may go tinper t-he name 
of private happiness. It can consequently be seen as one root of the 
transf:btmation of public life from the field of highest happiness -
througl;l sagely exercising res~sibility with the approbation of others -
into the instrument for the further accumulation of personal wealth =; 
and 0happin(;!SS 0 o Mar,cuse 0 s moral critique of cC>p,t;emporary American 
society 0 is thei':efore 0 one with whiCh the ~erican revolutionaries 
would vrobably whole-heartedly agree. 
I -would not want to p~rsue much further the parallels I have 
suggested between Lenin and Jefferson 0 although clearly the con-
siderations that they prompt go much further than the points that I 
have--tentatively- sugmestedo -_ But tl'le strikingly similar ideas that 
both_:_~he .American ·and thi -Russian--,-experiences .:contain _._stiggest= how __ ·_ 
relevant is the -experience-_oL . the~t'ormer to the sad story of--the 
latter9 -a relevance that na-s certai~~~-not be~ f~lly ~p}..ore_!i._ 
Beyonc:t~that 0 it may -for my pur.poses simply Wlderline :-the relevance 
of the area-l"'have suggested- wherein the assumptions- and --the experiences 
Of the tWO reVOlUtionS were markedlyD and CQllSCiOUSlYo dissimilarD that 
of the rule of law. 
The Party Problem 
It is common in critiques of the Soviet state to attribute its 
deficiencies to the authoritarian structure of the Bolshevik Party 
from its earliest pre-revolutionary days. Its intolerance0 its 
· .. ', .··.· 
aclusivity0 its hierarchical structure9 it~ concentration of 
effective power at the top can all be detected in the USSR not 
long after the seizure of powero This apparent simil~ity suggests 
a process of organic growth as the authoritarian party creates the 
author! tar ian stateo My argument would not seekto deny t:hls 0 but 
rather to relegate it to a subordinate status as an explanatory 
schema a The concentration on the respoosibility of the Party allows 
the responsibility of the constitution to escape unexaminedo 
the absence of the Party from the pages of The State and Revolution 
has provided an argument for the innocence of that teito by implying 
' 
to its idea,s a viabl"litY and practicality that was si'mply corrupted 
or abolished by the democratic centralist organisationo Iri contras,tp 
I would. suggest that the regrettable features of the B_olshevik Party 
were not a world apart from features that all political parties tend 
to displfY9 the fact that these features caine to define the lineaments 
of the Russian state; whereas elsewhere they appear to have been kept 
.. 
under ~coritr.ol 0 is due_ j:o Lenin °S con¢ept of state "t'orm; ·not his concept· 
I 
of party .a~ · ·· , 
The Leninist Party is accused of two ominous qualitieso 
Intetnal-ly0 it has -~- exc¢ssivelY rigltl and central.i.st character0 
denoted by the term -~democratic . ....centralism a 9 and in its -r-elations m th ..... -
the external political world 0 it claims a status of privilege over 
other political tendencies inasmuch as its politics claim to be 
0 scientific 'o The consequences of both these assumptions may then 
be identified in the subsequent authoritarian regimeo 
Essentia1Ly 0 democr~tic centralism was intendeds 
10
o o ·o tq make t})e local organ is ati;ons the principle 
ox;-ganis;ltiorfai .units of toe. Party in fact and not me:t"ely 
irl'c~~~t -~<f t:o sece to it that all tht! ~~gher=standing 44 b()~hes are elected 0 accountable0 and subJect to recallo oo< ) 
. I 
! 
In this it dj,ffers hardly at all from ~e lillOrmal manner in which 
the internal life of political parties is organised except in one 
respecto But the differentia ~pecifica of democratic centralism lay 
in its definition of conditions tmder which no democratic norms would 
be allowed to prevails 
00 ln the heat of the battleo when the prolet~ian army 
is straining every nerve 0 no criticism whatever dm be 
permitted in its rankso But before the call for action is 
issue~ 0 there should be the broadest and freest discussion 
and appraisal of the resolution 0 of its axguments and its 
various propositionso"(45) 
The question acutely posed is therefore 0 who shall issue the 
°Cal~ far actioo o which will terminate discussion? Who is to decide 
what shall cdnstitute such an •action o an:<:t for how long shall its 
authority be deep1ed to have sway? Lenin proposed. the simple answer g 
the Party Congress 0 the highest and most representative authority of 
But if _the •action• situation ever came to· prevail for 
years 0 as it qUite publiCly d1d in the desperate post=revolutionary 
situation 0 the Party Cc:mgress will -be composed of-·menibers elec,ted 
U:U~er.· conditians-~where.:.full-demoeJ:;"atic dis_cussion. hc:ts l()Il_g_since been--,·-
.. 
. I -
The Party Cori:gresso under such canditions 0---eontainsno·-~-
• guarantee of expression of the arguments .of. the membershipo 
.......... 
The assumpt~on. of': a.:!.Scien:tific·• status for the dedsians:-of 
the Leninist Party .s_uggest~ that in. its relations with -other. political 
parties it will pursue a quite unique courseo This assumption 
establishes that pqlitical differences With the Party may not be 
considered as differences of opinion 0 but as erroro This clearly 
legitimises the dismissal and suppression of oppositional and critical 
political tendencies 0 and explains the course of events from the 
suppression of the Con~tituent Assembly in November 1917 to the 
eventual disappearance of all other partieso and then the eventual 
suppression of all political differences within the single surviving 
c- ~ •• • .;_. •• ··.- • • ~ •, 
The internal and external threats to d~ocracy contained in the 
Leninist Party are thus clearly culpable in ·the subsequent developments 
i 
of the dictatorshipo But they can be only part of the explanation 0 
and for this reason my argument does not place a great deal of 
emphasis on the implications of Lenin's thoughts of the party. 
Parties 0 after all 0 are voluntary institutions 0 and have the right to 
determine how they shall order their internal lifep no-one is obliged 
to join. Further 0 if 'democratic centralism' is overtly ominous in 
its implications for political life of a party0 it may be that this 
hardly represents a more fundamental violation of the principles of 
free association and control than the situation that actually obtains 
within political parties that have not taken the pains to make their 
assumptions so explicit. The ability of political elites to determine 
the nature and course of debate 0 to minimise the effectiveness of 
their internal opponents 0 to perpetuate their own rule and ideology 
are familiar elements of the critique of oligarchical tendencies of 
mass partieso The power-of such oligarchies may well be all the 
greater· .for being':informal and unwritten •. 
Michels summarised his analysis, oLsuch tendencies B 
oo •• o if we leave out- of. consideration the tendency 
of the leaders to organise them~elves and to consolidate 
their interests~> and if··we l:!ave also out of consideration 
the gratitude of the led to~~·~he leadersg and the 
· general immobility .and passivity of the masses 0 we-~re · .~ 
led to conclude that the principle cause of oligarchy in 
the democratic parties is to be found in the(4G) technical indispensability of leadership. oo 
Thus the simple existence of 'democratic centralism' is 
unconvincing as an explanation for the decline of democracy in 
the USSR. 
Similarly0 it may be argued that every political party has 
. 
the right to formulate its own ideologys and will necessarily 
assume a clear and rational superiority for its own ideas over those 
of its opponents o The idea of civilised exchange of opinions is 
always to some degree at odds with the passions and interests 
involved in the issues that constitute the field of politics. The 
Leninists were not the first to fall to the temptation of sabotaging 
or 0 where possible 0 suppressing their political opponents. 
Bolshevism was 0 therefore 0 composed very largely of methods 
of internal organisatian 0 and attitudes toward the external world 0 
that favoured an absolutist outcomeo Doubtless 0 a political party 
would do well to do without these features if at all possible. But 
inasmuch as political combat is very often about fiercely-hold views 0 
it would be difficult to establish a set of prescriptions that would 
guarantee the absence of such natilresG 
, 
Whether or not these features 
are allowed to express themselves to the extent of constructing the 
authoritarian state0 therefore 0 will depend upon whether there are 
institutians within the society tha~ can balance and limit such 
tendencieso The problem.~ of. the Bolshevik dictatorship 0 therefore 0 
is .ultimately a questJon-~:of~-::_tbe .constitution of the state. 
Constitutions are rules~~for.-:'rimiting. the powers which· any 
. . ' 
institution. may aggregate to. itself within a complex of institutions. 
The problem of the simple state of ·Lenin fs model 0' simply ·put 11 ·is 
that the fewer· institutions ~here are that ,make up the body politics 0 
i 
the greater the proport~on of the total sum of power that will be 
lodged in each institution. If these institutions are reduced to 
one 0 or to a set of institutions that are not significantly separated 0 
power is unitary 0 not distributed. This 0 of course 0 is the negation 
of the field of democratic politicso 
Conclusions The Guilt of The State and Revolution 
The problem of bureaucracy is thus only seriously confronted 
1 
when its roots are discovered at the depth that I ha~e suggested. 
It is possible to control a bureaucracy only when its prerogatives 
and limits are defined by the process of legislation. In the 
absence of that it will either write its o~ laws and amplify its 
own powersu or it will be victim of unrestrained political authority 9 
performing its functions according to diktatp and consequently under 
pressure of hastep whimp expediency 0 and corruption. Since the 
absence of the rule of law plunges the administration into a sea 
of arbitrariness 9 there is no reason why it should not do both. 
A bureaucratic problem does not 0 thereforep only emerge when 
popular power is usurped by a ruling minority"' as the Bolshevik coup 
might appear to. In reality0 there may be little difference betw~n 
the situation of party dictatorship and that of the popular power of 
Lenin's Commune State as far as their consequences on the problem of 
bureaucracy are concerned. Both illegitimately invade the domain of 
the administrative decision and distort its proceeding with a pervasive 
set of value-orientations. --~The distinction between the two domains -
collapses'!) and there ensu e5'oan ~unhealthy'-:and::--chaotic ;osmosis:4lhereby-~--~ 
each domain comes to absorb approaches appropriate only to theother. 
Thus-the 'political' institutions of~he Soviet state- the· factory 
committees 11 the party cells 0 takes on the culture of administrative 
apparatuses, forced t? accept the limited powers and rights of 
knowledge and discussion more appropriate to the administration. 
And the bureaucracy becomes a Byzantine labyrinth of interest and 
intrigue. 
I am, therefore, suggesting that there is a conflation of 
politics and administration in The State and Revolution. Such a 
conflatian must herald a disastrous cross-pollution of the two 
domains 11 and this is what underlies the enormous steering problems. 
, 
-1'51· 
· of Soviet society. The mechanism of social' operations become 
inpenet~able and devoid of possibility of cont~ol. 
The .a~guments in Chapters d. and .3 11 the~efore 9 lead to a central 
suggestian 11 which may counte~ the collection of naive and distant 
inte~pretations of Lenin 9 s text which were discussed in a previous 
chapte~. The common thread of all those interpretations was the 
essentially innocent nature of Lenin °S text. That is 11 the text is 
innocent of the subsequent destruction of democracy under the Bolsheviks. 
The text was a utopian document that could not be implemented in the 
harsh objective conditionsjj the text was an ambiguous document that 
contained the acceptable and the unacceptable - the Soviet as well as 
the terror~ the text was a tactical work which really should not be 
asked to measure up to the actual strategic problems that faced the 
new governments_p the text was pa~t of an argument with the S_ocial 
Democrats of Paris and Berlin11 not a serious contribution to political 
theoryz or 11 the text was the repository of genuine emancipatory politics 11 
betrayed by the dull ..positivity\of historical conditions. or the ambitions 
of .political·careerists:jj..::.;::an"d -so·ono-=My~gument muld suggestD instead 11 _ 
. . . . . 1 .. ~ ·- - ._ . - . 
tha_t .the text9 in ·alL:its moments-~libertari.ari-and authoritarian - .. is--
guilty of subsequent devei-opmentsg.,·=t~t -isp ·the- features.·of~the- · 
authoritarian-Soviet~ regime are present·:within every-lin e....and concept--
of the -text. And it :is·not just a question of similarity between what--
was written and what later happeneds the cultural effect of. The State 
and Rsvolution can be suggested as the causal link between the text and 
subsequent events. 
The central absence in Lenin's politics is a theory of 
political institutions. All political functions are collapsed into 
one institution 11 the Soviet 0 and even that institution itself will 
know no division of labour within itself according to different 
-1sfJ-
ftmctions. Lenin's state-form is one-dimensional. It allows for 
no distances 0 no spaces 0 no appeals 0 no checl{S 0 no balances 0 no 
processes 0 no delays 0 no interrogations 9 and above all 0 no 
distribution of power. All such are ruthlessly and deliberately 
excluded 0 as precisely the articulations of the disease of corruption 
and mystification. The new state form will be transparentp monological 
and unilinear. It is 0 in sum0 a gigantic gambleD the gambleis that 
it will be possible to set about constructing this state in 'the best 
of all possible worlds'. The odds against the gamble are astronomic. 
It does not simply demand the absence of the peculiarly tmhelpful 
conditions of post-1917 Russia - although those conditions themselves 
have for a long time conspired to suggest the essential innocence of 
the model. It also demands ~ situation devoid of all political 
conflicts 0 of all economic problerns 0 of all social contradictionsp 
of all inadequate 0 selfish9 or simply human emotions and motivations 0 
of all singularity0 of all negativity. It demands 0 in short 0 for 
Lenin's pol~tical structures to·work 0 that there be an absence of 
politics. 
But the 'crime' of Lenin's text is ·not that it did not works 
it is- that it did. The 'libertarian.!. Lenin bears equal responsibility 
for the Gulag with the •authoritarian' Lenin. Lenin's theory of the 
state rigorously outlawed all and any version of those political 
institutions and relationships that can make the triumph of the Gulag 
less likely. In their place, The State and Revolution put a concept 
of the state that already; in August 1917 0 was monolithic 9 
authoritarian" single-willed and uncheckable. It matters not what 
Lenin's intentions were. The extent of Lenin's responsibility is 
not defined by his intentions 9 but by his implications. Lenin's 
text was responsible for things Leninjl perbapsjl never conceived. 
The issue is not what the author intended 0 b4t whatthe text dictated. 
The text created a discourses a field of ideas within wuch subsequent 
thinking had to take place 0 outside of which thought was not merely 
i1legal 0 but impossible 0 a non-sense. The C~eka 0 the Politburo0 the 
Institute of Marxism Leninism were hardly needed to police the borders 
of that discourses a discourse has. no need of border guards because 
the discourse is a 0 world=view 0 • It colonises the whole planet of 
thought and leaves no enclaves from which resistance may be mounted. 
Only the passage of time can subvert such a discourseg reason can do 
nothing. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE TEXT AND ITS CONTEXTg 
A MICROSCOPIC UNIVERSE 
In Chapter 1 9 I discussed the judgements of Leninus ta~ts that 
have been attempted by historians 9 and one of the qualities that 
could be seen in their comments was a certain air of surpriseo 
That is, The State and Revolution was something of an 'absurdo or 
Oimpossible 0 text in the light of Leninus extremely practical politics. 
At best 9 this absurdity could be reconciled to reality by attributing 
its writing to devious 9 or even dishonest 9 motives. 
Doubtless 9 there is a contradiction9 such accounts of the. text 
are not wrong in insisting on absurdityo If politicians may be 
criticised in contemporary discourse or in biographical analysis for 
their failures to fulfil the promises they make 9 there is no more 
outrageous example of 0 bad faith 0 than the state that Lenin constructed 
after 1917o In the preceding chapter I have attempted to show 9 however 9 
that the ~onnection between the -text-and Lenin°s subsequent activities 
is more intimate 9 and more rational 9 and more inevitable 9 than ~uch 
criticisms would allow. ·- I propose now to consider the problem from 
'-
another angleg having established the relationship between the text 
and.the state that subsequently emerged in Russia 9 I will investigate 
the relationship between the text and Lenin. That !s 9 I want to map 
Lenin°s path to The State and Revolutiono I do not intend a col!l= 
prehensive intellectual b~ography; it will be more useful to highlight 
and focus on four domains 9 or foDr stages in Lenin's path 9 that were 
influential in determining the destination of his intellectual journey. 
These four domains may be 9 loosely 9 termed those of Lenin°s cosmologys 
Lenin's culture; Lenin°s concept of Parliamentarism; and Lenin's 
theory of .political motivation. 
Lenin°s Cosmolo~ 
Much has been written in recent years to the effect that Marx 0s 
project was essentially scientific. Althusser prefaced his influential 
essay on °Marxism and Humanism 0 with what he regards as a paradigmatic 
quotation from one of Marx 1 s last writingsg 
"My analytical method does not start from man (l) 
but from the economically given social period 0 11 
In other words 9 Marxism is not a humanismo 
Althusser seeks to establish a straightforward opposition between 
the Marx who started from man 9 and the Marx who conceived man as a 
result of an 9 economically given social period 1 o Accordingly 9 the 
early Marx consecutively adopted two assumptions that were undermined 
by the same philosophical erroro The common error was humanism, the 
suggestion that there existed a human °essence 8 or 1 natureV 9 and that 
history was anaccount of the effectivity of such essential themeso 
Mar~'s first version of this was "~iberal-rationalist" 0 a theme 
derived directly from the enlightenmento This was later displaced by 
the concept of '0 communialist 01 humanismv wherein such ·a human essence .. 
could only be expressed,in "universal human relations 9 with men and 
with his objects". Here Marx 0s philosophy is already politics, a 
practical politics of social revolutiono But for Althusser this was 
by no means the true scientific Marxo That could only appear when 
the coneept of man was abandoned and this unacceptable humanism was 
replaced at the centre of philosophy and politics by a different 
subject: the social formation constituted by the specific articulations 
of forces of production and relations of production, an ensemble which 
producss 9 not man 9 but simply different specific level of human practiceo( 2) 
It may indeed be possible to construct a Marxism that is purely 
such a science of social formationso Such a project is entirely 
legitimate for those who wish to commit themselves to ito But the 
problems ~t Althusser experiences in identifying the writings of Mar~ 
that are truly free of non=scientific (in other words 0 Hegelian) 
influences indicate that the assumptions that Marx held about his own 
work are rather differenta If we are to understand Marxism 
sociologically (rather than understand Marxist sociology) we must 
attempt to define the impulses behind ito To ignore the origins of 
Marx 0s work is to fail to grasp its specific intent 0 and consequently 
to be left bereft of its significance within European culture 0 and its 
impact upon contemporary societyo The early writings and the humanism 
that Althusser rejects illuminate Marx as a child of the Enlightenment 9 
and in particular of that period of the enlightenment wherein reason 
was revealed as being not without profound costspin this the work 
of Kant was of great importancea While Marx pays little or no 
attention to Kant 0s writings 0 it is clear that he was involved in 
working out ~n alternative to the answer which Hegel offered to the 
Kantian problema This problem was how to resolve the impact of 
KantVs thought on the integrity of mano It has been said that 
Kant found man whole and left him inte~nally shattered 9 the victim 
of the acutest of antinomies: 
"The prime tasks of thought and sensibility were seen as 
the overcoming of the profound oppositions which had been 
necessary 9 but which now had to be surmounted ooo These were 0 
the opposition between thought 0 reason and morality on one 
side 9 and desire and sensibility on the other~. the opposition 
between the fullest self=conscious freedom on one side 9 and life 
in the community on the other; the opposition between self= 
consciousness and communion with nature9 and beyond this the 
separation of finite subjectivity from the infinite life that 
flowed through nature ooo How was this great reunification to 
be accomplished? Ho~ to combine the greatest moral autonomy 
with a fully restored communion with the great current of life 





Appropriately translated 0 this amounts to a summary of the 
problems of modernity that have becorr.e a. central concern of 
sociologists and political philosophers over the past centuryo 
!t expresses the costs of 0rationalization° 9 the ~oats of 0anomis 0 9 
and 9 of course 9 Marx 0 s most powerful and evocative theme of alienation 9 
the feeling of a lack of completeness and eufficiency surrounding oneos 
being in the worldo For industrial man 0 Kant evoked potent themes 0 
and 9 whatever the claims of Althusse~ and his ~chool 0 it is indisputable 
that Marxism would have had little significance in the world as a 
politics did it not address itself centrally to these themeso A 
philosophy that can offer answers to the contemporary problem of being 
in ~e world of modernity will find adherents where a science of the 
development of social formations will remain for~ver lonelyD 
I 
tt is 
perhaps no surprise that Althusser accepted that he and his fellow 
scientists of Mar~ism would remain a distinct elite in his future 
societyo It has been said of Hegel thatg 
"His ideal 9 like that of most of his contemporarie• 0 
was that of the recreation of a whole man in an integr~ted 
cohesive! political communityo" (4) 
. & 
and Mar~ may clearly be said to have adopted this ss the essential 
! 
purpose of his worko Perhaps it would not be too much to suggest 
that Lenin in his own way was driven by such imp~lseso Hegel and 
Marx 0 of course 0 differed from later social critics of 'dehumanisationo 
such as Weber and Durkheim by their willingness to embrace the project 
of discovering a comprehensive solution to the problemo But it is 
here that a philosophical assumption may become a political threato 
1 refer to the threat inherent in what Adorno _calls 0identity 
That is the assumption of an identical structure of mind 
and matter 9 the actuality or the possibility of the identity of concept 
and objecto After Kant 9 it was hardly poss~ble to maintain prsvious 
naive assumptions to the effe~~ such identity already existad 0 but 
similarly 9 after Kant 0 few were happy to reconcile themselves to a 
universe which emphatically escaped the possibility of human control 0 
and which rendered inevitable the acute e~istential problems already 
referred too Thus identity was not rejected; rather its achievement 
became a historical project as opposed to a pra~existing feature of an 
ordered universeo In Hegel this issued in the concept of the Absolute 
Idea 0 translated 9 in history 9 as the modern stateg 
11 ooo the free individual must ultimately come to see 
himself as the vehicle of universal~asonp and when the 
state comes to full development as the embodiment of this 
reason 0 the two are reconciledo" (5) 
for Marx 0 clearly 0 identity would become possible by the act of 
proletarian revolution 0 when the universal class 0 the proletariat 0 
became identical with the object 9 with society and history 0 and 
rendered it transparent and rationale This would constitute the aend 
of prehistory 0 0 that is the resolution of all those conflicts and 
torments that arise from a situation where man is confronted by 
society as something un~nown and uncontrolledo Lukacs' later 
0subject~object identical' succinctly ~~mmed up this projecta(6 ) 
What are the dangers of the search for identity? Adorno 
described the philosophical threat involved as follows& 
"Whenever something that is to be conceived flees 
from identity-with the concept 9 the concept will be forced 
to take e~aggerated steps to prevent any doub~of the un= 
assailable validity 9 _solidity 0 and acribia of the thought 
product from stirringo Great philosophy ~as accompanied by 
a paranoid zeal to tolerate nothing else 9 and to pursue 
everything else with all the cunning of reason 0 while the 
other kept retreating farther and farther from the pursuito 
The slightest remnant of non~!dentity sufficed to deny an 
identity conceived as totalo~ (7) 
If the search for identity chariges rrom being a philosophical 
project to describe the world 9 into a political project to change the 
world 9 its consequences can be terrifyingg 0exaggerated steps 0 and 
0 paranoid zeal 0 o will be acted out in historyo That which is pursued 
will be men 0 not just things. Thus the historicisation of the identity 
project makes permissable the treatment of human beings in a hitherto 
unprecedented mannero All singularity must be absorbed into unity 0 
all singularity constitutes 9 not a mere opposition 0 but a mortal threat 
from an unreconciled and unabsorbed Othero Such an nothern will have 
few defencesg it is illogical 0 meaningless 0 and ultimately ephemeralo 
As Adorno concluded: 
"Auschwitz confirmed the philosophema of pure identity 
as death ooo Genocide is absolute integrationo" {B) 
Lenin 0 of course 0 was actually philosophically anachronistico 
Sartre condemned 11 Lenin 9 s unthinkable pre=critical philosophical 
thought"(gl demonstrated by his commitment to an eighteenth century 
version of mechanical and reflectionist materialismo Perhaps his 
belated appreciation of Hegel during the war years produced-an 
epistemology more in keeping with the projects of Hegel and Marxp 
there is little specific evidence for thiso Nevertheless 0 Lenin 
was a philsopher of identityp in the following senseo 
-....._ 
It is arguable that Leninism is an origini doctrine 9 not merely 
a technology of powerp because it provided the necessary ~ewo~king 
of the identity project in the light of the problems that seemed to 
undermine Mar~ 0 s versiono The simple problem was the apparent 
inability or reluctance of_ the proletariat to act as the self=conscious 
agency of revolutiono This profound absence in reality ruptured the 
classical simplicity of Marx 0 s doctrineo There were several possible 
reactions to this absence. The Lukacsian project could proceed no 
further after its enunciation in 1922g it was simply incapable nf 
embracing the contemporary reality 0 {lO) and ~onsequently produced a 
utopian· and leftist in·and of political tacti-cs which could not con= 
struct a tactical domain of any viabilityo The Bolsheviks had already 
overcome this problem by accepting the displacement or class by par~Yo 
The 1 immanent class consciousness 0 thesis found its theor~tieal slision 
and practical subuersion in Lenin°s introductign of the concept of th® 
party = the interventionist 9 manoeuvring 0 tactic=seeking partyo This 
had to result in the implCit interment of the concept of the proletariat 
as the transcendental subject of historyo 
Bolshevism accepted this displacement of class by pa~ty as 
historical subjecto This resulted in the body of strategies and 
practices subsequently known as Stalinisrn0 which internalised politics 
as manoeuvre and manipulation in a manner foreign = and indeed morally 
repugnant = to classical Marxist theoryo Thera were still those who 
rejected the ethical implications of such a choice of party over class 9 
and opted for the alternate pole of class=as=subjecto 
communists 0 and vcouncil Communists 0 who did so had to accept the 
consequences: 0utopian° politics and historical 0irreleuanceoo(ll} 
Others~ame to accept 9 at least implicitly~ the absence or~ 
revolutionary subject 0 and on such a basis were-able to-dsuelop 
....... _ 
sophisticated analyses of classes 9 individuals 9 and ideas in 
capitalist societyo Such was the career of the °Frankfur~ Schooloo 
Trotskyism 9 whose career was to be as unrewarding as that of the left 
commun~s 0 refused ~hg twentieth centuryo The moml strength (which 
accounts for its attractiveness among certain subculturaa} 9 but 
political weakness 0 of Trotskyism resided in its refusal to recognise 
the chasm between proletarian actuality and Marxian theory that opened 
up some time early in this centuryo Trotskyism insistently believed 
in the need to build parties~ but the theory constantly a~tampted to. 
=lllli= 
displace agency from pa~ty to proletariato · Here 9 a spirit of 
liberation still e~ists 9 yet history becomes a source of embarrassmento 
Parties constantly manage to substitute 0 as the ~orking class demonstrates 
it inability to progress without the partyo Trotsky 0 s politics thus 
became impoverished beyond seriousness 0 a product of shee~ incom= 
prehensiono On the one hand 9 theories of betrayal and trsachery 0 
on the other 9 organisation fetishism offering to the proletariat 
simplistic analyses and exhortions to actiono 
The parade~ of the collapse of Mar~vs theory of agency is then 
thisg Mass parties 9 that 9 fundamentally 0 do not believe that the 
masses have any right 0 or role 9 to play in their o~n liberation~ 
and tiny collectivities that ground themselves in mass self= 
emancipation but remain desperately devoid of mass supporto 
All of Lenin°s actions were ultimately motivated by this ruthless 
and unsparing search for~e agency that w~uld oveicome the apparently 
irreconcilable diffuseness of the experience of the human subjecto 
In 1902 his argument in vwhat Is To Be Done 0 'in~it:ates the first 
':: ~~ 
' assertion of the inadequacy of the proletari~t for this task 0 .and .. 
l 
the elevated role of the party that resultsoi ~ut he could-be 
swayedo The 1905 Revolution 9 displaying the spontaneous combativity 
I 
of the Russian people, resulted in a greaterl appreciation of the 
working class, and brought him to moderate his views .about·how 
easily workers could be allowed to join and control the partyo 
The decline of the-revolutionary wave sees Lenin in the subsequent 
years obsessively monitor-ing the purity of the party once againo 
The impact of the war 0 which will be considered in detail later 0 
was disorientatingo Working class support for the war was 
attributable to the betrayal of the parties of Western Europeo 
This necessitated the further purification of the 0 international 0 
party by consumating the split with the Gopportunists 0 a But that 
experience 0 along with the none too impressive pe~formance of the 
Bolshevik Party before Lenin's return in April 0 combined with the 
astounding activities of the Russian working class 0 must also hava 
brought the possibility of class as subject once again to priority in 
The absence of the party from the pages of The State 
and Revolution is at least partly attributable to this 0 
Thus the problems of the philosophy of identity may have a 
bearing upon the legacy of Lenino This specific historical legacy for 
the Russian people consisted of 0 firstly 0 the rise tb power of an 
absolute dictator 0 and 0 secondly 0 the horrendous loss of life 
associated with 0 or consequent upon 0 thisa Part of this may perhaps 
be attributed to regrettable necessities of the industrialisation 
process or the demands of state survival in hostile conditionso But 
much of the violent history of the USSR seems to defy explanation in 
rational termso Once the dictatorship of the Party was consolidated 
in the early twenties 0 there seems to be a remarkable disparity 
between the potential of any putative opposition (whether they were 
internal party groups 0 anti-Bolshevik political remnants 0 or hostile 
social classes) and the degree of vi~lence and ene~gy expended against 
themo Perhaps 0 therefore 0 the rise to power of the absolute dictator 
can be partially explained by the constant displacement of the 
transcendental subject of historyg from class to Party to Central 
Committes to 0 finally 0 General Secretary~ as each potential subject 
consecutively demonstrated its inadequacy to the task assigned to it 
by historyo And perhaps the violence against all real or potential 
opposition can be understood by realizing that those who fall victim 
to the terror machine were identifiable as elements of an unreconciled 
Other 0 a standing outrage to the claims and sensibilities of the 
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imperialism of identity theoryo 
Such considerations may in fact be brought to bear upon Lenin 
himselfv his role and his historical fate (and consequently upon the 
remarkable hegemony that Lenin°s ideas established within the culture 
of the US5R)o 
Mar~~s original project possibly contained in nuce the seeds of 
its later power of enchantmento This is the ability to reconcile the 
irreconcilable a The axiom about philosophers now having the task of 
changing the world is also a statement that philosophers now possess 
that very powero It is the possibility of c~eating a body of thought 
that removes the separation between °is 0 and 0ought 0 0 and establishes 
a doctrine that combines a science and an ethico The world can be 
known~ and that known world will be revealed as expressing the highest 
ideals of the human spirito 8ut within this 0 possibility 9 0 Lenin is 
uniqueo Despite Marx's aspirations 0 his role was to be little 
different from the one commonly reserved for the philosopher and 
intellectual: to comment on and criticiQe from the sidelines those 
actually engaged in the practical tasks of movements and stateso~­
This !s not to condemn Marxg the communist philosopher=politician 
is a unique animal in historyo Wi t.~n the communist movement as it 
has developed since Marx 0s time the difficulty of combining the two 
roles is demonstrated-by the scarcity of those who could truly claim 
to have done so. The division of party labour into 'theoreticians' 
and 9 functionaries 9 is one that has been replicated throughout Marxian 
parties and regimes. 
Thus the philosophical and political writings of those who have 
aspired to such a dual role = Stalin 0 8reshnev 0 Ho=Chi-Minh 0 
~im=Il~5ung, while assiduously published and propagated 
by the state regimes they themselves constructed 9 are devoid of real 
content or intellectual significanceo The' functionary mode came 
easily to cancel other possibilitieso The reverse of this coin 
are those people who in the Russia of the l920°s found that their 
insistence on °theoretical 0 debate as the foundations for s~ats 
policy contributed in no small measure to their rapid elimination 
from practical politicso Bukharin is a case in point 9 but far more 
illustrative is Trotskyo 
Trotsky appears to be the supreme e~ample of the man of action 
capable of reflecting profoundly on.his avery political deed and 
statement~ a man of a highly intellectual cast of mind 9 cultured 
and philosophically rigorous 0 who at the same time achieved a role 
in state affairs equalled by fewo 
But the truth is that Trotsky was hardly 'a success when can= 
f~onted with the practical tasks of politicsg that is 0 of reaching 
admini.strative decisions capable of encompassing and reconciling con= 
tradictory influences 9 pressures 0 and demands 9 in situations bounded 
by scarce resources and the demands of .the memento ~is moments of 
r~al power bear this auto Trotsky emerged into the mainstream of 
history on two occasionso The first time was_his chairmanship of the 
Sto Petersburg Soviet in 1905o This experience 11 however,-has little "'~ -
to do ~ith the problem under discussiono It was not an adminietrative 
postg the Soviet was rather a theatre for grandiose and heroic 
gestures 9 an exercise in the true romanticism of the powerlessp and 
Trotsky in his accounts of the e~periences revels in precisely those 
dramatic gestureso(l2) 
When finally entrusted with the problems of state in the post= 
1917 government 0 he resolved the problems that he encountered with a 
singular lack of subtletyo As Lenin diplomatically suggested in his 
Testament 0 Trotsky 0 s actual state practice was 0excessively 
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administrative 0 in charactero His baptism 'of fire was the Brest= 
Litovsk negotiations 9 where he pursued a policy of 0 no=waru no=peaceo 
in anticipation of the spread of the revolution 9 a policy that earned 
him the strictures of Lenin and further advances by the German armies 
(g.n •ethical" position)o Xt appears to have been an educational 
experience~ this brief romanticism was subsequently replaced by a 
determination to pursue the most ruthless form of practical politics: 
the purely administrative mode displaced any more sophisticated 
political confectionso He had no compunctions about taking and 
executing hostages 9 not simply from the enemy but from among the ranks 
of the Red Army Qpour encourager las autres 0 p he scorned those who 
advocated a new 0revolutionary 0 form of military strategy and 
organisationo and insisted on the superiority of conventional warfare 
and disciplined and hierarchical formations? he could see no better 
solution to the problem of relations between the trade unions and the 
state than to turn the unions into the arms of the etate under the 
slogan of the 'militarisation of labour 9 o Trotsky collapsed into 
the administrative mode with a vengeance 9 and rejected all -criticisms 
as the vapourings of woolly=minded -liberals (his 0 scientific 0 mode )o 
This brief 0 and ultimately embarrassing 9 experience of the 
·--
realities of power soon gave way to his role as inner=party critico-
He could return to his books 0 his referencesphis superb arguments 
and debating skillso Now he was the theorist and dissector of other 
people 9 s mistakes - that is 9 their failure to apply Marxist philosophy 
rigorously to the affair& of stateo ·And 9' not surprisingly 0 as his 
distance from the ~vers of power grew 0 as his responsibilities 
diminished 9 so grew the theological cast of his criticisms and the 
utopian flavour of his solutionso 
The list of those who managed to retain the leadership of party 
=11~= 
and state while justifying their actions with a ~ecourse to Mar~ian 
doctrine is therefore limited to two~ ~enin and Mao=Tse=Tungo The 
latter is 9 however 9 somewhat different from Leninp perhaps he is so 
distanced from the original roots of Marxian philosophy and social 
theory that it is valueless to discuss him as a Marxisto It was 9 
after all 9 Mao's lifetime project to achieve the Qsinification of 
Leninus project was never the Russification of 
Mar~ism; he had too much contempt for Russian culture to dream of the 
idea. His project was the westernization of Russia 0 through the most 
western of doctrines 9 classical Marxism. He believed that 0 at most 9 he 
was do~ng no more than creating a 'sub-set 9 of classical Marxism to 
take into account the needs of transforming a semi=feudal society into 
the image of that studied by Marx. 
Lenin 9 therefore 9 achieved the symbiosis of science and ethics 
with unique success 9 embodied in his own person. He made the 
revolution according to the scientific mode 9 and that revolution was 
; 9 g9od'o His person is therefore the paradigmatic character of the 
'twentieth century lust for identity. ~is ability to sustain 9 to:~ 
live 9 to reconcile~the_tension between revolutionary elan and humanist 
vision~ on the one hand, and 0 on the~ther~ the brute necessities of 
success and power 9 transformed-him from a political leader into some-
thing truly unique. Those who bemoan the creation of a 0cult of 
Lenin' after his death(l4 ) fail to realise the inevitability of such 
a process. 
According to the culture he had created 0 he was not simply the 
great and respected leader of the revolution 9 but a figure of trans-
cendental significance, a person who had broken through the crude 
limitations of human character to become the living embodiment of the 
identical subject-object. How could 9 then 9 one do less than worship 
himp and the successor who claimed his mantle? 
Lenin°s Parliament 
In mapping the discourse that gave rise to The State and 
Revolution an obvious step is to attempt to traca the origins and 
evolution of the themes in Lenin 1 s earlier writingso Such an 
examination will in fact prove disappointing and yield little in 
the way of an explicit geneaology for the ideas of 1917 0 Indaed 0 
despite the fact that the problem of parliament and the role of 
socialist parliamentarians had been considered in all its nuances 
within the European movementp particularly in the German Party 0 
there is in Lenin a practical absence of any considerations of a 
fundamental nature: his discussion is exclusively in the domain 
of tactics towards particular institutions at particular momentso 
What comments there are can not easily be brought to bear upon 
Lenin 9 s later definitive statement on the issueso 
The socialist movement in nineteenth-century Europe did not 
conceive democracy in general and parliamentary institutions ~in---
particular as ends in themselves~ Their concern-was the complex 
of issues that emerged- in the wake of the par~digmatic revolution 
...... . 
against autocratic power 9 the French Revolutiono The 0social 
problemQ remained 0 and indeed was perhaps for the fi~ time 
revealed as a problem of a different order and depth 9 inaccessible 
to the purely poli~ical and constitutional innovations that radical 
movements had so far achievedo An awareness of the social problem 
thus constitutes equality as an unsolved problem within political 
democracy and transforms constitutional~hieve~ents into a means as 
well as an endo 
Colletti proposes as Marx 0s most perceptive account of 
parliamentary democracy his discussion of the French Constitution 
of 1848. This analysis is notable for its recognition of the 
ambiguity of the short=lived institution 0 
"The comprehensive can tradiction of this consti tutiong 
however 0 consists in the followingg the classes whose 
slavery it is to perpetuate 0 proletariat~ peasantry 0 petty= 
bourgeoisie 0 it puts in possession of political power through 
universal suffrage. And from the class whose old social 
power it sanctions 0 the bourgeosiev it withdraws the political 
guarantees of this power. It forces the rule of the bourgeoisie 
into democratic conditions 0 which at every moment help the 
hostile classes to victory and jeopardise the very foundations 
of bourgeois society. From the one it demands that they should 
not go forward from political to social emancipationv from the 
others that they should not go back from social to political 
restoration. oo (15) 
Colletti uses this formulation to counter what he considers to be two 
major misinterpretations of the constitutional state. One sees 
political equality as a mere 'trapo and the other sees the 
representative state as a genuine expression of the 0general interest'. 
Against these 'sectarian' and •revisionist' positions~ Colletti 
asserts an interpretation that refuses to pre-judge the institutions 
of democracy~hemselves. For him, -they have a certain quality of 
neutralitys they are the. '.best terrain o upon which- the dimensions 
of the social problem and tlme struggle to --resolve--it may becrevealed. (l6) 
But clearly we are still here talking the language aftacticso 
There is no serious consideration o!" ... the problem of ·democratic 
institutions, _per se and how thesE:Lmay best be constructed to achieve 
the maximum of popular power in a non=authoritarian form. On this 
problemg as in the rest of the Marxian tradition, there is only a 
practical silence. 
Engels certainlyp in his 1894 introduction to 'The Class 
Struggles in France' 9 is famous for taking a more than positive 
attitude towards the parliamentary and electoral experience of the 
German Social Democratic Party. But this statement itself is fraught 
with dangers of interpretationD since Rosenberg had argued that itwas 
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incomplete due to reasons of censorship. (17) 
The politicians of the Second International wereg of course.~~ 
forced ~o take a more precise positian 0 aptly summed up by Kautsky 
in 1892 8 
0
'The bourgeoisie 0 with all sorts of talents at its 
commando has hitherto been able to manipulate parliaments 
to its own purpose. Therefore.~~ small capitalists and 
farmers ~ave in large numbers lost all faith in legislative 
action ••• The proletariat is 0 however 9 more favourably 
situated in regard to parliamentary activity ••• Whenever the 
proletariat engages in parliamentary activity as a self= 
conscious class 9 parliamentarism begins to change its character. 
It ceases to be a mere tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie ••• 
It is the most powerful lever that can be utilized to raise 
the proletariat out of its economic 9 social.~~ and moral degradation. ,,(18) 
Kautsky's estimate of parliamentary activity carries a positive 
message 0 intended as it was to justify the work of the Party. But 
it is interesting that the attitude to parliament 1expressed there is 
more manipulative.~~ more tactical.~~ and less categoricruthan Marx's 
comments on the constitution. Marx's comments did not contain the 
suggestion that 9 under certain circumstances.~~ the constitution would 
be a 'm2re tool in the hands.~f the bourgeoisie~. , On the contrary.~~ 
the const-itution itself set -limits on the freedomof-both pan:ies to 
manipulate the political sphere as freely as they might wish. Kautsky 
sees the constitutional form as per~ps solely determined by-the 
_character with which it -is~inves-ted-by -particular social forces. He 
does not foresee any possibility that the- progress he notes might ever 
be reversed~ but he perhaps does open a door for quite a reverse and 
negative estimate of the parliamentary form to be made by other people 0 
under other circumstances. 
Kautsky's attitude was of course never itself acceptable to the 
more radical elements of the socialist tradition. They rejected 
parliament as both a genuine democratic form and as any aid to the 
struggle for social emancipation. This conception was to gain weight 
after 1914 given its ability to express the fury and frustration 
felt by radicals at the outbreak of war. The clear inability of 
parties and parliaments to control and subdue the tendencies that 
brought war for no very clear reasons could be at least partially 
laid at the door of parliaments ~ they were complicit in the disaster. 
A putative instrument for the rational and dignified control of human 
affairs was apparently revealed as impotent. The more radical a body 
of politics is 0 the greater the belief in the innate susceptibility 
of human affairs to rationalist discourses and practices. It was 
not 0 therefore 0 surprising that the failure of parliament to effect 
this control was blamed an certain inherent inadequacies of that system. 
The indeterminate nature of all these positions would have denied 
to Lenin any coherent and authoritative tradition upon which he might 
have based his thoughts on democracy in the Russian context. 
But his early estimate of parliamentary structures in the USA 
and Switzerland was not noticeably.negative9 (lg) and his strategy 
for Russia- certainly included --the need .:for parliamentary developments 
in the European·· style.;·~ · Writing in 18959 ·he asserted :that s· 
"o o o the st:r;uggle of the working clr-.ss for its 
emancipation is a ·politicaLs.trugglejl and its firsL 
aim is to ·achi_eve political ·liberty." (20) 
Political--liberty-is ;her-e .defined as consisting ·of. the convening 
of a Constituent Assembly under universal suffrage, and the standard 
freedoms of assemblyD presso etc. These were required becauses 
" •• o the worker needs the achievement of the . 
general democratic demands only'to clear the road to (2l) 
victory over the peoples • chief enemy •• o -capital. •• 01 
Both Lenin and Kautsky defined the positive role of 
parliamentarism as educational as well as legislative. Ka.utsky 
argued that electoral activity was a means of bringing political 
confidence to the working classs 
''This very participation of the ·proletariat proves 
to be the most effective means of shaking up the 
hitherto indifferent divisions of the proletariat 
and giving them hope and confidence. •• (22) 
For Leninv the educational experience is didactic rather than 
mobilising a 
'"It is far more advantageous to the workers for 
the bourgeoisie to openly influence policy than 0 as (23 ) it the case nowv to exert a concealed influence. 10 
But Lenin is not discussing parliaments and democracy as a 
substantive issue 0 the above is an argument he derives from the 
need to seek allies against the a~tocracy. The 'democratic' 
struggle is one in which the proletariat can have an interest 
because it is a campaign in which it can ally with other social 
forcesp the benefits of the democratic achievements themselves 
are secondary. Kautsky has the same feelings about the way in 
which democracy -can clarify~he processes of __ ruling class power 0 
but in his argument ·it· is' in parliamentary_ activity that.-.the _ -~: 
,• 
proletariat- can counter- "the activities of the ·boilrgeoisie0:...not just 
observe thems 
"'Great~:capitalists· can _inhuence rule~s and legislators __ 
directly~ bu~. the-workers can do so only through parliamentary 
activity o o .,.By. eclecting·:repJ:eSertta-tives ·to- parliament 0 .- ,...t 
therefore 0 the working-class can exercise-an-influence over 
governmental powers." (24) 
There are 0 therefore 9 nuances here which might indicate the 
seeds of the later violent disagreement between the two men on the 
issues of democratic institutions. But ~he texts will probably not 
bear that weight of significance. The significance of the positions 
of both writers in the 1890's is probably what they held in common 0 
not \\!~hat separated them. Lenin's estimate ~s bound to be less 
positive than Kautsky's 0 given that Kautsky's Party enjoyed the benefits 
of parliamentary activity at the time 0 whe~eas the Russians had no 
such institutions and the bourgeoisie took a pusillanimous attitude 
towards creating them. What both men had in common was an almost 
inevitable tendency to relegate the problem of democracy to the 
sidelines 0 a domain assessed in terms of its usefulness for the 
purpose of social emancipation. Certainly0 for Kautsky 0 democracy 
had already been to an extent achieved 9 whereas for Lenin the issue 
of democracy was a minor issue among the sordid reality of Tsarist 
Russia. But it would be tendentious to construe any of this as 
indicating sigriiicant differences between the two theorists. 
For Lenin 0 the Duma did not help matters. He argued against 
a boycott 0 because it was necessary tos 
09 
••• explain to the people the impossibility of 
achieving political freedom by parliamentary means as 
long as the real power remains in the hands of the 
Tsarist government" u · 
and to show the peoples 
"••• the utter uselessness of the Duma as a means of 
achieving the demands of· the-prolet_ariat "and revolutionary _ 
petty-bourgeoisie 0 J,aspecially- ·th~ peasantryc,!' (25) . _ · ·· · 
He could hardly ..be fault.ed ror this. The Duma-itself lacked 
meaningful powers-g it was subordil\4lte::·to ·an .appointed second -- · 
chamber 0 .and had no. prerogative..-·at ·all over.-the· key areas of state 
finance and military ·affairs.;·: It was not seriously representative. 
The first electoral law ensured unequal representation of the social 
classes. Ninety thousand workers and two thousand landowners each 
enjoyed the representation of one deputy. Worker representation 
was organised,p like the Soviets 11 on the basis of factories 11 and due 
to the fact that factories employing less than fifty workers were 
excluded from the franchises along with building workers 0 casual 
labourers 11 and artisans, som~ 63 per cent of the uitban male working 
population had no vote. Nonethelessp the results proved less than 
satisfactory to the regime 11 and ~ochan points out that~= 
"F~om the outset the Duma clearly expressed all the 
forces disrupting Russian life. 10 (26) 
The electoral system was consequently readjusted until it 
produced a Duma that the regime felt it could live with. 
Nevertheless 11 Lenin did not make the mistake of identifying the 
existing Duma with parliamentary institutions in general. The Duma 
was not taken to serve as a model of genuine constitutional forms. 
Lenin compared the Duma with what was possible under such genuine 
structures. The parliamentary form was not condenmed 11 a priori 11 to 
be nothing more than a 0 talking shopo serving to 'fool' and 'distract 0 
the people. It could 11 indeed 11 be an institution that controlled the 
affairs of state. The problem of 'constitutional illusions o 
concerned only a situation where the parliament did not live up to 
f 
its claims and responsibilities. 
"When .. a constitutional· system has become f-irmly .. 
established 11 when 11 ·. for a certain-:J)2riod 11 -.the constit,utional 
struggle becomes -the main _form ·of ~-:the class :struggle ::and ·of 
the political·-struggle generaJ.ly11 _ tl)e "task· of dispelling 
constitutional- illus:ions . .is. not the special~_-t."ask of the Social-
Democrats, not ·the task of the moment. Why? Because.at . 
such times affairs -in .-constitutional- states -are ·administered -~L, 
in ·the very :way that .parliament'aecides •.. By constitutional ___ _._ 
illusions -we-:mean-deceptive ·faith •in a -constitution. - . 
C_O!lstitutional--illusions . .:.pr-evail-when"a ·constitution· seems -
to exist11 but actually ·does~nots ···in other ·wordsi~-::when ""'.: 
affairs of state are not administered in the way parliament 
decides. When actual political life diverges from its 
reflection in the parliamentary struggle 11 then 11 and only then 11 
does the task -of combatting constitutional illusions become 
the task of the advanced revolutionary class 11 the proletariat. 
·The liberal bourgeoi~.dreading ~e extra-parliamentary struggle 11 
spread constitutional illusions even when parliaments are 
impotent. The anarchists flatly reject participation in 
parliament under all circumstances. Social Democrats 
stand for utilising the parliamentary struggle 11 for exposing 
0parliamentary cretinism 0 11 that is 11 the belief that parliamen~y 
struggle is the sole or under all circumstances the main form 
of the political struggle. oo (27) 
It is certainly instructive to comparethis formulation with 
Lenin's final attitude toward parliaments in the years after the 
revolution. In 'Left-Wing Communism' Lenin takes up the same 
debate 9 and his argument appears to be with the same schools of 
thought. The social-democrats spread constitutional illusions~ 
the anarchistsv who bear the main weight of the pamphlet's stricturesv 
argue an abstentionist position. But Lenin's position will in fact 
have changed. In 1905 Lenin clearly entertained the notion that 
parliaments can be just what they claim to bev that "affairs in 
constitutional states are administered in the very way that parliament 
decides." In 1920 he sees the anarchists to be essentially right in 
their negative estimate of parliamentsp and sees the virtue of 
participating to be a tactical ones facilitating ·the destruction 
of constitutional illusions. There is no possibility that parliament 
is other than a front or a shamp by its very nature expressly denied 
the ability to control the affairs of a state. 
i. 
Clearly Lenin •s views on .this issue in these -years were rather 
incoheren·t- and ·unimportantp dictated more :by·~ime··and audience--t-han 
real r~flection. Certainly there is nothing in his characterisation 
of parliament that_ will determine a ~jection of parliamentary forms- .. 
within the socialist. state0 ·-Similarly 0 howeverp. he reveals no strQng 
attachments to the idea and the institution that will place any 
particular barrier in the way of a passionate commitment to an 
alternative form. · It is aJl. far too vague and temporary to allow any 
more definite lineage to be established. What is perhaps interesting 
is the fact that Lenin's view of the Soviet as a governmental form was 
hardly more positive than his view of Parliament's. It may come as a 
surprise to realise(in 1982 with the weight of the Leninist claims 
' 
upon us) that the Mensheviks adopted a far more positive attitude 
toward the Soviets than did Lenin. Martov in particular viewed the 
widest establishment of local organs of self-government as crucialp 
at least ·to the revolutionary process itself. This reflected Martov 0s 
longstanding suspicion of any Bolshevik-type conception of organising 
revolution from above, already made public in the 1903 argument over 
the form and role of the party. For him9 the first ob~~ive wasg 
o• ••• the formation of revolutionary committees in this 
or that tow.n 0 this or that region 9 for the sole purpose of 
helping spread the rising and the disorganisation of the 
government." (28) 
The Menshevik conception of the Soviets could also have a 
clearly constructive role. In response t~ the government 0 s first 
toyings with the ideas of limited representative institutions 9 Martov 
rejected any idea of boycotq but he combineq participation in 
whatever institution the autocracy devised with a more radical idea 
which would claim representation for those excluded by the electoral 
law. What he called '0peoples 0 agitational committees" would be 
formeds~ ostensibly to. mobilise participation in the official- elections. 
Buts- i 
I· 
01At the ·same~.time .the committees s-ti'ive-to-createp-
apart from the l~al-representation 0 an illegal representative 
organ. which at_a certain moment.~could -appear_ before. thecolUll.try 
as a temporary organ of .the peGpJes ~ will. . 'The committees 
would call the population to elect their representativ~s by 
unive:sal vote 0 -these"repre~~~atives would·-at a_given'moment 2 _ meet- J.n· one -town-:-and --proc1.al.m-·t-hemselves -a const1.tuent assembly.,-"( 9) · 
The sympathy for, and responsiveness to, the possibilities of the 
new organisation which is obvious in Martov is quite absent from Lenin. 
Lenin was not guilty of tile crass suspj_cion with which his supporters 
regarded the Soviets. Convinced of the vi~tues of organisation and 
suspicious of spontsneous movements outside the c_ontrol of partyp they 
were tempted to boycott them altogether, or else seduced by the idea of 
turning them into a section of the Bolshevik Party by compelling them to 
accept the Bolshevik programme and the authority of the Bolshevik 
Central Committee. 
Lenin himself argued that the question of party and Soviets was not 
either/or. but both. But the institution had little role in terms 
of administration as opposed to disruption. Lenin did not conceive 
of the Soviets' role as anything but temporarys its real weakness 
was not its possible politics - he had enough confidence in his own 
to be able to disregard that» but in its structureg 
"This reservation was due to the weakness that Lenin 
saw in the Soviet organisation 0 in particular its excessively 
dispersed character» the lack of a central authority." (30) 
What is clearly absent from Lenin even more than from the 
Menshevik Account is any conception of the Soviets a~ the actual 
institutional structure of a post-revolutionary state.~i arguably 
there .was no reason for Lenin to consider this problem» given that 
the coming post-revolutionary stat·e in Russia could not be a 
socialist one. Inasmuch as the physiognomy of the post-Tsarist 
society would be det'ermined not by a proletarian policy 11 but by some 
appropriate -eombinaton--of ·a mixture .of class forces:> ..it was extremely 
,• 
\Dllikely that the definitiori--.of the state ·£orm would be a -:task ·that 
would fall to the Bolsheviks.;· --Lenin's thoughts a12 inevitably 
strt.?.ctured from the point -Of view of he proletariat as a less than -
hegemonic; --an-d indeedp·-possibly subordinate class in tne coming 
society.· Lenin's responsibility was·thus to a specific class 
interest 11 not to society as a whole. 
It would seem11 therefore 11 that Lenin's pre-1914 attitude to 
both sides of the problem of state forms - to parliaments and to 
Soviets ~ amounted to little more than disinterest. Prior to the 
catastrophe of the 'split in Socialism• thereis no indieation of any 
r 
reason in Marxian principles ~ in contemporary revolutionary 
experience to reject one and elevate the other 11 and establish the 
distinction as a fundamental of revolutionary ideology. What was 
to become the essential core of twentieth century revolutionary 
theory derived ab initio from Lenin•s response to the disaster that 
he considered had been visited upon his movement in 1914. This is 
not to suggest that the whole theoretical reconstruction that foll~ed 
is no more than another moment in Lenin •s permanent career of personal 
and political disputation. It obviously grew into more than that. 
But it does confirm the total nature of that reconstructions Lenin 
could derive from his prior political thinking practically nothing 
that might guide him in this reconstruction: he was forced back on 
those fragments of knowledge and understanding that might be termed 
his own 'culture'o 
Lenin •s Culture 
At one point in his book on the problem of 'Beginnings', 
Edward w. Said discusses the acute prdblem posed for the reader by 
Milton's 'Paradise Lost '• Discussing the passage .where the angel 
Raphael informs Adam of---the--'event-s· in heaven, he points out that: 
,-
"The truth -is-= at· about ·rive ·removes from =the· reader.,· 
First suppressed in night, suppressed once-again -by Raphael 
(who as an angel~ knows :mor.e -than Adam) ~~-suppressed -stilL _ 
further because Adam after all is the original man from' whose 
priority--we have all--fallen,· sUppressed another time by 
Milton •s use of English -to convey the conversation in Eden, 
and finally_ suppressed -~'by:-a-:poetic discourse to -which we_ can 
relate-- only after -a mediated act (of reading a seventeenth 
century epic) - the Truth is actually absent. Words stand 
for words which stand for other words ••• " (31) 
This is a vivid expression of the problems of textual analysis 
we have aiready discussed; - It also highlights the problems inherent 
in Lenin's reformulation of Marxism that produced The State and Revolution. 
The text represents an attempt to reveal the 'truth' of the political 
process called parliamentarism. Lenin certainly operated with a 
clear belief in the existence and accessibility of this truth, even 
-1St,.-
if such a concept seems increasingly inappropriate to researchers in 
the human disciplines. Yet 9 if we do not share Lenin°s confidence 
in the existence of such apodictic truthg we cannot operate without 
a belief· in the possibility of discriminating between the relative 
merits of competing explanations of social phenomena. We must simply 
be aware of the historical and contingent nature of the adequacy of 
such truths. Here 9 we must try to judge the probability of Lenin's 
reformulation attaining an adequate insight into his object of study. 
This can be approached by analysing the removes that separated Lenin 
from his object 9 and the suppressionsthat tlhese involved. 
It is well known that the outbreak of war in 1914 was a moment 
of profound rupture in Lenin °S life and politics. It occasioned a 
reformulation of his politics of the most fundamental character. 
To estimate how likely was this project to be successfulp it is 
worth considering the resources that Lenin had at his disposal for 
the task. 
The events of August 1914 were a doubly debilitating blow for 
Lenin. Not only had events taken· a;::startling and horrific new turn; 
,.-
his-socialist colleagiles,:mentors.,:and-leaders in the Second-:~-=-: 
Internat~onal-had committed a gross act of 0betrayal 0 • He was 
bereft of both his political and personal moorings. · "Here was an 
undisputedly Marxist leadership which .. had gone back on its most 
fundamental wordz which had transformed what had appeared to be 
sincere and strongly held principles into basest verbiage; which 
0knew the truth' and deliberately buried it. It was a stunning 
shock for Lenin because it amounted to, not least, a personal 
betrayal. Not surprising, then, that he thought the report of 
the SPD vote for war credits the work of police provocateurs. In 
his first writings after the terrible truth became clear he spoke of 
his "most bitter disappointment 01 o 
Lenin was thus thrown back on his own resources 0 and these 
were meagre. His view of the world had always been structured 
through a series of suppressions. He had strictly disciplined his 
thought to exclude contamination from anything other than the Marxian 
traditions Russian culture had long been dismissed as unworthy of 
much consideration 9 characterised byp for Lenin 0 that most devastating 
of handicaps 0 •backwardness•. Russian culture had produced the con-
tro1porary mess of Russian society 0 and certainly could not contain a 
solution to that mess. But Lenin was no more comfortable with a 
foreign culture. The culture of Europe was •their culture 0 9 the 
culture of the bourgeoisie. The European tradition was anathema. 
Marx inherited a cosmopolitan European education 9 and was able to 
draw on the whole tradition of classical enlightenment culture to 
focus an a problem. He could 9 at will 9 refer to Heraclitus 9 to 
Shakespeare 0 to Hegel 0 to any of the streams and shallows of 
European thought • 
. . Lenin was quite different. .-We know -for .certain that he had 
not read Shakespeare9 Byrano Molie:re·0 or Schiller. Dostoevsky 
was 0rubbish 0 ~ -·he had respect only for the populist-novel iri ·the 
.. . 
tradition of Chernyshevsky. 
of English logic and German -critical philosophy 0 he knew -:nothing ·of . 
any of them. ,.(J"l) Even more sur-prising ,is his confessed :ignorance 
until the war years of Hegel. A survey of his writings is a 
revealing activity&·· the meagreness of his referenc~confirms the 
philistinism of his intell~ctual formation. 
Consequently Lenin had0 throughout his careero dcpeneed upon 
a knowledge.of the world that was massively attenuated. It was 
the ·knowledge produced by Marx as transmitted through the parties 
and theoreticians of the Second International. And despite any 
pretensions of the Marxian tradition to an encyclopaedic understanding 
of history and society 0 its legacy to Lenin was similarly stilted. 
Marx and Engels • discussions of specific and concrete social institu-tions 
concerned almost exclusively with moments of rupture 9 destruction 9 
and reconstruction in European history - the years 1789p 1848 and 1871 
being the recurrent focio Lenin was transmitted no knowledge at all 
of the realities of stability 0 of the complex networks of instituions 
and practices which constituted the body of Western Society. 
Therefore in all his agonisings and reconstructions subsequent 
to the split in the International.!) he was mano~uvringwithin a universe 
of intellectual possibilities whose dimensions were microscopic. If 
his intellectual resources were limited so long as he had confidence 
in the thinkers of the· ·second International.!) itp at leastD had a 
certain intellectual rigour. After 1914_ his confidence shatteredp he 
resembles nothing so much as the incredible shrinking man. 
If we.fot::us on the specific problem of the critique of 
" 
parliamentaf..Y Jdemocracy9 a further handicap .is .. revealed. Lenin's. 
1 
critique was ~ippled~cby its own -situation in historical--time.· 
-!·i . J 
Perhaps- he hete only partook ·of· a common- human- failing to -pass judgement--
.. 
on historical-developments before they__]lave attained maturity. But 
! 
l . . 
his critique mras 1attempted at- a time when the world was practically--
' 
' ~evoid-of kxample.s of parliaments that could 9 even formally,~~ .be called 
genuinely representative of the citizenry and untrammelled by the old 
class power. According to Therborn(33) 0 the first democracy without 
qualifications on suffrage -was established in New Zealand in 1907 D 
and Denmark and Norway in 1915. These were the only institutions 
that predated Lenin•s remarks of 19l7p although it must be conceded 
that male franchise did obtain in certain countries several years 
earlier - as in France in 1884 0 in Norway in 1898. Clearly these 
facts amount to extenuating circumstances for Lenin's argument; 
although the subsequent spread of full formal democracy within 
and outside Europe underlines the paradox of The State and Revolution. 
Thus it can be said that, in a literal sense, Lenin did not 
knm" H!J.at he \·Jas talking about o The 0 suppressions' embedded in 
his 0\1n thought are sufficient to render improbable any access to an 
adequate account of the object he \1Tas studying. Firstly, the 'truth' 
is indeed 'suppressed in night' 1 the night of history not yet made, 
the night of the un~owable futureo The second suppression is the 
assumption that the parliamentary form in fact has no future; the 
third suppression derives from the lack of any personal experience of 
a culture that contained such embryonic versions of the institution 
as did exist; the fourth suppression is the estimation of this lack 
as inconsequential; the fifth, the adherence to an understanding of 
parliament derived only from its relevance to the social question; 
the next; the assumption that the only meaningful discourse on that 
relevance was that of the theoreticians of the Second International; 
the next, the adceptance as legitimate only those elements of that 
discourse that fell indisputably within the nostrums of Marx and 
Engels; the next, Lenin's own entirely hypostatized appropriation 
of Marx and Engels derived from his own personal incapacity to 
estimate the degree of coincidence between the classical analysis 
and the object it surveyed, due to the final suppression; his own 
near-absolute lack of any intellectual or cultural resources from~~~~~ 
to judge that privileged discourse. Truly 9 11\vords stand for words, 
which stand for other wordsooooo 19 
Despite his assumption that he had cleansed his thought of unacceptable 
pollutions, Lenin coul~\no more than any of us, escape his culture. 
He· found no Archimedean point from \..rhich to survey reality with a 
true and pristine objectivity. In fact, he ensured the reverse. His 
refusal to open himself to the multitude of cultural and intellectual 
inpuences that Europe offer ed resulted in his falling far more 
abjectly under the sway of the influencer; that had formed him at a.n 
unconscious level. In a way then, Lenin never esce.ped his own child-
hood socialisation. Intellectual maturity, it may be su~gested, is 
achieved by a process of critical selection; the child becomes an 
adultby appreciating and critically reviewing the manner in which he 
is a cultural product, and his intellectual independence begins from 
the point of that realisation. But, in contrast, an outright and 
enraged rejection of one's own culture is a: 'childish' act: the act 
of an adolescent unable to come to terms with the complexity that is 
himself. It is an attempt to constitute onself as a tabula rasa. 
Needlesci to say, not only is such an attempt inpossible, hut the 
assumption that it is possible leads shallow thinkers to very easily 
convince themselves that they have achieved it. And thus the con~ 
tinuing power that native culture continues to exercise over the 
individual remains uninterrogated and unchallenged. This is a po\ver 
t6 which Lenin clearly fell victim. 
"State and Revolution" has been treated as a \vestern artifact in this 
argument. And it certainly is that, in its classical roots, and in 
tts continuing spectral presence in \vestern polit~cal thought and 
culture. But we may, nevertheless, discover specific conditions for 
its produ9tion not in Europe, but in Russia itself, and deriving from 
an entirely different history and tradition. This was a tradition to 
which Lenin was an unconscious but remarkably faithful heir. I shall 
here seek only to evoke those elements of the. Russian intellectual and 
cultural tradition whose echoes we may find in the pages of Lenin's 
utopian text. 
· · \1hat were the characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia of 
which Lenin was an indubitable 0 if resentful 0 heir? There seans to 
be a consensus about two features in particular: the espo~sal of 
a loyalty to a ~aguely defined and often imaginary national uniq~essg 
and an openess to Europ~intellectual innovations which was 0 however 9 
marked by a profound absence of discrimination or rigour. As a 
result» the Russian intelligentsia were dangerously vulnerable to 
totalising and utopian projects. 
There is no need to retail the details of Russian social structure 
in the 19th century 9 The patrimonial system of rule had for centuries 
claimed for the autocracy the rights of both the ruler and the owner 
of the realm. Such was the overwhelming weight of the state 
within the society that thedevelopment of those classes whose interests 
·were those of modernity was blighted or crushed. As a result the 
intelligentsia began its life far more socially isola ted than had .. 
been the case in Europe. Beso.ncon places the emergence of this group 
from 1850 onwards» the product of a national organised system of 
education under total state control. In this,. as in so many other 
develppments 9 from Catherine the Great's introduction of political 
debate in the 18th century;, to Zubatov's suprisingly successful 
police-sponsored unions» the a~ocracy was the initiator of so much 
thatelsewhere were independent and organic results of economic and 
social development. The Russian intelligentsia failed to find a 
natural» congenial» and 9 above all P suaessful P ally in a rising 
bourgeoisie. Instead it from the first exhibited a degree of root= 
lessness due to the "incapacity of civil society to impose on the 
young its own values and raison d'etre". (34) Rather» its formative 
experiences evoked distrust of potential allies who constantly ' . 
. succumbed to fruitless compromises with the autocracy. 
In the creatiQg o~ this attitude, the repression following the 
Decembrist attempt had been fateful: 
" ••• the longest lasting and most harmful legacy of the era 
was the hostility between the government and the educated 
classes. In the latter it was made to breed a fear and 
loathing of the autocracy which made themr: see every government 1 
even one bent on reformv as an uncompromising enemy. 
vJhatever liberalism was to arise in Russia, it was always 
to be somewhat shamefaced at not being revolutioary radicalism, 
and always reluctant to acknov1ledge that there could be a 
threat to liberty from the left as well as from the right". (35) 
Here we have, thereforev a sort of 'free-floating' intelligentsia, 
that· is ,one that remained \1ithout ties or connections to any particular 
interest groupo This represented a genuine opportunity for a messianic 
ideology to seek a hegemonic social role. T~classic modernizing 
revolutions of Europe were intendedv despite the more ambitious of the 
ideologies they inspired, to satisfy the aspirations of specific rising 
interest groups. The-political programmes of such groups always, 
therefore, had elements of a realist and 'minimalist' practicality 
about them, as did their subsequent actions. But 
· "o •• in Russia the struggle for political liberty was waged 
... from the beginning exactly in the mariner that Burke felt it 
·ought never to qe waged: in the·name of abstract ideals". (36) 
The radical intelligentsia were given by history full licence to 
~laborate .an ideology of the most maximalist character. It is 
"j ' .• -
.-true. _'tpat the · valid:l'ty of this ma'ximalism was called into question 
--
when economic and social developments around'.the turn of the century 
indicated that political development in Russia might tnke the more 
normal course of the emergence of competing social classes. The crisis 
.in Marxismv which sought to replace the more eschatological cast of 
revoluti~ry strategy with a process of integration into developing 
civil society and a 'long march though the institutions', was evidence 
of thiso But the impact of Populism and Terrorism, and the success of 
Bolshevism 9 indicate that a large number were resilient enough to 
resist these temptations. 
Hhile a mass intelligentsia was a product of the second half of the 
19th cent~ryv this group inherited a culture of political speculation 
from the prior generation. The freedom to think and write had arrived 
under the tutelage of Catherine the Great, 1762 - 1796. VJhile the 
popular philosophy of the time was European rationalism, and the 
political· ideas those of American constitutionalism 9 the appeal of 
these ideas faded in the wake of the Decembrist fail~re, and, the 
radicals turned to a different so.urce1 that of German idealist philosophy. 
Schelling \oJas introduced into Russia in the 1820 1 s 9 Hegel in the 1830's. 
These philosophies effected an immediate conquest, and held overt sway 
until forced into retreat by materialism in the second half of the 
century.· But their imprint was never eradicated or 
1
escaped • 
. The principo\ import of Hegelianism was the way in which i~s critique 
of moderility - the problern of alienation - linked up with the search 
1 for a Glational identity. It enabled iatellectuals to translate Russian 
! 'backwardness' into evidence of a historic role. This \'Jas what became 
•I 
known as Slavophilism. It argued that the communual spirit formed the 
essential feature of the Russian national character and provided the 
basis of all Russia~ institutions, in contrast to the atomised individual-
ism which permeated the \\lest. It derived from the mystical and 
euphoric nature of the Orthodox church, which had resisted the rational-
ism which had poisoned both Catholicism and Protestantism 9 and'.found. 
'its expression in the peasant community, and the peasant's intuitive 
'and affective culture. 
,It was of course the case that many of the assumptions of S&lavophilism 
I . 
were i~lusory. The peasant commune, in particular, had no very ancient 
roots, provided little economic security, and was no effective 
mechanism for preventing economic and social differentiation and 
securing an integrated communityo 
But naive though the picture the intellectuals held might have been, 
it coincided in a vague way with what they could assume were the 
peasants' aspirations, as they had been expressedo There was un~ 
doubtedly a peasant revolutionary tradition, which lay in the revolt 
of the 17th and 18th centuries, from Bolotnikov to Pugachevo The 
long-lasting myths of 'return' that they engendered were permeated with 
dramatic beliefs proclaiming: 
11a messiah who would purge the land of suffering and usher 
in a golden age of abundance and tranquillity that would 
last for ever11 o (37) 
Thus the disappointments of political activity amongst the peasantry 
would not necessarily destroy the fundamental images with which the 
revolutionaries operatedo In a universe of ideals structured by a 
poorly understood Hegelianism, there was no difficulty in believing 
in an 'invisible people', a hidden kernel or essence trapped within 
the irrational appearances of everyday lifeo Once an ideology appeared 
that could offer a political technology for extracting the one from 
the other, the myth of the communalist people could be transformed 
into a project of social engineeringo 
In Europe, the mood that led from Kant to Hegel was enscnclered by the 
faltering confidence of its rationalist precursorso It was one moment 
in the intense, rigorous 9 and serious philosophical debate which was 
a permanent feature of European culture since Descarteso But perhaps 
the most striking feature of the Russian reception of the European 
philosophical debate is its lack of seriousnesso There was only a 
brief flirtation with the rationalist mind before the enth~iam for 
Hegel swept all before it. The absence of a rigorous native inte-
llectual tradition meant that any critical and creative accep~,ance 
was displaced by intoxicated speculation based upon ill-digested 
nostrums. Modern commentators concur on the essential superficiality 
of the treatment given to these, and subsequent, intellectual imports 
into Russia. (38) From Hegel, the Russians derived only a belief 
in a naive historical teleology 9 a superficial and indiscriminate 
critique of Western intellectual and social development, and an 
~ 
essentialism which-initio defied all need for empirical verification. 
All this became the grounding for the mission of this radical inte-
lligent§iat to a6t as midwives to the mission of ancient Russia itself, 
which was to give the world the example of a society which declined 
to follow the erroneous path of Western rationalism and liberalism, 
but instead reconstituted an integrated human psyche within the organic 
society. The national roots of Lenin's project for the commune-state 
begin to appear. 
From the 1850's, the old radicalism was overlaid by the adoption of 
a scientific or positivist philosophy, and its proponents declared a 
defini~ive rupture with the beliefs of the previous generation. But 
this 'materialist' revolution sufferred from the same lack of caution, 
subtletly, and creativity. The RussianS adopted the crudest form of 
mechanical materialism, whereby the whole world could be reduced to 
basic physical or chemical processes. Pipes points out the crucial 
sophistication that escaped them: 
" ••• the n6o-Kantian criticism of mechanistic science ••• never 
reached the Russian radicals ••• Chernyshevksii, on his death in 
1889, still clung faithfully to Feuerbach and the idols of his 
youth 50 years before, blissfully unaware what confusion was 
being spread in the field of natural science by recent discoveries." 
(39) 
The radicals could now subscribe to a belief in the possibility of an 
absolute rupture with the specifics of history and environment, and the 
creation of a 0new man° from the primal socio=biological materialo But this 
was emphatically not the new man of the Enlightenment vision of rationalityo 
This ~as one 't'tho would reject the false sirens of \-!estern individualism 
in favour of voluntary submergence in the collectiveo The emergence of 
social and individual differentiation~ which us both the prize and the 
penalty of the Western pathg was the be avoided~ as were 9 thereforeu the 
institutipns which expressed this diversityo Thus it would appear that 
the 'materialist revolution° in Russian social thought was not allowed to 
penetrate to the level of fundamental anthropologyo The same mystical 
essence=appearance polarity was now simply reinforced by the possibility 
of a new pradticali t;yo The Hegel\a..n generation had been hard put to 
define a practical programme for themselves 9 let alone find a means by 
which it might be carried outo The new radicalsll howeverg could 
derive from their iconoclastic scientism a diversity of strategy and 
tacticso They were no longer bound by what history had produced~ and 
condemned to be the passive observers of an unfolding historical proaessa 
They couldv by spreading ideasn or by practical grassroots activityg 
or by exemplary and provocative violence 9 dictate the course of political 
developrnento This ability to reduce the complex intellectual innovations 
of Europe to the simplest of axioms produced an unbounded confidence in 
their own potentialo 
So we can in this story already discover the essential elements on which 
Lenin's model could be builto The maximalist rejection of 'practical' 
politics 9 and institutions; the dramatic eschatology which- grounded 
the concept of the new man 9 for whom politics as social diversity and 
conflict would be alieni the positive image of the peasant commune as 
model§ the unique 0Russian 1 = naturally translated by Lenin into 'proletarian'= 
essence t~at would make this viable~ are all themes we have already 
encountered in the discussion of State and Revolutiono 
These are the creative images out of which the future could be con~ 
juredo Miasmic and simple=minded they may well be 9 but it is impor-
tant to remember how dramatically they could be confirmed by the 
negative experience of the Russian realityo It is hardly surprising 
that Lenin's estimation of the problems of bunaucracy~ politics 9 and 
the stat~differred so widely from the European themes articulated 
by Webero His b~ucracy 9 his state machine 9 entirely lacked the 
elements which were the central organising principles of the modern 
state.o His state was characterised by corruption 9 inefficiency 9 
irregularity of procedures 9 particular interest 9 secrecy 9 arbitrariness 9 
and all the other sins which Weber insisted i.t was the task of the 
modern state to eradicate 9 not sustaino It was Lenin's tragedy that 
Whl\t 
he could not see that)he was articulating was not a theory of the 
modern state, but a critique of the primaeval and obsolescent Russian 
exampleo 
I have in previous chapters placed some emphasis upon Lenin's failure 
to grasp the truth, among others, of two aspects of the modern state: 
firstly, that of the rule of law, and secondly that of the precise 
nature and role of the bureaucracyo These failures may now be attri-
buted to some extent to the fact that in autocratic Russia phenomena 
existed which went by the same name 9 but bore no resemblance to the 
European exampleso 
We may recall the essence of Lenin's unremitting hostility to the modern 
stateo There was, he asserted, only one possible relationship between 
the people and the state, and that was one of bitter conflicto The 
state existed only to maintain the monop~y of power and wealth held 
by the privileged, and it was consequently, a machine of 'monstrous 
oppression°o Whence derived this powerful, appalling1 image? For it 
clearly did not fit in such unequivocal form either with the experience 
of Western Europe.nor with the mainstream of political thought that 
derived from and commented upon that experienceo 
In Lenin's experience there existed no possible connection between 
the state and freedom, there was only a profound antagonismo Yet 
the European experience was differento There the connection between 
and freedom 
the state/was lat-Jo In Europe 9 the rise of the modern state was bound 
up t-Ji th the construction of a legal system designed to fill the vacume 
• left in the regulation of social relationships by the dosappearance of 
the feudal networks of rights and 9bligationso Thus a legal system 
provided a system of security for the citizen which ensured a regul-
arity of both public and private behaviouro The persuasive virtue of 
such a system was not whether the laws were 'good' or 'bad' Leo 
whether they favoured the privileged or otherwise 9 but that they 
provided a stable framework within which life might be livedo It was 
often the disruption of this stability due to the flouting of laws by 
tradi tionalist,":monarchs which aroused the revoluti®ry fury of the 17th, 
18th and 19th centurieso 
It took no great feat of perception to see that if a legal system was 
something to be valued, then its necessary concomitant was the existence 
of the modern state, of which it was but a parto Courts needed ~encies 
to make the laws; they clearly also needed agencies of policing and 
punishment to render them meaningfulo Herein arises the ambiguity of 
the European experience of the state which, for good reasons, escaped 
Lenin, as it escaped most of his compatriots and predecessorso Ulam 
comments on the phi\·osophy of the man who was possibly the first Russ·.~c-ui 
revolutionary: 'DFestel may be excused for not rea1izeing, in 1820g the 
necessary link between freedom and the government ~lawsofo' ( 40) But those 
who followed were to be no more perceptive; And perhaps for a good 
reasono 
At loast until 1864~ no concept of independent justice existed in 
Russiao Crimes committed by one person against another, or by a 
public official against a citizen~ were no matters of public concerna 
A legal G~de was first issued in 1649, but rapidly becane irrelevant, 
and had anyway little to offer for the redress of private grievanceo 
Under Nicholas I a new Code was issuedv but to little effect, since 
the actual practices of justice were so dubiouso The government 
initiated legal actions only when the state itself~ or one of its 
agents 9 had been offendedo Private individuals were left to their own 
resources, and usually simply bought justice = or, more accurately, a 
decision in their favour .... by payments to the court ... secretaryo No one 
was, anyway, very sure about what laws they should be obeying, since 
laws and decreQs were promulgated in an entirely haphazard fashion, 
requiring only the approval of the Czar~ and new laws were in fact 
often kept secret from the citizenso 
Alexander II's attempts to transform Russia into a state grounded in 
law were consequently ill=fateda For his attempts appear to have met 
with a cynicism on the part of public opinion which condemned his efforts 
to failureo When the government attempted to try terrorists as ordinary 
rather than political criminals before the newly-established juries, 
the accused were often acquitted despite the undisputed- and often 
proudly admitted - evidence against them. Citizens rendered judgements 
based not on the merits of a case, but on their abhorrence for the 
regime of the gendarmes and their sy@pathy for the idealistic defendants. 
The regime that had for so long confronted even its most sophisticated 
and moderate critics with a legal system that was political and biassed 
to its Yery core was unable to convince them that here was a system to 
be run according to different principles. The citizens simply responded 
by using the new system as a vehicle for their own politics. In 
--
consequence the government reverted to its old methods of administrative 
justice9 a step which of course confirmed liberal public opinion in its 
original estimation of the government's initiativeo Therefore it was 
quite understandable that the concept of the rule of law should fail to 
find any placo in LGnin's thought 9 even though such a failure is a further 
indication of his regrettable intellectual limitationso His image of the 
uature of bu~ucracy is similarly home=growno We can clearly establish 
the origins of his near~obsession with bu~ucratic corruption 9 and his 
characterisation of civil servants as unprincipled seekers after cash, in 
the Russian system of 'feeding 1 o For cerlturies 9 Russian public servants 
had been expected to 'feed themselves from official business'o That is 
they were paid no salary 9 but were expected to provide for themselves out ~ 
monies raised within the district under their administrationo It was their 
sole obligation to send to Moscow a fixed sum of revenue 9 and their standard 
of living then depended upon the degree to which they were able to supple-
ment this sum for their own purposeso Clearly, the system provided licence 
for corruption of the widest kindo Honest public official$were only to be 
found in the centre 9 staffing the ministerial offices, an innovat~n imported 
from Germany 9 and greatly appreciated by the imperial regime. Anywhere 
outside of Moscow and one or two other ur~an centres 9 it was commonly 
accepted that civil servants were not just corruptible, but that public 
administration was synonymous with corruptiono In terms of the images the 
leading Bolsheviks held of the state machine 9 then 9 it is perhaps significant 
that Lenin lived in provincial Russia until the age of 23~ he was born in 
Simbirsk, a provincial town on the Volga, briefly attended Kazan University 9 
~ved with the family to Samara, spent another equally brief period at 
Sto Pe~ersburgh University in 1891 and returned to Samara to practice law 
~ 
before moving more permanently to St Petersburgh in 1893o Bukharin, by 
contrast, was a Muscovite, and spent only four years of his life in Russia 
outside that great city. Lenin, presumably, would have been acquainted 
with only the most tawdry aspects of the imperial state 9 while Bukharin 
~auld have kno~n an animal of an entirely different 9 and mor~ modern, spocieso 
Thus I:J0b':·eX" might make sense to Bukharin 9 but never could to Lenin. 
Lenin°a Theory of Political Motivation 
It was from this background that Lenin was forced to attempt a reconstruction 
of his understanding of the world. The reconstruction he achieved was con-
sidarable~ inasmuch as it resulted in a world~view that was entirely coherent 
and consistently revolutionary. It was a rather less impressive achievement __ .., 
in terms of its complexity or subtlety, and, indeed, its adequacy. It comprised 
!three basic organising principles: imperialism, the labour aristocracyn and the 
sovieto Imperialism was the problemn the labour aristocracy was the 
- basis of the continued existence of the problem 9 and the soviet form 
encapsulated Lenin's new answer. Concisely, the development of capitalism 
into imperialism had provided the bourgeoisie in the metropolitan countries 
wi~h the 9pp9rtunity to undermin~ the proletarian progress to revolutionary 
politics that had previously been considered inevitable. The labour aristocracy 
was a section of the proletariat that had been detached from its true class 
allegiance, and consequently become enmeshed in the fabric and institutions of 
bourgeois society. 
Thus, the bourgeois state, in both its administrative and political forms, 
had become the core of the process whereby the organisations of the proletariat 
were delivered up to imperialist politics. Lenin hinted at a fairly sophisti-
cated model of this relationship when he coined the term "Lloyd-Georgeism" ( ) 
to describe the impact of social reform upon the labour movement. This 
analytical avenue, however, remained emphatically underdeveloped, and in its 
place is ·an argument of a much simpler nature. Reformist politics were in 
this argument not a mass political phenomenon; they were confined to the 
labour aristocracy. 
This reduction is perhaps surprising, and certainly not necessary for 
Lenin's project of salvaging revolutionary politics. Lenin could have argued -
as we have seen Colletti argue - that the institutional forms of parliamentarism 
paralysed the revolutionary impulses of the proletariat by a combination of 
social atomi .sation, manipulation, and mystification. 
cTh¢' Soyiet fqrm co~ld_ have been offered as the counter 
to all th~ee p~ocesssao Such an argum~nt would render redundant a 
concept of the labour aristocracy as specially significant in diverting 
the revolutionary processo There is no need to single out any distinct 
part of the working class as uniquely guilty of bearing 0 consp!ring in 0 
or succumbing to 0 the culture of social peace and parliamentary progresso 
But the organising principle of Lenin 9 s expl_anation for the split 
in socialism was not the rejection of parliamentarism 9 but the definition 
and critique of the labour aristocracyo It is possible to trace in the 
development of Lenin 9s analysis the gradual disappearance of the effects 
of peac~ful decades 0 parlia~entarism 0 legal organisations 0 etc~ and their 
replacement by direct and crude material determinants on a small minority 
of the movementg crumbs 0 bribes 9 11 lucra.tive and soft jobs 11 ~ (lt-d.) Lenin 
thus chose to pursue a far simpler analysis which 0 paradoxically 9 
involves a far more complex and weaker chain of explanation if the Soviet 
form is to be justifiedo 
In that analysis 0 the proletariat constitute a 0silent majority 0 0 
those who .have simply--not_ been heard ~fromo But 9 .if the masses do not 
appear -to ·nave succumbecL.to . ..the_ charms ~of-=:par li-amentarism: and sociaL 
peace 0 it is_hardly-nec~ssary_ to advocate the Soviet -form to counter 
such dangers o At this point in the ~gumen:t 9 --therefore 9 there-exists 
no necessary ·....or useful-connection: between ~-enin ts- analysis of the split 
in socialism- and the- -soviet -alter.native·c. -What I shall seek -'to do is 
suggest the necessary connection that in fact does existo For it 
. 
seems to me that the institutions of the commune state that Lenin was 
to advocate in 1917 ~erive-their viability -from a theory of political 
motivation 9 and that this theory of motivation can be discovered as 
the fundamental assumption of the theory of the labour aristocracyo 
we can find a concise and representative statement of the analysis 
in the 1920 Preface to 0 Imperialism 0 z 
~capital exports yield an income cif eight to ten thousand 
million francs per annum 0 at pre-war prices and according to 
pre=war bourgeois statistics. Now~ of course 0 they yield much moreo 
. ~viously~ out of such enormous superprofits {since they are 
obtained over and above the profits which capitalists can squeeze 
out of the workers of their Qown° country) it is possible to 
bribe the labour leaders and the upper stratum of the labour 
aristocracyo And this is just what the capitalists of the 
oad~anced countries' are doing 0 they are briqing them in a 
thousand different ways~ direct and indii~ttg overt and covert. 
This stratum of workers-turned bourgeois 0 or the labour 
aristocracy who are quite philistine in th~ir mode of life 0 in 
the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook9 is the 
princi~pl prop of the Second International 9 and in our days 0 the 
princip'l social (not military) prop of the bourgeoisieo For 
they are the real agents of the bourgeoisie in the working class 
movement 9 the labour. lieu-tenants of the capitalist class~ real 
vehicles .of reformism and chauvismo 11 (43) 
I shall ~ot seek to present a comprehensive critique of the 
theories of imp,erialism and the labour aris tocracyo Although it 
should be clear from what follows that I find both of them inadequate 
' . 
as explanatory categories there already exists a varied literature to 
this effect 0 which it would be redundant to retailo(Jt-~) I shall seek 
only to register some points which may take us to the point where-~he 
theory ofpolitical motivation..:produced by these concepts-i-s revealed~ 
,• 
firstly 0 Lenin 9 s concept of imperialism .is--onec-that cannot be 




the Highest Stage of Capi talism11 ~ -writ'ten in 1916 0 'Lenin· outlined.,-the 
general features· of the imperiali-st--stage ·of· capi talism9 -and stresses· 
. what he considers to be the key factor - the export of capital from the 
metropolitan~ countries to the colonies or semi-colonieso In Chapter B 
he considers the effects of this on the metropolitan nationso An 
extensive quote from Hobson advocates the idea that the Western 
nations were becoming totally parasitic in their economic role 0 drawing 
all productive wealth from the Asian and African continentso The 
result 0 Lenin suggests 9 will be the transformation of the proletariat 
into "great tame masae·a of retainers 0 no longer engaged in the staple 
=.Ltl = " 't 
industries of agriculture and manufacture 9 but kept in the performance 
of personal or minor industrial services under the control of the new 
financia~ aristocracyo 10 (~S) The condition of Southern England is 
advanced as a foreshadow of what might come to passo 
He then proceeds to offer evidence for Hobson's analysiso He 
seems to support the vision of the gradual disappearance of manufacturing 
capital from Western Europeo But his evidence is rather bizarre: 
an increasing proportion of land in England is being taken out of 
• 
cultivation and used for sport and the diversion of the rich~ England 
spends annually ~14 million on horse racing and fox hunting; the number 
of rentiers in England is about one milliono The corrollary of those 
tendencies is this: "The percentage of the productively employed 
population to the total population is declining" ~ from 23 p~r cent in 
~ 
1851 to 15 per cent in l90lo The surprising scale of these figures 
would have given anyone lass committed to the thesis pause for thoughto 
In fact Lenin is equatihg 'productively employed 0 with those !employed 
in the basic industries 9 p which by any economic theory is an in-
~upportable-deviceo (''t-b) 
Of course it is true that the capital structure of the country 
·-~.,;,,r-. · .. -. -· . ' l 
~:s,undergoing changep but both Leni~and Hobson entirely mi~cons~ruedl 
what was happeningo An advanced stage of industrialisatibn 'prod~ces 
., 
' .. , 
tendencies for the service sector to undergo expansion at~the expense 
of the primary and secondary sectoro 
Together witn the development of the service sector was the 
exten~ion of the factory s~stem into previously marginally involved 
sectorsi and the transformation into a factory workforce of parts of 
the population whose situation was previously quite different. The 
decline in the numbers employed in domestic service and the reverse 
process of the increase in industnial employment of women 9 prefigured 
' 
= 20.;: 
by developments in the first World War 0 are lndicative of thiso 
Note should also be taken of the growing industrialisation of 
agriculture 0 and the growing productivity of labour within the 
manufacturing sact6r which must 0 on the one hand produce a tendency 
for slow or negative growth in employment in that sectorp and growing 
employment amongst those sectors needed to service the technical 
developments that this rise in the productivity of labour reflectso(47) 
Lenin therefore constructed an entirely mythical sociological 
grouping under the category 0 labour aristocracy 0 - 'great tame masses 
of retainers 0 o They lived off the 0 crumbs 1 from the table of 
imperialism? they were directly bribed out of superprofitso Lenin 
even gave a rough estimate of the size of this bribe;(lt<6) although 
no attempt is made to define the method of distribution of this sub= 
ventiono But what is clear is that lenin nowhere considers this 
0 bribe 0 as passing through 0 or deriving from 9 the process of 
production in the metropolitan countries .. High wages do not come 
from the worker 9s-position in the- production-processp they are purely 
the dividend- of~ parasitism .. · .-~The --labour ~aristocrats -~have :become--the 
o coupon-clipper.s 9 -of the working class o 
.. 
Clearly;- eiuqh .B -mechanism: 
can only have a_n -utterly- corrupting- ~nuance on -~hci'se in receipt., 
Recipients of .such an unearned.Bnd unj~stified subsidy -will surely 
fight to-the·death t~ defen~~he imperialism that provided it .. The 
labour aristocrat becomes akin to the Roman proletarian 9 whose 
existence was subsidised by the slave economy, unlike the non= 
aristocracy at whose expeAse society lives(49)o But what an absurd 
inversion of reality this constitutes, and its absurdity clashes 
more fundamentally with the assumptions of Marxian social theory 
than perhaps any othero 
The higher paid worker in Lenin 9 s time achieved and maintained 
his position due to his skill = or rather the short supply of that 
I 
skill = or his organisation 9 and usually by a very specific combination 
of bo tho It is puzzling that such a simple fact should escape Lenin's 
analysis 9 · but two factors may account for ito The first 9 of course 9 
is that Lenin°s project excluded the realisation: he was not seeking 
to explain the origin ofthe higher paid worker 0 but to simply utilise 
it as a link in the chain of his explanation 9 proceeding from 
imperialism to the politics of the dayo Secondly 9 there was little in 
Lenin°s experience 9 as well as in his field of interest 9 to direct his 
attention to the simple explanationo 0 lmperialism 0 is a remarkably 
one-sided study of early twentieth century capitalismo It concentrates 
extlusively on methods of ownership and finance ahd excludes any con-
sideration of the industrial process itself 9 ioBo what was being 
producad 9 and howo The remarkable changes in the techniques of 
production and the nature of finished products is entirely absento 
One may wander precisely what image Lenin possessed of the twentieth 
century factory and those who worked thereo 
Thus 9 if we read 0 lmperialism 1 as at least in part directed to 
establishing the existence of a distinct social grouping which is~ 
"' 
essentially parasitic and unpraductive 9 we have to register Lenin's 
attempt as a failureo He has failed~to prove that such a group 
emerges as a consequence of economic development.in an imperialist 
' . ! 
i ; 
'. i. 
phaseo He has further consequently failed to demonstrate the existence 
of a social grouping who will be motivated to defend their native 
imperialism as a matter of automatic self-interesto 
My second point concerns the assumptions which would be necessary 
to sustain the argument for this postulated social groupo Lenin 
makes a silent but necessary assumption that the wages of members 
of the proletariat have a historic tendency to maintainf and always 




to explain in tha particular condition of the labour aristocracyo 
This concept of an °iron law of wagesu is strangely resilient in 
the Marxian traditiono Bernstein made use of it as stick with which 
to beat Marxism and his criticisms ware justifiedo He was castigating 
a belief that was widely held and articulated amongst the orthodox 
theoreticians of the movemento Kautsky included it in his popular 
explanation of the Erfurt Programme in 1892g 
~oo~ industrial development exhibits a tendencyv 
most pleasing to the capitalist 9 to lower the necessities (r. ) 
of the working man and to decrease his wages in proportiono" )O 
It became a commonplace article of faith in the communist 
movement 0 in defiance of whatever evidence to the contrary might have 
suggestedo thus it was possible fifty years later to insistg 
'~ooo on the fact ooo that conditions among the working 
class in Britain 9 on the average 9 did not improve during 
the second hal~ of the nineteenth centuryooo Whenever we are 
able to point to improvementS.-l!le are at the same timeD , 
unfortunately 0 -~obliged .to.-;point-:cto deteriorations which· over= 
compensate th~ improveme-nts -~i~-:the conditions of..: ~be ~working 
class during ·the-last~f-if-ty -or-·-:hundred..:::Years.,u-{)1 ) · · ., 
,-
The author 9 the ~rxist historian Kuczynski\) could only support 
this statement-'by ··suggesting-a pictuNt. of--British capitalism which 
• laft::li ttle room for the ·development --of:forces· and techniques of 
i 
production a ThtJs,-·in a discussiun of·pro·ductivity··changes 9 he' 
ascribes by far the greatest importance to the aspect of the 0increased 
intensity of labour per worker 8 0 loBo the workers working harder 9 and 
ascribes only a minor aign1ficance to ~he revolutionisation of the 
techniques of productiono({~) 
It has been argued(r~) that there is in fact no ambiguity on 
this issue in Marx 9a political economyo Nevertheless we can only 
note the frequent tecurrence of this theme within the Marxian political 




move men to Such an assumption could clearly'play an important political 
role at moments when employers have enforced reductions in wages and 
conditions in specific conjunctureso It enables a political argument 
to make the transition from the problem of the moment to the problem of 
the systemo It is clearly a matter of some speculation how effective 
the theory of revolution remains when Marxvs theory is substituted for 
the iron law of wageso When Colletti declares that: 
"It is the dependence which ties the workers to the will 
of the capitalist class 0 and not their absolute poverty ooo 
in other words 9 capitalist appropriation is not exclusively 
or primarily an appropriation of thin9s 9 but rather an 
appropriation of subjectivityooo 11 (S"lf-) 
a theory of revolutionary action becomes markedly more problematico 
The iron law of wages demands little empirical refutationo 
Rising living standards were common to the British working class in 
the latter part of the nineteenth centuryo There was undoubtedly a 
minority that was better off than most 9 but the differential was modesto 
It should also be noted that .the existence of differentials was in no 
111ay unique to the. imperialist-~tage .of --capi talismo In the light of the 
long=standing nature -of- -:the- phenomenon:p-:.;and the_ relatively_-_minor~mater-ial-:-__::__;__ ~ 
differentiation between the skilled and the unskilled 0 imperialist super= 
- ......... 
profits ~re .an unnecessary~import into~he discusaiono Far from the 
labour aristocracy.~ being-,-a..:....creati.on ~f the bourgeoisie- for political 
motives 9 made possible by their returns from the colonies 9 it is further 
arguable that such differential underwent a tendency to diminish for some 
time before Lenin wrote his booko(~~) 
Thirdly 0 whatever the economic factsv Lenin°s appreciation of 
the politics of the higher-paid worker was~ inversion of the trutho 
Clearly 9 ideas of respectability and conservatism could very easily 
flow from social stability andv more specifically 0 from the craftsman°s 
elevated role in productiono But very often situations of crisis or 
structural change produced among such people a fabric of consciousness 
that made them e~tremely and uniquely amenable to radical ideaso The 
experience of the Communist Parties after the war testifies to thiso 
In most Parties 9 workers from the skilled trades constituted the 
largest single elements of the membershipp and if one considers the 
relatively small size of those groups in the working class a ID wholep 
the attraction of communist politics for such people is clearly 
markedly stronger than among unskilled workerso(~b) Nevertheless 9 
for Lenin 9 the primary task of the Communist Barties after the war 
remained ang 
"immediate 9 systematic 9 comprehensive 9 and open 
struggle against this stratumo" (~7) 
The obverse of ·the dismissal of the 0 top 10 per canto was an 
exeeedingly sanguine picture of what Lenin terms the 0 revolutionary 
masses 0 o In August 1914 he drew a sharp distinction between the 
opportunist le~ders and the mas~ of the working class 9 insisting that 
it wasg 
,... vvo o o imperative :tCl=~appeal to the· re-volutionary -consciousness 
of the.: \!forking_ masses 11 .who_ bear. -:the entire burden -_of.±ha~- ( <"o ) 
war and are in mo~t cases hostile to opportunism ~nd chauvinism11 11 ~ 0 
and in -·1915 he declared~· 
01 It·is-a f~l-sehood~for·anybody:ooo to say that the 9 massesoc 
of proletarians have turned-towards chauvinism: nowhere have 
the masses been asked .. o o" ( ~~) 
Clearly 0 such asser~ions had very little relation to the reality of 
the timeo Thus Lenin°s political sociology of the working classes 
of western Europe 9 ~lready theoretically dubious 9 can find no serious 
empirical supporto 
My fourth point concerns the affects of the weaknesses outlined 
above upon any more general theorisat!on of the sociology of class 







advanced a particular version of the relationdhip between the twoo 
He then asserted thatD without the activity of political parties 9 the 
working cl~ss was incapable of developing a politics that esaaped 
from what he called 0 trade union consciousness 0 o(bo) He had no 
reason to ascribe to the working class a mass politics that automatically 
reflected their class interests. Even later 9 during the 1905 
Revolution~ his assertion that the working class was 0spontaneously 
social=democratic 0 was linked to the prior activities of political 
radicals within the labour movement 0 who had made the ideas available 
throughout the working classp and it should be noted that such a 
social democratic consciousness at that time for Lenin probably 
amounted to little more than a broad sympathy with the general aims 
of the overthro~ of autocracyo ( 'lol ) When he suggested the existence 
of a similar spontaneous political ideology among the masses after 
1914p he was in fact suggesting the existence of ideas and sympathies 
considerably more sophisticated-and rigorous& sympathy not merely for 
social reform 9 political democracy 9 and social just;ice~ but for specific 
attitudes towards conjunct.uraX . .politic'al-issues ·.of.~the dayo 
Lenin°s~esis on 'trade-union consciousness 0 was in itself not 
.. 
notably sophisticated 11 but it,·.did contain the possibility of 
- '-
elaboration into=a reasonably=:ad_equate_ statement of ~the culture of .a 
subaltern.£:lass. It could 0 in other -words 9 have been developed into 
a concept somewhat akin to Gramsci 0 s idea of 1 hegemony' 9 wherein there 
is an appreciation ot the complexity of the way in which societyp classp 
and culture constitute the network of meanings through which people see 
the world and experience their activitieso As long as Lenin did not 
assume political consciousness to be an automatic reflection of class 
position g the opportunity remained for him to appreciate the political 







that the 0 trade union consciousness 0 theme itself was not even a 
simpler version of Gramsci 9s sophisticated sociology 0 In itself 9 
it remained true to Lenin°s reflectionist epistemology 9 for trade 
union consciousness is little more than a reflection of the specific 
factory situation in which the worker is placed~ it does not allow 
room to take into account the far more important determinations that 
existed 0 outside' the workplace: national culture 9 religion 9 
socialisation 9 authority patterns etc. - not forgetting politics itself. 
Nevertheless 9 Lenin remained for some time aware of sociological 
tendencies that produced in the working class a resistance to his 
politics. He referred to Engels 9 castigation of the: 
"o o. bourgeois respectability which has _grown 
deep into the;bones of the workers 11 11 (~~) 
in his discussion of England. 
In 1908 he suggested that the material locus of these tendencies 
lay in the ''small producers (who are) being cast into the ranks of 
!(lo'?>) 
the proletaria~~ as capitalism developso Two years later he made 
; 
an attempt·": to define the causes of 9 opportunism 9 in broader terp1s. 
. ~ ~ 
The continued growth of the labour movement itself constantly introduced 
.,: 
to its ·ranks those unschooled in its P£actices and ideology? the 
development' ?f capitalism is uneven in pace and depth, recruiting to 
the labour movement many who were unable to make the break with the 
ideology of the enemy; the oppressive aspect of capitalist develop= 
ment ~ its degradation 9 its poverty = often counterbalanced the potential 
insc.ribed in the newly disciplined and ·organised workers; and the 
activities of the bourgeoisie itself must not be overlooked 9 as it had 
developed the tactic of conceding of political rights and reforms which 
hampered the revolutionary development of the class.( 04) 
It is worth stressing at this point that even these relatively 
sophisticated definitions of the origins of political differences in 
the working class do not legitimise politicso That is 9 political 
not 
ideas that are/sympathetic to Lenin's own are attributed to lags~ 
and lacunae in the movement of historyp they remain 9 for Lenin 9 both 
incorrect and transitoryo Even at this early stage 9 the possibility 
that political disagreements might simply testify to different value 
orientations or to conflicting political strategies is absento 
Neverthelessv even such an approach provided for an understanding 
that was considerably more complex than wbat was to follow. Lenin was 
to come to deny the very existence of problematic political ideas within 
the bulk of the working class 9 and replace it with the idea of a clean 
ideological break between aristocracy and mass. · His Lenin 1 s first 
reformulations of the problem after 1914 contain something of the old 
discussion. He referred to "peaceful decades which have not passed 
without leaving their mark"(b<') and the results of "the preceding 
peaceful period in the development of the labour movement ••• (which) 
taught--the working class to utilise such important means of struggle 
as par lianientar.ism_: and --all---legal opportunities~~. ,j( bb) 
In these -writing:~ rrom -1914 -and 1915 there- is a dimension· that 
is missing from .later· works. ·- While ~~tention is alre-~dy: directed to·-
the importance of ~he labour aristocracy-in this proce~s 0 -~heir Tole 
is subordinate and not key i~ the analysis~ But in his first m·ajor 
theoretical accounting with 'opportunism' "The Collapse of the Second 
International" written in the middle of 1915 9 Lenin begins to confine 
the roots of this political ·practice to much more directly material 
factors than the 8 peaceful decadeao. The opportunist ideas of the 
labour aristocracy are no longer simply different from those of the 
mass of the proletariat in degree - perhaps due to their greater 
access to political expression end material improvement = but are 
1_ 
directly counterposed to the rest of the classg A stratum of 
0 working men° have become 0 bourgeoisified 0 during the period of 
economic growth and social stability~ and consequently are isolated 
from the problems and ideas that permeate the lower masseso It is 
here that the breeding ground of chauvinist and opportunist ideas 
may be foundo( 07) 
This is perhaps the first clear indication of the road that 
Lenin is to travelo The analysis has undergone what 0 even for 
Lenin 9 is a profound impoverishmento Almost ten years earlier he 
had already suggested a specific connection between 'opportunism 0 
and the imperialist stage of capitalism 9 but he did not attempt to 
confine the effects of opportunism to a minority of the proletariato 
He limited himself to the general suggestion that: 
"ooo in certain countries there is created a 
material and economic basis for infectina the 
proletariat with colonial chauvinismo" (b<2) 
But the development of the theory from 1914 onwards is to narrow 
doWn the causes of opportunism-to imperialist superpr.ofi·ts 9 and the 
... 
e~tant of opportunism-to a labour-~ri~tocracyo 
Various descriptions·uf-~he infected stratum are giveno 
'-
Initially_the·description is c~nfined ~o- 0leaders' parliamentarian 9 
-- trade union 0 journalistic 9 andi others)~,) . -The~ :it is extended--to 
11 Parliamentarians 9 officials of the legal labour unions 9 and other 
intellectuals ooo some sections of the better paid workers 9 office 
employees atco "(.?o) . 
Lenin will be dissatisfied with such a definitiono It con-
flates two distinct categorias 9 the "labour aristocracy" and the 
"labour bureaucracy"o 
He therefore attempts to more precisely define the sociology of 
this phenomenomo In later writings there are many attempts 
to identify the roots of opportunist politics in the labour 
aristocracy a What is this aristocracy? It variously includes 
"the better paid workers 11 9 a "petty-bourgeois 0 upper stratumu or 
aristocracy ooo of the working class 11 9 "certain strata of the 
proletariat11 0 11 near=proletarian elements 11 9 11 non=proletarian elements 11 0 
a "stratum of workers-turned-bourgeois ooo who are quite philistine in 
their mode of life 9 in the size of their earnings and their entire 
outlook 01 0 the 11 upper stratum" that "furnishes the bulk of the 
membership of the cooperativesp of tt.ade unions 9 of sporting clubs and 
of the numerous religious sects 11 0 "a section of the proletariat" that 
has "become bourgeois" 9 "workers belonging to narrow craft unions" 11 
those infected by "bourgeois respectability" 9 etco(~) 
A glance at these definitions reveals their remarkable variety = 
and consequently their conceptual U3gueness. If Lenin were attempting 
to proceed from a general theory of the roots of opportunism to 
investigate the specificity of the phenomenom in various countries 0 
such oscillations would not be remarkableo Precise-analyses would 
show _differentiation according to nationa1-contexto -But -this is not 
a precise analysiso Th_pse defini tiona are taken-from attempts to 
state _a :general ~t_t"!_e_ory of- opportunislll¢..;. 'ln this context,:such vagueness -
of definition point to problems in-the-theoretical ~bhema-itselfo 
Theoretically9 we have rettched-a-desperate -pass. The 
sophisticated sociology offered by Marx has been rendered down to a 
conceptually attenuated and empirically ~nsupportable 0 deus ex machina 1 9 
a scapegoat upon whom all ~he sins are' heapedo The concept of the 
labour aristocracy is made to serve as the explanatory category for 
the problems of a world that has become in Lenin's mind simplified 
beyond reasono But does the demonstration of this have any con-
sequences for the wider issues of political theory that have been 
discussed in previous chapters? My fifth point brings us to the 
consequences of the problems highlighted in this sectiono 
It·would seem that Lenin°s reconstruction of revolutionary 
theory after 1914 is a remarkable failureo l have argued that in 
many respects he was simply wrong9 wrong on the nature of imperialism; 
he was wrong on the economic trends in the capitalist nations9 he was 
wrong on the roots of 0 opportunism 0 9 he was wrong in his definition 
and understanding of the 0 labour aristocracy 0 9 he was wrong on the 
politics of the 9 masses 0 ~ he was wrong in his understanding of Marxian 
political economy9 he was wrong in his appreciation of the changing 
role of the European stateQ Is not the whole enterprise 9 therefore 9 
essentially valueless 9 and an examination of it redundant? 
A reconstruction of Lenin°s last problematic 
reveals the coherent structure of his world-viewo All that remains to 
be done is to arlow the silent parts of that problematic to ~peako 
The importance of the concept of·the 0labour aristocracy• is that it 
articulates Lenin°s theory of political motivationo The concept of 
the laboli"r aristocracy is the destination poinLof a two-way-mciveinento: _ 
The first movement~is .to construct the tabula rasa of human consciousness. 
That is, t~e anathema·is pronounced ~o all and any points nf view 9 
whether in natural-science or in~political_theory• that differ from 
Leninis own version of the ·Marxian world~viewo - All such points of 
view are delegitimised a priorio They are not just 'wrong': that 
still casts the issue in terms of opiniono They are epiphenomenal and 
ephemeral. They are the-productions-of specific and demonstrable 
impurities in the historical stream~ and their transience is ensured 
by the fact that history moveso It may be for this reason that 
Marxian politics has tended to enter on a crisis when confronted,with 
the development of culture and institutions that legitimise difference. 
Mar~ had written in a period where there was consensus between the 
radical and the reactionary forces about the impossibility of a 
pluralistic and consensual politics. The reactionaries hid 
behind a battery of privilege,restrictions 0 and e~clusions even when 
allegedly in a democratic phase. The revolutionaries could not 
constitute democracy as an end in itself because its most positive 
role would be as midwife to the dismissal of their political enemies 
from the historical stage. The evolution of liberal democracy must 
thus occasion a horrendous confusion. The repeal of Bismarck's Anti= 
Socialist Law in 1890 was bound to produce a Bernstein by the end of 
the decadeo The turn of the century iA Russia replicated that crisis. 
Traditional characterisations of Russian society and ec.onomy between 
1900 and 1914 as 1 backward 0 have tended to exaggeration 9 as have the 
negative estimates of the policies of various. 0 reforming 1 ministries 9 
notably of Witte and Stolypin. Political life was similarly subject 
to transformative impulseso. K~p has suggested that this was the 
consequence of 1905~ 
"When poli.ti-cal repression was: relaxed 9 .- as it was 
after 1905 9 the radicals -ooo h~d to adjust to the 
unfamiliar worl~of-competi ti-ve open poli tics 9 in -which 
much of their traditional I&B)'lB of. thinking was exposed as_ 
shallow_ or .irrelevant~ They were led tci ·consider· their 
ideas in the light· 'of·· fresh experience a o • 11 .(~} 
It is possible that 1905 itsel.f was the consequence 9 as much 
as the cause 9 of the reformulation of culture and politics in Russia: 
"There now existed a society which was more subtly 
differentiated fro~ the society_ of two classes = peasants 
and nobility - of earlier times; a cultural life which was 
in evidence in a ·rapidly expanding system of educationp an 
extensive 9 varied press with a wide distribution and a 
fundamentally liberal orientationo ooo And finally 9 and most (J 
impflrtantly 9 a Western=style political life was beginning to emerge. 11 '· 
It would be wrong to e~aggerate these developments; but even in 
their modest form they introduced confusions into the Marxian campo 
Russian Social Democracy had its Bernsteinp ~n the form of Struve; 
the same tendencies launched Plekhanov on his slow journey toward 
0revisionism 0 o Even a minimal liberalisation and democratisation 
implies the possibility of evolution toward something more substantialo 
This must occasion fissures in any hermetic ffiarxian model of_politics 
as the direct articulation of transp~rent class interests~ a conflict 
between science and ideology 9 bodies of views buttressed by the whole 
armoury of uncompromising 'struggle 9 o Liberalisation in fact undermines 
the central metaphor of Marxian politics~ the 'class struggle'o How 
can a process saturated with the features of direct physical con= 
frontation 0 mentally encapsulated in soma image of brutal hand-to= 
hand combat 9 be reconciled to an image of ordered 0 genteel 0 debate 
and negotiation? Such act~vities must be 'ploys 0 or instrumental 
and cynical tacticso 
Lenin 9 s first move is 0 therefore 0 to eradicate politicso The 
development of liberal democracy carries the awful possibility that 
disagreement over political pOlicies ~nd negotiations over~hem 0 can 
become a legitimate .. activityo-- -But to-accept that is to'accepL.that.c 
political positions arr: opinionv not fact9 values 11 not science 0 
Lenin must find this unacceptableo ; • -._His ideas to be forced to 
ecompeteu as an-equal-with \:hose ·of -liberalism0 Struvism9. Populism 0 
constitutional~smooe? It is inconceivableo 
The greatest embarrassment for Lenin is the politics of 
opposing tendencies within his own campo The politics of the 
bourgeois and liberal parti~s can be attributed to uncomplicated 
class interests ~ whether they are being brutal in establishing 
dictato:!:.ships or conciliatory in introducing ameliorative and 
liberalising measureso The apparent distance of any measure 
from obvious class interest~ is a matter of subtlety 9 nothing elseo 
The politics of reformists 0 opportunists 9 mensheviks 9 revisionist~ 
are another problem. They clearly betray a transparent class interest. 
A specific attribution must be found for this. But the only possible 
attribution is a version of the sama 9 interesto Politics is private 
self-interest made pu~lic. Thus Lenin°s first move is to abolish any 
possible distance between the gross economic position of an individual 
and his motivations; to abolish any space for 0 values 1 9 and consequently 0 
disagreement over values. 
This first move~ent leads into the second in this mannero It 
is necessary only to construct a sub-set of interests for his 
political opponents in the working class campo This is the labour 
aristocracy 9 who have specific incomes and conditions to pratecto We 
have already seen haw the concept of motivation by self-interest permeates 
the pages of The State and Revalutiono The theory of the labour 
aristocracy is Lenin's most consummate expression of thm theory of 
political motivationo For crassness 9 vulgarity 9 and inadequacy it 
perhaps-has few competitors~ But it achieves the necessary tasks~ 
With _this 'theory his Marxism -is once again secured as -sciencep- not 
opiniono Its very sucqess in this~ask will ensure its4mmunity from 
interrogation a 
It is importan~ to appreciate what Lenin-~as achieved by this 
simple • sociological ,reduction-o C-tle -has ensured that pali tics is--an u-
ontological impossibilityo That is 9 there can be no genuine 
differences of opinion within political lifeo He has pushed to the 
limit the possibilities of-e~anomic reductionism that Marxism might 
containo Each and every disagreement with Lenin's version of Marxist 
principle and policy can now be revealed as simply disguising the material 
self=interest of its proponentso Clearly 9 the advent of a society in 
which the economic grounds for conflict have been removed is also the 
advent of a society where there is no possibility of political disagreement 
and debate. Thus is grounded the theory of The State and Revolution 9 
which promises the free society through institutions designed to cater 
for human beings who have no politics. And t~s is founded the ae~uality 
of Bolshevik police~socialism which implements those theories in a 
situation where human beings do 9 unfortunately 9 assert themselves politicallyo 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE TEXT AND I~S SECRETg 
A POLITICS FOR THE END OF TIME 
Michel Foucault has expressed concern at the uses to which his 
work on internment may be putp in particularg 
"A certain use which consists in saying 'Everyone has 
their own Gulagp the Gulag is here at our doorp in our cities 9 
our hospitals 9 our prisons 9 it's here in our headsj I f~ar 
that under the pretext of a 0 systematic denunciation° a sort 
of open-ended eclecticism will be installed.oo" (1) 
The temptation is obviouso The outstanding feature of the 
twentieth century appears to be a persistent violence against the human 
individual 9 ~ither in ovrertly physical or in more subtle forms. The 
temptation is to ascribe all these to a common 0 supra=historical causep 
in the hope of thereby making some sense out of it all 9 once and for 
all. But such an approach~ however understandable 9 may ultimately 
only serve to obscure the crimes of the powerful. 
Sociologists have ccertainly 9 if perhaps inadvertently 9 provided 
the appropriate concepts for such approaches& Secularization and-~--
democracy _in de Tocqueville 9 rationalisation iii Weber 11 isolation -<Jhd 
anomie in Ourkheim, even 9 indeed 0 alienation in Marx 0 all contain the 
'-· 
possibility of infinite extension until they may~ separately, or some 
time:r.together 9 _ both explainC-"our ills and convince us of an_ inescapable 0 
inhuman 0 destinyo I have pointed out previously the possibility of a 
less pessimistic interpretation of Weber 9 although it must be admitted 
that he himself was hardly~~ convinced,optimist in these matters. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to attempt whatever discrimination is 
possible between human ills and evilsp and in the case of the Gulagp 
to refuse a "universalising dissolution of the problem" ( 2 ) by asserting 
the specificity of historical events. This 0 for ·examplep is the 
f 
reservation that one feels impelled to register about the conclusions 
of the classical frankfurt theories 9 wherein the 0 frantic e~pansion of 
totalitarian mass democracy' becomes little different from the expansion 
of totalitarianism itselfo Habermas 0 rejection of the totalising 
thesis ~r the 'dialectic of enlightenment 0 in favour of an argument 
which accepts the necessity of the concepts of 0science 0 and 0 progress 1 9 
in their approp~iate place 9 seems to be a necessary return to the 
exercise of such intellectual discriminationo 
To the extent 9 therefore 9 that I have attempted to examine the 
roots of the Gulag in the previous chapters of this argument 9 I have 
done so in the spirit advocated by Foucaulto Specifically 9 this means~ 
"Refusing to question the Gul~g on the basis of the texts 
of Marx and Lenin or to ask oneself how 9 through what ~rrorv 
deviatio~ 9 misunderstanding 9 or distortion of speculation or 
practice 9 their theory could have been betrayed to such a degreeo 
On the contrary 9 it means questioning all these theoretical texts 9 
however old 0 from the standpoint of the reality of the Gulago 
Rather than searching in those texts for a condemnation in advance 
of the Gulag 9 it is-a matter of asking what in thrise texts could 
have made-the-Gulag possible 9 what might even now continue to justify i. t 9 and. what.,-makes- it- intolerable -truth still .. accepted 
todayo The Gulag question must ·be::-posed-not in terms of-error 
(reduction bf the-problem to o11e of·theory)-but::in:terms,of realityo 01 ( 3 ) 
My argument was.not intended to explain .the history of the twentieth 
century in terms of the consequences ~T.one text 9 but to_ ask what in 
this one- text could .have ~~'mad~ ·the Gulag possible~' a --,And such an 
l 
attempt must 0 in principle, r~main a partial explenationo I have in 
passing acknowledged, and indeed made much use of 9 the contributions 
to such an understanding that is provided by the varying approaches of 
many different 0 and differi~g, analysts. 8ut 9 despite all this, there 
is perhaps a need to move to a more general level of discussiono 
For a problem remainsg that is the continuing power and seductive= 
ness of Lenin°s themes in contemporary history, inasmuch as their 
prescriptions may still be advocated 9 and their consequences defended, 
at the cost of human sufferingo And furthet 9 if the seductiveness 
of Leninism lies 0 as I have suggested 9 in ~e way in which the libertarian 
themes of_ The State and Revolution coincide with aspirations that may 
be found in many places and at many times 9 how is it that the dead 
positivity of authoritarianism proves so successful in conquering its 
opposite? Why was it that 9 whatever the presuppositions of Bolshevik 
theories 0 those aspirations were never powerful enough to say 0 at one 
of the many crucial points of Soviet history 0 "enough! 11 ? 
therefore, necessary to complete this argument by considering the nature 
and consequences of the desire for 'real freedom 0 that underlies Lenin 9 s 11 
and by implication9 other Utopian and libertarian argumentso 
It is in the work of Sartre that we may find the necessary depth 
to approach this question. Sartre lived in the ptilitical world defined 
by Merleau=Ponty 0 s aphorism to the effect that "it is impossible to be 
an anti=Communist and it is not possible to be a Communist. 11 ( 4 ) MarleaU= 
Panty-was writing in 1947 9 and Sartre wrote the Critique of Dialectical 
reason in 1960o bespite the difference in th~ two dates~ they are both 
contained-~ within a
1 
single political period,- defined- by_ :-the .outcome of- the 
' 
Second World War and the development of the Cold Waro At the same 
~ 
time\!~ therefore, that both were cons~ous_of· the _impossibility of not 
taking sides with the war=time Communist Resistance, and of not taking __ 
a similar side in a decisively bi=polar world 9 there was too much in 
the experience of Communist politics to make such a choice one that 
could easily be lived with. It would seem 9 therefore, inevitable that 
Sartre •auld conclude that ~n existentialism that did not imply a 
specific political commitment was hardly adequate to the task of 
being in the world of post~war Europeo But there can be no doubt 
that the attempted reconciliation of existentialism and Marxism 
reached no final and satisfactory solutionjj in the light of Marleau= 
Pontyos assertion 9 it was impossible that such a resolution could be 
conjured out of abstract i.h:Jughto The significance of the Critique 9 
therefore 9 is that it attempts an investigation into the nature and 
possibility of freedom in a world that is recognised as almost in= 
conceivably mote complex and intractable to the dictates of thought 
than that of Lenino 
Thus the Critique is an attempt to define the nature and 
possibility of freedomo In this 9 Sartre is hardly unique; many 
before him have made the attempto The difference of Sartrevs attempt 
lies in the way in which his discussion honestly lays itself open to 
all the results of the twentieth century 9 and confronts the experience 
of freedom=becoming~authbritarianismo He does not take the easy path 
of counterposing his 0freedomv to the really existing varieties 9 thereby 
maintaining the purity of his model at the expense of saying nothing 
about the real worldo His freedom is permeated with the awar~ness at 
every point of how close to unfreedom it lies 9 of how this threat is a 
condition of existence of that freedom itselfo Sartre 9 therefore 0 
honestly construes freedom·-_as _a -gamble _of the sor.t -to llilhich we have 
.-
referred- earlier~ : 
The foundation o~ Sartreus argument is a fundamental phenomenology 9 
that is 9 an attempt to structur.e a .sctc-ial theory around a concept_of 
the indiviQual that contains a minimum of assumptj.gnso Where .Marx 
assumes some version of-ontology - according to interpretation the 
necessity to labour, the necessity to cooperate 9 the necessity to 
objectify etco 9 Sartre is only prepared to accept such drives on the 
understanding that they are-products of history: they do not precede 
the fact of being human in the worldo Sartre will accept no such 
assumptions because of his insistence that the only essential quality 
of man is that of being freeo 
This stance will allow Sartre to attempt a definition of human 
.f 
freedom 9 and consequently of the nature of revolution 9 that escapes 
the one=dimensional logic and the naive optimism of the ontologically= 
based traditional Ma~xian theorieso 
A phenomenology places the individoal at the centre of the 
project of understandingo It signifies not simply that individuals 
are important in the scheme of things 9 but t~at the objects which 
appear to constitute the social world are expressions of hu~an 
intentionality 0 and representatempts to inscribe meaning in the 
environment in which men liveo To examine social institutions is 
to attempt to map'the achievements and failings of human intentionality 0 
Any individUal is confronted most fundamentally with the task of making 
sense of the world; this cannot be done by p0re interpretationso 
Inasmuch as men are beings in the world 0 the attempt to make sense 
of the world is an attempt to~ in the world in.a particular mannero 
Such attempts constitute the projects which the individual adqptso 
Because they' are intimately-c6nnected-with the search for meaning 0 
such project13 are greater than:the simple:-.acts themselves 9 they_are 
attempted ··totalis.ationso _ : £ach--e nd ravery project 9 - being· an attempt- -
to make sense of the woEld 9 ·derives from the ind1vidual 1 s larger 
project -cof -n ving in the world at a CElftain time and place. 
A project thus totalizes the world for the human subject 0 ·giving 
it a coherence and ordero B~t inasmuch as they are .attempts-to-be 
in the world 0 totalisations must run the risk of failureo Most 
totalizations are failures 9 and history is the account of such failed 
attempts at.totalisationso- ·The litter of failed or past totalisations 
is what constit~ the world of dull and resistant positivity that 
appears to confront each individualo Inasmuch as individuals ell 
pursue their own projects 9 each representing differing totalisations 0 
the search for totalisation appears fruitlesso The conflict of human 
intentions produces results which appear to match nobody 1 s original 
project= the situation described in Engels 0 famed 0 parallelogram of 
forces 0 • 
In "Being and Nothingness" Sartre found that the ultimate 
value of the human project was questionable~ 
"Existential psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man 
the real goal of his pursuit 0 which is being as a synthetic 
fusion of the in=itself with the for-itself; existential 
psychoanalysis is going to acquaint man with his passion. 
But ••• men ooo are condemned to despairp for they discover 
••• that all human activities are equivalent and that all 
are on principle doomed to failure." (5) 
Since all life is ultimately a failure to be 9 a profound 
ont~logical lack against which all efforts must ultimately founder 0 
history could contain little hope of progress. But the "Critique" 
does admit of such a concept of progress. If projects can e~cape 
from being irredeemably the intentions of isolated individuals 9 and 
become the common property of larger groups 9 there may be a way to 
escape the ultimate failure. If a single 0 meaningo, or totalisation 
"; 
~ight come to characterise the whole of society~ then a totalisation 
i 
might be achieved that would remove the fractious conflict that exists 
between a myriad of individual projects. History may be r~interprefed " 
. "" 
in thhi light. ~ " "i ~ The rise of a world system and world econo~y dissolves ~ 
the differences of me~ning that separates societies and cult~res and. 
suggests their absorption into a single totalisationo 
But history is most definitely not imbued with an automatic 
and irresistable logico Along with the barriers to totalisation that 
are erected by distance and simple cultural difference' 9 there are con= 
flicts ~ithin any given society 0 between classes 9 and indeed, within 
classeso The path towards totalisation is thus not evolutionary 0 but 
revolutionary a Classes are represented by conflicting partial 
totalisations 9 expressing their different intentions 9 or perhaps 
interests a Revolution is the unique path to successful totalisationo 
Thus Sartre gives an account of history as the terrain of 
conflicting projects and failed totalisations. Human life has 
been lived in a condition of 'scarcity'. History is a history of 
shortage 9 and of a bitter struggle against this shortage 9 which has 
determined the relationships between men. 
Scarcity necessitates collective arrangements and efforts to 
extract the means of survival from an 1 inert 1 nature. Yet the 
advantages of such cooperation are not unalloyed~ it is 9 after al1 9 
only the existence of the others in the group that produces scarcity 
in the first place. Such a contradiction produces a specific type 
of group: the series. Each is bound to the other by mutual need 
and mutual hostility. Each lives in a state of hostility to nature 
the inert = and further J.n hostility to his fellows. He is subjected 
to the practical arrangements sedimented by history ~nd its institutions 9 
and the competing needs of other people. The possibility of freedom 9 
therefore 9 is negated by the domination of the 'practice-inert'. 
In contrast 9 ~he paradigm of freedom is the fused group-at the 
1 
- ' 
moment or··-0 apocoJ..ypse 9 i1 .typified for Sartrec:by the crowd that stormed-~-~-:-~-::'-
the Bastillec, It exi~ts only on the basis of a common purpose 9 and 
that common -purpose is identical to ~e personal project of every 
individual involved. Na=ona 0 s project is subordinated ·to it 9 because 
each has realised a new~r-oject 9 the success·of which depends upon the 
participation of all the others. Such a group has no structure and no 
leaders. 
Sartre is under no illusions that such supremely free groups can 
be created at will and maintained in permanence. In "Being and 
Nothingess 11 he explained the willingness of people to accept oppression 
and misery in terms of a lack of imagination: 
0
'It is on the day that we can conceive of a different 
~tate of affairs that a new li~ht falls on our troubles (fi) 
and our suffering and we decide that these are unbearable." 
Thus a worker in 1830 will only be impelled to revolt against 
his brutal conditions if those conditions are worsened 9 if his meagre 
wages are reduced 9 because he can then conceive of a situation where 
his suffering is less than it has become. The analysis in the 
'Critique 9 reinforces this suggestion. A revolt is not produced by 
the simple existence of hunger 9 oppression 9 and injustice. These 
are common and permanent features of many societies. The group that 
is resigned to such an objectionable practico=inert can only be trans= 
formed into a fused group by the arrival of a threatsD a promiseo 
The trriwd that stormed the Bastille was produced by such a combination. 
The St.-Antoine district of Paris was threatened because it lay 
in the path of the obvious route for the rumoured advance of the KingVs 
tro6pso "This possibility actualized the threat of the Bastille: it 
was possible that the districts 0 inhabitants would be caught in~the 
crossfire. 11 {?) But tbe Bastille_ also contai'ned_a __ promise that would 
negate the-threat: in fact it contained cannons and rifles With which 
the people might defend-themselves. It would appear that it is only 
--when the-practica=inert presents• not simply the promise. of the con=·-· 
tinued -0 hell of daily-life 0 pc'blit the threat of' personal-e)(tinction 0 
that the fused group is born to resist ito 
By placing the individual at the centre of his philosophical 
project 9 Sartre has captured the depth of meaning that the revolutionary 
act produces for ancl in its participants. Anyone who has ever been 
involved in a meaningful collective project can testify to the trans-
formation in human relationships and in daily experience that such a 
project achieves. The apocalyptic group 9 devoid of all complications 
and hesitations derived from the myriad complexities of daily life 0 can 
transact its business and pursue its goal with a speed, efficiency 9 
willingness 9 and comradeship that makes formal structures and pro-
cedures practically redundanto Such a collective draws on an almost 
electric field of common assumptions and shared norms that allows the 
participants an almost superhuman insight into what other members of 
the eollective wish to communicate and achieve. 
Sartre 0s description of such a group is not dissimilar to what 
Durkheim described as moments of "collective effervescence 91 9 rare 
moments when: 
''••• men are brought into more intimate relations with one 
another 9 when meetings and assemblies are more frequent 9 (B) 
relationships more· solidp and the exchange of ideas more activeo •• 11 . 
The nature of such_groups has been often discussed in the sociology 
of religions and crowd psychologyo But Sartre 9s analysis offers an 
important insight into the process of revolution. 
The fact that such a-profoundly joyous moment can be experienced 0 
and the further fact-that a1large number·of·people 0 particularly those 
i 
involved ~.n politics 0 _nave ~ntimatiohs of such_ moments ·at ·least once~_ 
t 
in their lives 9 is -importanto Political theories can be conatruc~ed to 
suggest that lives 9 not ;moments 0 may be lived this -\ilayo -·- In particularp 
: '-
in the aftermath and complications ofwmry revolution-there exists the 
yearning to return to the moment.of primitive and uncomplicated·solldarityo 
Not a little of this enters into all post-revolutionary oppositional 
movements 0 when the-return to the routine tasks of daily life must 
occasion some feeling of 9 ~etrayal 0 0 a,deep sense of loss. The romantics 11 
from the Levellers to the Trotskyists, are shot through with this nostalgia 0 
whatever the practical merits of their oppositional progr~mmeso 
But the apocalypse cannot be maintained. After the immediate 
object of the fused group has been achievedp threats emerge which are 
capable of undermining the solidarity of the groupo The apOCllilypitic 
group depends upon the existence of an enemy = not a theoretical or 
ideological one, above all not a distant one 7 but one that is real in 
the sense that it is present and immediate as a threat to the physical 
existence of each individualo The removal of this threat, or even its 
distancing 9 is likely to produce some kind of diversification in the 
ptojects of the group members. The assault on the enemy is after all 
a strictly limited task 0 and one likely to occasion few disagreements. 
Such disagreements will be tactical at most 9 and swept away in the 
rushi~g tide of events. What guarantee is there that the group will 
be recreated in the morning, to continue the struggle against the 
enemy? The enemy is both more distant and more abstract. It is a 
ruling class and a social system 7 not a company of troops in the next 
street. 
Thus the fused group of the ~pocalypse is a moment, not a 
conditiono It creates no guarantees of its own permanence. It is 
guaranteed by no ontological·~tatus~ Man has not entered the realm 
of fr~ado~ because no such objective ~ingdom of the ~ree~existso ·~or 
has any human essence been uncovered or liberated; there is no such 
essenceo Freedom exists only.to th~xtent that it is constantly 
recreated _by _the commitment of- each, to the common project. .. The 
return to seriality remains a possibility because only the relation-
ship that humans adopt to their world can banish the practico=inert 
and serialityo 
The moment of apocalypse is thus- followed by the Pledge, as a 
means of preserving the 'surviving' group. Each member must make a 
commitment to maintain the common project in the changed conditions. 
This is a defence against the internal danger brought about precisely 
by the fact that the individuals are now free. They are free to leave 
-· 
the group and change their projecto The pledge is given in a moment 
before such defections become real 0 but when their possibility can 
be envisagedo The possibility is made obvious to all by the fact 
that the enemy is still unvanquishedo Defection~ if it be not treason 0 
is tantamount to treason because the logic of the fused group works in 
reverse~ if all are necessary to prevent the extermination of anyv 
then the defection of any one threatens the ability of all others to 
survive. 
A choice to defect cannot be construed as a real choice: it is a 
choice to return to the practico=inert 9 and is therefore an abandonment 
of freedomo Such individuals must be forced to be free by the common 
groupo The pledge 9 therefot>e 9 is freely taktln 9 and is a demand for 
violence to be used against oneself if one breaks one's word. 
The possibility of one's defection cannot be countered by a 
moral commitmento Tom.orrow one's commitment may have changed and 
ona 0s past be rejectedo The pledge is a recognition of this 
possibility 0 and an agreement by all that such a change would be 
evidencecof the reconquest•of ·the·~ractico-inerto 
i 
All give ·the 
group the right to use-terror -against those who threaten__±ts integrityp 
and by direct implication, -'the right ~:use terror against themselves. 
The terror may not save.the individual---although it will certainly 
save many·who might otherwise defect- but it will-save the group 
and therefore safeguard the conditions of freedom. 
The apocalyptic group does not only fade due to the passage of 
time; it must in fact be consciously displaced by something else. 
The practice-inert is not a place or a time but a relationship between 
man and the worldo It remains 9 and remains until a future which can 
be no more than speculativeo It must be combatted 9 constantly 9 with 
will and reason~ it must be worked ono The insurrectionary crowd 
must become an instrument for effective soci~l change. The Apocalypse 
is a necessary rupture with the practio-inert; it is not a considered 
renegotiation of the relationship between man and the world 9 but a 
practical abolition of one pole of the relationshipo The rupture 
frees the people of all chains = both those that are part of the 
prior social and political arrangements 9 which it is the task of the 
revolution to destroy~ and those that are part of insuperable historical 
conditions 9 or even the biological limits of the human organism itself. 
This group 9 then 9 is by definition utopian and impractical. The 
revolutionary crowd is saturated by a spirit far removed from any 
0materialism 0 o The cry of 9 tout e~t possible' echoes from 1917 to 1968. 
But the ene~y must still be destroyed~ priorities established 9 
resources allocated, fields ploughed. Sartre underlines the transience 
of the apocalypse by insisting on the necessity for such considerationsp 
and by refusing to ignore the dangers of seriality produced by the 
performance of such taskso The group that successfully confronts such 
tasks:-.cannot _be ~the same--group that stormed the Bastille or top$d the 
Czaro The group~must-change 9 and~to.:thie extantit.matters-not-how this 
change is brought about.;-- Sartre argues against- a .common mistake g 
''It is common -fur exampl;;-; in periods of revolution-·~ to 
contrast a centralising, authoritarian. tendency coming :.!1:£!!1 o. -
above 9' that -is to say' _f_rom -th~ oel-ements· .who hold power if-or-- -
the time. being 11 with a--democret-icp -spontaneous tendency--which 
grows from the base oo• I am not denying that politically it 
is of th.~ greatest importance whether organisation is imposed 
from above or produced from below ooo the regime itself will be 
different in-the two cases 9 as well as the relations of 
reciprocity between individualso But the important point 
here is o.. that the 111ode of r'egroupment and organisation is 
not fundamentally different according to whether it depends on 
centralisation from above or spontaneous liquidation of 
seriality within the series itself and on the common organisation 
which followso In short9 this is not and cannot be an issue 
about Blanqui 9 Jaures 9 Lenin 9 Rosa Luxembu~g 9 Stalin or Trotsky 
ooo the type of formal intelligibility and rationality can be 
the same with organisation from above as with organisation from 
belowo" (9) 
It is 9 therefore 9 crucial to understand that however democratic 
or spontaneous is the process of the formalisation of the new 
organisation 9 such a formalisation is inescapable 9 and such a 
formalisation is not without costso 
In this way Sartre distinguishes his analysis of the revolutionary 
process from the assumptions of the tradition of The State and Revolutiono 
The apocalyptic group - expressed in the commune-state ~ cannot but 
disappearo This is due nob to the treachery of leaders 9 the strategy 
of a bureaucracy 0 or the straitjacket of adverse conditionso It is 
inherent in the nature of the revolutionary process 9 because that 
process is itself simply a collective project pursued by human beingso 
Sartre 9 tharefote 0 has ruptured the discourse which has previously 
prevented revolutionaries from grasping the consequences of acting in 
the worldo As we have previously suggested 0 a utopianism that.does 
not accept the existence of humans living and acting in a world of 
time 11 place 9 -and change 9 _ doesJlot have -to pe betrayed to usher in 
authoritarianism~- ~t itself:betrays-the reality of the human actors 0 -
• it is a violation -of- the--most -:f-undamental--fact of being human·9 "the fact _ 
of being in the world. ~ Being in the world compel~ the following changeso 
firstly 0 an internal ~iffe~~ntiation~akes place 9 to allow for 
the performance of different tasks~ --A division of labour emerges 0 -
and the group becomes an organisationo But the;organisation does not 
destroy freedom but creates a new freedom whereby individuals pursue 
the common end indirectly through their particular functionso Sartre 
uses the metaphor of a football team to illustrate the diverse functions 
moving toward a common goal 9 individual talents expressed in a common 
struggleo Thus even groups with a complex division of labour are com= 
patible with freedomo While 9 compared with the apocalyptic group 9 
there is clearly a loss 9 this does not signify a return to senalityo 
But what happens in the case of a disagreement within the group? 
One point of view will be implemented 9 the other defaatedo Those who 
lose will -find themselves in a position where the project ot the group 
has to some degree become outside and against their own projecto The 
common project is no longer their owno Seriality has been reintroducedo 
The dissidents 9 position in the group is now one of passivityo Inertia 
has become part of the collectivityo The condition of the group is 
0degradedo in comparison to the situation where everyone 9s praxis was 
freely expressedo 
Even so 9 all is not losto If the group has decided one way 9 it 
can,in its own sovereignty 9 decide anothero So long as the processes 
involved are reversible 9 the situation is not one of ~erialityo If the 
number of those lost to inertia becomes threatening 9 _ a change can be 
agreed ono 
This remains possible so long as memberscr the group value their 
freedom above all elseo But another solution is possibleo Out of 
the organisation may emerge.t-he-institutiono As conflicts and dis= 
agreements -multiply 9 .cas -they inevitably will 9 - .they"may be oresolved ~bye:'-=-"'"-
the transference of-the~right to-decide between~~em to·a body- or 
leader =-~tanding outside and above--t~, groupo Great.temptations 
exist to opt for this solutioni especially in a situation where the 
group ~s still threatened! by an enemyo Excessive discussion 9 and 
repeated tactical and strategic twists and turns in response to that 
-discussion 9 threatens the efficacy of the struggle against the mortal 
enemyo Individuals are already ~artially serialised 9 and engrossed 
in their particular and vital functionso A transference of the common 
praxis to a leader is a slight step 0 legitimised by urgencyo The 
leader does not seize power 0 he is the willing recipient of a willing 
abandonment of freedom by the members of the groupo The return to 
seriality is complete as the institution estgblishes itself as a 
frozen and irreversible source of authorityo 
Sartre's analysis presents an incisive account of the process 
of revolutionary transformation 9 and then revolutionary degenerationo 
Each step can be illustrated by events and processes from the Russian 
B)(perienceo But the real virtue of Sartre 0s account lies in the 
fact that it does not pretend to be a history of a particular 
revolution 9 and the Russian revolution 9 while present in every line 
of the argument 9 is practically absent from the texto The 
significance of this is simpleo Sartre calls on historical example 
only as illustrative aidso But the analysis is not an account of a 
revolution~ of a particular problem in historiography 9 but of the 
process of revolution itselfp as created by human beingso All such 
revolutions are made by human beings faced with the challenge of 
creating their own freedomo ·All such human beings determine the 
outcome of their actso Revolutions will always take place in 
conditions constrained by-.historical ~i~i ts 9 by· unforeseen -con= 
l tingencies~ by materiaic~nd-cultural~hortages 9 _by_particul~r 
personalities 9 by specific inheritanca~9 -by-problams that demand 
urgent solutiono Without- such 9 - histor,y. would contain no· revolutiohs 9 -
. -...,... 
for ~hat would there-ba_to_revolt against?. Revolution does not 
solve these problemsp rather it~puts individ~als-in ~ position -
where they can choose h~~ they are to be solvedo And the most 
fundamental choice involved is simply this: will we solve them by 
means which reaffirm and recreate our freedom, and make it possible 
for us to unmake the choices we have made if we subsequently decide 
that they were wrong? Or do we solve them by means which recreate 
their dominion over usp which readmit the practice-inert as the 
determining element of our lives? Do we replace cina set of frozen 
! 
relations with another? Do we use our freedom to remain free 0 or 
do we use that freedom to decide to become 9 once againp unfree? 
Revolutio~ is no more and no less than simply the first real choice 
that people have made in their lives. The unfree have been shown 
that they can be free. And if one free decision may be made 9 it 
follows that this freedom can structure every other decision that 
subsequently confronts the individualo And so the gamble is not a 
once for all attempt at liberty 9 but the constant nature of man's 
negotiation of his relationship to the world and his fellows. 
Implications 
Sartre's discussion is ontological 9 not empirical. 
it is not a model of stages derived from an examination of concrete 
history like Comte's three stages or Marx's succession of modes of 
produ'ctiono It is an attemptP by starting from the individual 
conceived with a minimum of assumptions- assumptions~at would have 
to be derived ~ history - of the field of human_actions in history 9 
and the limits of that field. While thia·account-has inevitably ~gnored 9 
.. 
and perhaps inexcusably.simplified 0 th~ complex tegiment of concepts-
and purposes underlying Sartre's argumenti-we can nevertheless make 
some comments about its implications ·fo'r revolution and freedom .in -the · · 
contemporary worldo 
It may well be that circumstances conspire against freedom in 
contemporary revolutions. Rather than revolution providing the ground 
for freedom, a divergence emerges between freedom and the security of 
the revolution. If that i~ the case 9 it is not yet necessarily an 
argument for rejecting revolutiono We may 9 instead 9 consider the 
concept of the 'transitional period 0 o That is 9 the revolution may 
provoke inevitable costs in freedom 9 i.e. the inevitable emergence of 
the institution 9 along the road to the abolition of scarcityo If 
such abolition is 9 howeverp possible 9 we may be prepared to bear the 
costs of the absence of freedom for a periodo It may well be 9 
however 0 that this abundance which will bring the end of scarcity 0 
and therefore the end of the practico=inert 9 and therefore the dis= 
appearance of seriality~ is a chimerao 
Let us first consider the relationship 9 or the tension 0 between 
revolution and freedomo The postulates of contemporary revolutions 
seem to emphasise the possibility of the degradation of the free 
groupo In other words 9 there is clearly a conflict between apocolypse 
and securityo Sartre has already indicated how 9 after the apoc~yptic 
moment 9 the enemy does not disappear 9 but certainly recedeso The 
enemy is no longer the troops that threaten immediate massacre 0 but 
the troops outside the city that threaten massacre some time in the 
future; or the continued existence of the power complex that can raise 
such threatening bodies in the future; of the social system that 
provides the _basis .for such a power··-complex _to contemplate _such an 
act in thi futur~o- -:This distance ~oosesn·the bonds that held-the· 
group in such uncomplic~ted solidarity 9 but it does not lessen the 
need for such a .solidari ty 0 ·:because ~ threat of annihilation remainso 
Thus the need for. the Pl~dge and the Terroro Their importance is 
greatly increased in revolutions of a more modern nature and purpose 
than the french Revolutiono There the defeat of the enemy could be 
-
regarded in terms that were military and the establishment of the new 
regime of freedom in terms- that were constitutionalo The modern 
revolution 9 however 9 must refuse such a simple definition of its 
tasks: it proposes nothing less than the restructuring of an entire 
society and all its institutionso far more than in the past 0 the 
revolutionary act itself is only the beginning 9 not the endg because 
its only success will be when it completes a global conquesto The 
revolution will be complete when it has transported society beyond 
the bord~rs of scarcity and beyond all possible external threato 
Only then is the enemy finally defeatedo 
The Pledge~ then 9 is the contract that will last for decades 9 
and the Terror its permanent instrumento The threat of the external 
world conferred legitimacy on the Stalinist institution through not 
only the wars of intervention 9 but also through the period of the rise 
offascism 9 through the cold war and 0 peaceful coexistence 0 to detente 9 
and again today 9 to cold waro Against this threat all claims of 
freedom are negatedo 
The history of the USSR shows the incompatibility between the 
surviving groupp given coherence by the pledgep and the organisation 
which possesses democratic qualitieso This does not simply refer to 
the rise of Stalin; for the majority of the population, even for the 
majority of the Party 0 the 'institution° was established within 9 at 
most 9 three years of the October insurrectiono In fact the period 
of the Russian Revolution that most clearly-shows the develoj3ment_and 
free interplay of fused gro~~a and organisations came before the 
October insurrection 0 not after ito This was the time when Lenin 0 
........... 
rightly 0 -called Russia. the 0freest country_in ~he world 0 0 and the 
period is saturated.~ith demonstrations 9 political parties 9 ~voluntary 
associations 9 and 0 above all 9 Soviets 9 pursuing their independent 
projects in a common field of totalisationso This could not last 0 
and October is the moment~here the institution begins its creep to 
power 9 not the moment of apocalypse 9 however much it may have been 
reinterpreted as such in the subsequent state ideologyo 
There is little doubt that the move to the Pledge after the 
revolutionary act is necessary~ in fact, the apocalyptic group is 
I 
i 
an embarrassment? it cannot in its simplicity and impracticality 
cope with the practical tasks of mobilization and reconstructiona 
The division of labour is urgently neededo This involves a cost 
to the group 9 a cost to freedom 9 if the apocalyptic group is the 
paradigm of freedomo But it is not a cost to the revolutiono 
Those features characterised by the term 9 organisation 1 ~ however 9 
are problematic from both standpoints~ that of freedom and that of 
the security of the revolutiono The football team is free and 
efficient ao long as every member agrees upon the tactics to be 
pursued; once there is disagreement 9 however 9 the efficacy of the 
group effort obviously sufferso Discussion~ ~isagreement~ 
opposition mean diversion of effort by every member of the group 
~nd withdrawal of effort by those in a defeated minorityo Un-
1 
freedom is ominously close; for when does a minority that has by 
such means distanced itself from the common project become a group 
which has broken the pledge 9 and thus 0 by its own prior agreement 9 
a subject of Terror?' -Herein-may be_dis~erned at le~st some of the 
fateful history of -the USSR -in --the 1920 Ys---and ~30so ---f-or what---is -it -
we read in the rejection;~f the various oppositions by party and 
populaae but an accusation of sebotag~n the form of dissent? And 
what is it that makes those oppositions so impotent 9 -so reluctant to 
pursue an open politica·l 'argumentp but the guilty conscience of those 
who are breaking a promise? 
Clearly 9 the more radical the tasks of the revolution 9 the 
more close to being One and-the same thing are the Pledge and the 
Institutiono In fact the Pledge and the organisation appear 
to be logically and historically incompatibleo The rise of the 
Institution is further aided by the fact that people = even 9 or 
aspecially 9 those that have made a revolution = are often more than 
ready to resign the freedom so recently wono At least part of 
the 0 institutionalization° of the USSR derived from the fact that 
the population was exhausted by the battle for freedom and survival 
through almost ten years of war and revolutiono Trotsky 0 s advocacy 
of 0 permanent revolution° may have been a fatal misnomer for that 
which he actually intended~ but in public discourse it summed up 
for the population all that they had been through and from which 
they now wanted a respiteo Berger has deftly summed up the con~ 
sequences of the ideal of 'full participation° in every decision 
affecting one 9 s life _as "a nightmare comparable to unending 
sleeplessnesso 11 (lD) At some point after the revolutionary festival 
the average individual retreats from constant participation to a 
necessary quietudeo And the institution awaitso 
But if the rule of the institution for a period of history is 
the price of the abolition of the roots of alienation scarcity 
it may be a price which societies are prepared to payo But the 
problem here is that for Sartra to assume that it is possible to 
abolish scarcity, and for him to--further assume . that ~this wil-l ·entail . -
the final resolution of ~he problems of being 9 makes little sense in 
terms-of the rest of his system6 In ~ct·9 such assumptions· lead to-
a complete subve~sion of his revolutionary-phenomenology and a return 
to an orthodox Marxismo This is what Aronson, for example 9 has 
attemptedo 
If scarcity is an exhaustive definition of the source of human 
suffering, it is possible to ~efine the·condiiions for the end of 
such sufferingo The scarcity that has conditioned life under all 
social formations so far will be negated by the achievement of 
material abundance that a socialist revolution will bringo If 
scarcity is taken as the a priori that gives rise to the existence of 
multipleu diverseu and conflicting individual'projectsu abundance 
will remove the root of divisions between human individuals. This 
interpretation sees the diffusion of projects as merely the con= 
sequences of the "war af all against all" that arises due to the 
threat of the other to consume that which the individual heeds in 
order to survive 0 The abolition of material scarcity may allow 
the emergence of some common human essence that will signify a 
permanent commonality of projects. 
To establish this possibility beyond doubtu however 9 Aronson 
insists on a reinterpretation of Sartre 0 s scarcity. He construes 
scarcity as a result of a historical human choice: 
"••• Sartre fails to explore the historical choice 
which makes there be scarcity in the first place." (ll) 
He cites the work of Sahlins on hunter-gatherers societies to 
suggest that the original human state was that of collectivities of 
humans who lived~ 
."••• emid·peace--end leisure;- amip a plenty--based (l2 ) upon.· a systematic minimization -of their J1eedso ri · 
At soma point in the life of societies, what amounts to a 
decision 0 - a "historical act" 9 is taken to create new needs 9 which · 
results in the need~~ labour·to overcome what~s now experi~nced 
as scarcityo 
This 9 of course 9 also coincides with the creation of classes, 
inequality, and the struggle over the surplus - in other words the 
beginning of the violence of history. The practico=inert 
immediately becomes a less ominous concept, easily subsumed under 
the traditional Marxian strategies~ 
11 ooo if workers controlled the labour process itself 0 
if they worked fewer hours and freely.exchanged functions 9 
if they were assured of a secure level of subsistence and 
co=opetated in socially meaningful work = then at some 
point the grim rule of necessity might be brought to an 
end 9 and the practico=inert subject decisively to human 
controlon (13) 
This is a familiar roadp and it can lead to only one destinationo 
Poster has expressed his disappointment at the way in which Sartrevs 
radical reconstruction of social theory appears to produce such a 
return to classical Marxism: 
"Labour and the workplace are reaffirmed as the vortex 
of historical time and the only form of domination that is 
included in the final totalisation is that of exploited 
wage labour ooo By reaffirming the primacy of labour and 
the mode of production 9 Sartre has missed the chance to 
transcend the limits of traditional Marxism so as to account 
for forms of-domination that play a significant role in 
contemporary radical thought. 11 ( 14) . 
If Sartre himself does not even need the corrections of an 
Aronson to return to the traditional Marxian political strategies 9 
something appears to have slipped in the theory. It may be that 
this is doe to the incompatibility· of Sartre 1s original project 
with -:the discoveries he~. has presented~i·n the· course-of attempting 
it.. But perhaps it would be possibl~to describe Sartre 9s conclusions 
about political strategies- as descriptive rather than normativeo -
As Poster himself elsewhere -points out ( 15 ) the c-i.~ims made for the 
power of Marxism to achieve the end of historyp the final totalisation 0 
are conditional. They are-conditional upon concrete history and upon 
existential choiceo 
The title of the 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' defines the 
book as an attempt to establish the possibilities and limits of this 
form of thoughto It is an attempt to define what sort of theoretical 
system is necessary if the assumption that history 1 is ultimately 
f 
intelligible is to be verifiedo For this purpose the prospect of a 
single totalisation is necessary 9 to achieve a resolution and 
congruence of previously conflicting or overlapping partial 
totalisations. It is thus necessary to conceive of a 0 totaliser 0 9 
an agency which through its praxis is capable of encompassing the 
abolition of the practico=inert and the final defeat of serialityo 
It is not possible to argue with the conclusion that Sartre reachesg 
if history is to be intelligible 9 then it will be onli through the 
agency of the only possible candidate for the role of totaliser 9 the 
working class. There is no escape from this conclusion 9 and Poster's 
regret that the Criti~ue does not allow alternative paths to 
emancipation - those of women 9 or children 9 or national minorities 9 
is simply not relevant to Sartre's projecto The totaliser must be 
the working class 9 because it is impossible to replace the 'subject~ 
object identical 9 0 as described by Lukacs,with any other candidate for 
the role of 0 universal class 0 o 
Thus the project of intelligibility is placed in doubt: firstly 
because th~ working class has not played the role of t6tali~er 9 ~nd 
gives less-and less eviqence 9 as history proceeds - in its increasing 
fragmentation and incoherence of dis+.1laying such a capabilityo 
Secondly 0 the nominati~ri·of -the working class ~o the role of totaliser 
carries with it all the philosophically unacceptable and sociologically 
inadequate implications that permeated Lukacs' original unwieldy conceptiono 
But the return of Sartre 9 s project to this too-familiar terminus 
does not render the whole ~nterprise fdtile. What Sartre has done at 
every point in the theory is to distinguish the assumptions that must 
be made if the project of dialectical reason is to be consumatedo But 
his procedure has still left open the possibility of choosing to follow 
the logic of the systemp or to dissent from it where its consequences 
become unacceptable. It may be possible to 'prevent Sartre 1 s theory 
from leading to its own dissolutiono For this 0 it is necessary to 
resist the temptation to embrace an assumption of the availability 
of a totalised historyo 
Thus it is entirely possible to approach Sartre's theory by 
assessing his categories 9 the coherence of his system 9 its legitimacy 
within the Marxian or radical tradition. All this can be done with 
the objective of establishing more securely the prospect of a successful 
outcome to the enterprise: the end of history in the final totalisation. 
Such approaches would 9 however 0 evacuate Sartre's efforts of any value 
and significance. The importance of his system lies in its ability to 
grasp the real world, not in the extent to which it satisfies demands 
for a perfectly coherent theoretical and strategic system. It is 
valuable to the extent that it manages to say something about our 
present condition that is signally different and more appealing than 
any other representations of the world that might be offered for our 
consideration. In other words a more valid criterion of-assessment 
would be: as a commentary on the histbry -bf the twentiet~'century 9 
does it offer an accoun~ which 0 by its relevance, demands our 
attention? It is my contention that~he sociology of groups, the 
dialectic -of revolution and fre-edom that it presents does precisely this. 
If we work-back, so_ to speak, from this achievement we can 
distinguish the dichotomies and anti~amies of Sartre's system 0 
which tnemselves express the agonising relationship between revolution 
and freedoms Sartre does-nut map an unambiguous path to the final 
totalisation; he demonstrates the conflicts, contradictions 0 and 
assumptions that constitute such a patho If he himself then chooses 
that path, that is his existential choice. But what he refuses is a 
theoretical 'soft option 9 that neatly erases the anguish of such a 
choiCBo This is expressed in his much~criticised acceptance of 
violence as inherent in revolutiono What he refuses is the attempt 
of those like Aronson who would ~issolve the antinomies and return 
us to a simple and comforting world of certaintiesg of limited 
problems and neat answerso 
Aronson 9 who wishes to enforce the reconciliation of Sartre 
with classical Marxism 9 engages in no significant discussion of the 
theory of groups and the evolution from fused group to institutiono 
Of this he offers merely a descriptive accounto The problems 
raised by this discussion do not appear to him as real problems at 
allo This is the consequence of his redefinition of scarcityo 
That reinterpreation was clearly intended to defend the possibility 
of socialism and the transcendence of alienation 9 and he appears to 
refuse any suggestion that t~e concept of socialism itself might 
have been problematised by the history of the twentieth centuryo 
Sartre 0s project in fact resists Aronson's optimistic 
interpretationo By considering their ori~in and their' inherent 
uncertainties P ~-we can detect some incompatibility between the· -_:. 
assumptions embodied in the original concepts (.of scar~ity 9 the 
practico-inert 9 the project and the totality) and the legitimation 
"-. 
of the traditional Marxian-centrality of the economicp ~and the 
process of economic~nevelopment as the ro~d -to freedomo Even on 
the level of the economist interpretation of scarcity 9 Sartre lacked 
such optimism 9 and affirmed thatg 
"ooo th1~ scarcity is a fundamental determination of 
man: as is well known, the socialisation of production 
does not put an end to it 9 except possibly through a long (l6 dialectical process of which we cannot yet know the outcomeo" ) 
Thus it may only be possible to enter a domain of relatively 
less scarcity 9 and such domains may already existo Poster points 
out that after 1968 Sartre himself 11 accepted 'that elementary 0 material 
needs were by and large satisfied 11 in advanced capitalism 9 
effectively dissociating his philosophy of revolution from 
reductionist versions of 1 scarcity 1 o (l?) C\~ Thus a distinction~be made 
between what could be said one hundred years ago and what may be 
said today~ empiric2l history has deprived socialis~the certainty 
of its claim to solve the problem of scarcity 9 and has provided 
capitalism with some mitigation to the accusation that it provides 
for the majority of its populations a situation of permanent scarcity. 
For Sartre 0 the unambiguous virtue of socialist revolution lies 
in its possibility of reconciling scarcity and needs in terms of the 
basic facts of hunger and survival. It is no accident that his 
latter-day political concerns were predominantly connected with the 
colonial revolution. He reminds us that: 
"The fact is that after thousands of years of history (lB) 
three-quarters of the world 1 s population are undernourished. 11 
The establishment o~-a socialist regime may lead tQ_the 
elimination of this .form of scarcity (or at least this is assumed·· 
to be the case 0 although even yet it must remain as an assumption and 
an assertion 9 not a proven fact of ex~rience)o Yet this is a very 
primitive formulation·of .the concept of~· Standing beyond this 
domain of biological need 9 there is a whole domain of needs that 
historically have d~veloped once the biological is satisfied, The 
Soviet Union is impelled to consider the development of consumer goods 
industries in order to mae t some of the.se 1 needs' that appear to arise 
inexorably once 1 biological0 needs are satisfied. These may be 
attributed to the delayed emergence of the 'new man 1 under socialism9 
to remnants of unreconstructed culture 9 even to the penetration of 
western ideology. However 9 one may believe that it is absurd and 
brutalising to suggest that every need beyond the biological is 
unnecessary and degenerateg such a view would dismiss Beethoven°s 
Symphonies along with motor cars 9 books along with central heatingo 
To select one and reject the other implies the 0dictatorship over 
0 
needsu that some theorists have suggested(lg) in a move that implies 
a return to the centralised and authoritarian plan so familiar from 
contemporary historyo For those societies 9 then 9 that have passed 
beyond Aronson 9s very basic situation of scarcity 9 the problem of 
continuing and developing needs remainsg and this very problem will 
confront those post-revolutionary societies that have fulfilled this 
basic task. 
Thus, in the absence of the establishment of a 9dictatorship 
over needs 9 9 the problem of a disparity between needs and resources 
remains even on the economic level 9 however far we may envisage the 
process of economic development and technological control proceeding. 
Further 9 the modern awareness of the finitude of pla~etary resources 
I 
may restore an appreciation-of the natural components-nf scarcity 9 
I 
above and beyond those social and historirial components which may b~ 
deemed to be subject to~uman interventiono What this 
dictates,-- thereforep "is not the necessity to achieve or enter some - -
I 
domain wherein~~~ problem of scarcity will be graduall~-eliminated~ 
rather, the necessity to construct processes of discussion and 
determination that can provide a democratic means to effect the 
allocation of finite resources between conflicting needs. 
But a concept of 9 nedd 1 that is reduced to the biological is 
absurd; one that is only reduced to the 'material 9 is exceptionally 
dubiouso It is probably just as dubious to attempt to define human 
need in any positive and technical sense at all. While it is 
possible to view the development of civilisation as the unnecessary 
-2JR. 
invention of ever more infinite and redundant needsP it is also 
possible to reject such an attitude for its presumptiono Given 
the existence of those human faculties about which we know, and the 
possible existence of some such about which we have as yet no 
knowledge 9 it is exceedingly dangerous to predict in advance - or 
even at some past point in history 9 as Aronson does = a break point 
where humanity moves from a situation of 1 genuine 0 needs to ones that 
may be condemned as 0artificial 0 o Artificiality is the nature of 
human existence 9 and concepts of a golden age prior to such a situation 
cannot be seriously entertainedo The definition of scarcity given in 
the glossary of the Eritique seems to provide the necessary open~ 
endedness to take account of this: the contingent impossib~lity of 
satisfying all the needs of an ensembleo( 2D) 
Thus 9 to bring Sartre 8 s insights back to life again it is 
necessary to reject the ~arxian concept of need that Aronson attempts 
to reintroduce. Sartre's concept does not derive from ~arxism~ 
rather it is a reinterpretation~f the concept of lack developed in 
his pre-Marxist _workso -There 9 'lack -is 
. . (21). 
an 'ontolog~cal-~r1vation 9 . 9 
the very ~tructure of the human being. It expresses the ultimate 
disparity between the human subject 8.Q9 the world of facticity 11 -and 
the helpless dominion Df-the former by the latter. In the Marxian 
version 9 lack is replaced by :need ·and "the resistance of-the world to---
man is now defined in terms of scarcity. 11 ( 22 ) 
Sartre 1 s discussion groups, and his tragic awareness of the 
transience of situations of·perfection~as summed up in the apocoJ.yptic 
group is hardly compatible with a scarcity defined in terms of 
economics 9 of the material needs for biological survival. It makes 
more sense to regard the situation of scarcity as a subset of a more 
profound human condition 9 his already given ontological lacko The 
.. 
problem of scarcity may well be the terrain for much of what has been 
brutal and regrettable in human history 9 and consequently may define 
the site wherein human action may minimise these consequences once= 
for-allo This is the site of political action 9 where human actions 
combined with developing technology may reduce the problem of material 
scarcity to nothing more than the inevitable contingency that follows 
from living in a world that is ultimately naturalo But this is not to 
enter the kingdom of the blessed. Jameson stresses that~ 
"It is here thnt the continuity of the Sartre of 'Being 
and Nothingness' and the Sartre of the critique is most 
striking 9 and I insist on the point because it is crucial and 
because most studies of the Critique gloss over ito Just as 
the being of the individual is in reality a lack of being 9 an 
inability to be 9 to reach some ultimate and definitive stability 
and ontological plenitude 9 so also the group is characterised 
not as a substance or a hyperorganism 9 but as a set of individuals 
trying in vain to become a substance 9 straining toward some 11 ( 23 ) 
ultimate hyper-organic status which they can never attaino 
Thus we may interpret Sartre in a less categoric manner than might 
appear necessary on~e surface of the theoryo A more considered picture 
can emergeo It would seem that the condition of scarcity is just one 
expression of man's condition: it is the expression that is 9 by and 
large 9 ~ history and available to historical change. Such historical 
change will doubtless remove sources of alienation, as it will remove 
sources of hunger. This is the argument, under some circumstances, for 
revolution. But revolution does not bring absolute abundance and 
material security, and it further does not bring the end of alienation 
as it cannot resolve those aspects of alienation that are locked in the 
condition of being humans in timeo 
Thus 9 post-revolutionary life does not consist of a permanent 
end to alienation through a permanent common project: 
01 there is no synthetic unity of the multiplicity 
of totalisations 9 in the sense of a hypersynthesis which 
would become 9 in transcendence 9 a synthesis of syntheses o 11 ( 
24 ) 
Si~ilarly 9 pre-revolutionary life may not be the permanent hell 
of s~rial confrontation with every Othero 
The extreme pessimism surrounding the consequences of scarcity 
is subject to modification in the discussion on groupso Sartre in 
fact avoids an extreme and simplistic dichotomy which would place humans 
under pre-revolutionary conditions in a situation of total mutua~ 
hostility 9 held together only by the brute demands of survival 9 yet 
permeated with a cultural loathing and fear of one for each Other; 
with the post-revolutionary situation signifying a total reversal of 
such a state of affairso It is much more a matter of degreeo A 
group at any one time is of a distinct type: either a fused group 9 
an organisationu series9 etco But such groups are both inserted in 
temporality and located within an assembly of many groupso Each 
group may shift between seriality and other forms over time; each 
group is involved with ~ther groups which will be of a different form 
at the time 0 Thus;it is diffic~lt to conceive of an ~ntity as large 
as a -nation as a grou~in Sartre's terms; it consists of a large 
number of groups 9 and in as much =as 'i-tself -is a group is _characterised 
by a permanent and shifting ---reconsti-tution of -its conet_btuent partso 
11 The important thing 9 therefore 9 is to find out how 
far the multiplicity of individual syntheses can 9 as such 9 be ( 2S) the basis for a community of objectives and actionso 11 
Individual totalisations, therefore 9 contain the possibility of 9 
if not being identical to 9 at least overlapping the totalisations of 
others, just as much as they contain the possibility of conflictingo 
Otherwise 9 surely 9 it would not be possible to speak of people as 
being part of a common culture 9 and this concept of culture is necessary 
if we are not to be forced to reject Sartre 0s appro8ch out of hand~ 
a society based only upon the dictates of survival would be chaotic 
indeed 9 and life would be 0 nasty 11 brutish and short 0 • 
There is consequently 0 a danger in Sartre 0 s theory of groups~ 
the danger is th~ the apoc~yptic group may be read as the stnte most 
earnestly to be desired 0 and therefore to be preserved at all costs. 
There is a danger 9 in Jameson's words( 26 ) of a 'mystique of apocolypse 0 • 
But 9 to this 11 Sartre might reply: "There always was". If Sartre has 
spelled out to us the seductive qualities of the apocalyptic s.tate 9 he 
cannot automatically be condemned as its high priest. For he has also 
told us of its transcience 9 its impossibility as an ~bjective 9 rather 
than a moment. Sartre is in fact identifying and forcing the reader 
to recognise the danger that already exists in reality 9 and has already 
been witnessed in history itself. The danger is that people will be 
impelled to preserve what can only be a transient condition 9 and this 
is what gives the Pledge and the Terror their significance: as 
attempts to preserve the ephemeral. Thus Merleau-Ponty was wrong to 
accuse Sartre of 0 ultra-bolshevism 0 ( 2J) for his- account -Of--the .terror. 
in the revolutionary process. Sartre has no more-than analysed history-
... 
and stated facts: - he has justified nothing. 
' Thus we have a disquietingly honest account of the real limits 
of politics. · :Political -action ~annat satisfy the ui timate -ontological 
lack of the individual 9 and the experience of the apocalyptic group is 
dangerous inasmuch as it suggests that politics can do precisely that. 
Those who object to Sartre)s honest statement of this reality objecting: 
"••• in reality to time itself. For to say that consciousness 
of human life is a lack of being 9 an emptiness striving towards 
stasis and plenitude 9 toward being itself 9 is only in effect 
to give a definition of time. Thus Sartre 0 s description of 
the failure of group action 9 like that of the failure of the 
individual human relationships 9 is to be understood in 
ontological rather than empirical terms. When Sartre says in 
8 8eiog and Nothingness 0 that the project to mve is an ontological 
failure 9 this means neither that there ~s 0 really 0 no such 
thing as lovep as a lived experienceD nor that love cannot 
last 9 but merely that love as such never succeeds in 
fulfilling the ontological function it sets for itself 9 
namely to bring about some ultimate plenitudeg or in other 
words 9 to achieve the very end of time itself. On the 
level of groups 9 therefore 9 the doctrine of ontological 
failure lays emphasis on the passage of time 9 on constant 
change 9 both in group and in situation 9 and on the succession 
of the generations. As in 9 8eing and Nothingness 9 it has what 
is essentially an ethical function~ it aims at dispelling the 
illusions of an ethic of being 9 and at reconciling us to our 
life in time. 11 (28) 
The 9 myth of the apocolypse 9 may be the greatest specifically 
political threat of our age. In the light of Sartre 9s elucidation 
of the difficulty of maintaining hold of freedom, of the dangers of 
' placing one's freedom irrevocably in the hands of othersp we may wish 
to avoid the pursuit of such absolute freedom. Sartre has shown that 
the connection between revolution and freedom is tenuous 9 and possibly 
negative. He has shown that the fundamental ontological privation of 
being is not accessible to solution by the act of political revolution. 
He has shown the Terror as the fury that is visited upon a society that 
is forced to confront thisi a terror that~is invited by the very act of 
the w pledge 1 necessary -to maintain the original ~puri ty-of~-the ----~~ 
revolutionary freedom. At last,. perhaps 11 ~~we are, -therefore, able.~to 
consider the question of revolution as a choice, fully informed· of ~its 
·-.__ 
nature ~nd consequences, o~~its benefits and losses. 
The State and Revolutioni~to return t~~our starting point, is ~the 
constitutional theory of the attempt to ontologise the apocalypse. 
In other wordsj it describes the appropriate institutional 
arrangements for a group which has achieved totalisation: a single 
common project in the world 9 where the possibility of differences 
within the group does not ariseo Lenin 9 s measures for the control 
of bureaucracy, and for the extension of democracy 0 as argued in 
Chapter- 2w are strikingly appropriate for the revolutionary group at 
the moment of apocalypseo Such a group has 'no need for bureaucracy 0 
indeed the concept of bureaucracy is an absurd irrelevancy to such a 
groupo This is because such a group is at the hour of its existence 
fulfilling tasks and solving problems in such a way that the 
grounds for a bureaucratic structure are not invoked~ in other words 0 
there is a minimal divi~ion of labour 9 and that which is necessary is 
highly flexible ~ no~one is irreplaceableo Similarly 9 such a group 
has no need to confront and consider the question of democratic forms 9 
because the simplicity and urgency of the tasks confronting the 
collective establish a necessarily narrow area of discussion and dis~ 
agreemente This will be an area of technical issues, about how best 
to achieve a commonly agreed short-term objectivep the defence of the 
people and the securing of powero Those who disagree with 'that aim 9 ioeo 
who adhere to a difference in values 9 rather than techniques 9 are by 
definition not part of the groupo They constitute a different 7 and 
probably mortally hostile 9 ensemble of individuals and the differences 
between two such groups, obviously 7 are hardly-the grovnd~-for 
discussion -and debateo -- Here ,;--rat;her 9 we are in the domain--of_ force 
and Yiolenceo 
But Sartre 9 s -sociology has dema(l_strated. that .bureaucracy -and 
democracy do become matters -of-~substance wi-thin-a relatively ·brief 
period of time 9 wherein the group must reconstitute itself to deal 
with new taskso These tasks 7 it will be remembered are the need to 
tackle diverse questions of economic and social reconstruction and 
transformationp and the need to accommodate the development of 
differences between members of the group over substantive issues 
that embrace more than technical problemso The first task produces 
the institutions of a bureaucracyp the second the institutions of a 
democracy a 
Lenin's whole thesisp therefore 0 is startlingly irrelevant to 
the question of The State and Revolutiono His measures for the 
abolition ~f bureaucracy and the extension of democracy are irrelevant 
tothe revolutionary moment 9 inasmuch as these are the natural 9 in~ 
evitable 9 components of such a memento And his measures are 
similarly irrelevant to the period that succeeds the revolutionary 
moment 9 inasmuch as they are simply non-functional, they cannot be 
applied successfully to a situation whose sociological constitution 
is fundamentally different from that of the revolutionary memento 
Regret at the inevitability of such a 0degrading 8 of the initial 
freedom is pointless; regret is only appropriate to the extent that 
attempts were made to institut~onalise the assumptions of the apocalyptic 
groupo For such attemptsg as I have tried to show 9 themselves negate 
the possibility of establishing securely the freedom and human dignity 
that is possibleo That which is possible may indeed be a pale shadow 
of the moment of the apocolypse 9 but it is a possibility of something 
real. 
We can 9 therefore 9 perhaps ~e~in to understand the depth-of -th~ 
seductiveness of The--State and Revolution: it speaks to the co~ 
sciousness of lack 9 and translates it ~to a -consciousness of ~=- __ 
that is 9 it promises an end to-the fundamental-anguish of being, that 
of being in timBo It achie~es this by promising an end to time itselfo 
And 9 so 9 we can see what must followo The termination of time is only 
possible if it coincides with the end of human beings 9 with the end of 
the time~laden universe of change. I have said that Leninls 
problematic ensured that politics is an ontological impossibility. Yet 
politics is a product of living in time: of changing circumstances and 
changing interpretations of what it is to liveo In those states that 
have been 9 and may yet be 9 built on Lenin's model it is assumed that 
'i 
politics is abolished as a result of the abolition of time. In 
fact 9 the abolition of time is briefly 9 and ludicrously 9 and 
tragically 9 secured by the abolition of politics. 
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